159年前 —— 1860年10月 英法联军进入圆明园 在园内大清中央

领导核心咸丰同志密室里 发现一批绝密档案 （ 由 Sir Thomas 

Francis Wade 韦德先生译成英文 ） 字里行间竟然闪动着刘总理

（副，排行老四）习主席（这位爷）博大精深智慧的 耀 眼 光 芒

作者：1860年中英第二次战争中 英军陆军司令詹姆斯·霍普·格兰特 James Hope  

          Grant 参谋部 后勤主管 deputy-assistant quartermaster-general 

          时年27岁中校 Lieutenant colonel 第一代子爵 嘉内德·约瑟夫·沃尔斯利 

          Garnet Joseph Wolseley, 1st Viscount Wolseley；1894年5月26日，

          晋升为陆军元帅 Field Marshal

升级版谷歌同学一秒钟完工译文：

圆明园发现中国官方文献概述。莫里森先生收集的一些文件

领事处是最有趣的，并给了一个

公正洞察中国政策的秘密目的，

以及进行公务的方法。从其中一些出现，那

Kweiliang九月与我们的谈判是

只是为了获得时间，而且从来没有打算最终安排事情。如果我们证明顽固

在我们超越天津的意图中，它有了

一直都在安排尝试战争的机会

再次。为了最大限度地做到这一点，谈判被分拆出来，以便进行军事行动

如果可能的话，可能会延长到寒冷的天气，

在他们放置的宽容之后

像沙皇尼古拉斯那样依赖他们的保护

据报道，他们为塞巴斯托波尔的防卫工作做了贡献。

一些被捕获的论文非常聪明，而且

表现出非凡的外交能力。

不顾真理，不受任何罚款

人性的感情，但随时准备牺牲自己的无辜代理人的权宜之计

那一刻，他们的政治制度是非常重要的

for all the complex situations of diplomacy. The coldblooded rules for government enunciated in " The

Prince," appear to be well understood in China. His

Celestial Majesty can never do wrong ; not because

his actions are always guided by a council responsible

to the people, but that in the event of any failure on

the part of a public servant deputed for any special

duty, even though such may have arisen from a strict adherence to his orders, all responsibility is cast upon

the unsuccessful agent, who is publicly degraded, to impress the people with an idea that the whole con- duct of the affair had been initiated by him. Gratitude

for faithful services is never permitted to interfere with

the exigencies of the moment. Expediency to its most

extended limit is the one great law regulating the

official dealings of his Majesty, both with his own

people and foreigners. So in one of these papers we

find the draft of an Imperial decree directing Kweiliang to be degraded as soon as the mock negotiations,

in which he was engaged at Tien-tsin, came to an end.

It was no doubt expected that the publication of that

order would lead us to believe that he alone was to blame for the non-arrangement of affairs, and incline us to lend a more willing ear —as we subsequently did —to the proposals made by his successor. Success

covers all errors in most governments ; but in China we

find one of the highest and most faithful public ser- vants deprived of rank and station for carrying out

accurately the instructions he had received, in order to give to mock negotiations the semblance of reality. A

long paper, written with the vermilion pencil of royalty,

upon the subject of our demands, gives a fair outline

of the various degrees of importance attached by

Chinese politicians to each of the specific concessions

we had asked for. Of all others, they considered the march of troops

into Pekin as the most highly objectionable, and the

residence of an ambassador there as next in importance, both equally to be avoided. The paper went on

to say,—"If conciliation is once negotiated, why do they

want to bring soldiers to Pekin with their ambassadors?

Their doing so would seem that they had some hidden

purpose, which, when their troops were within Pekin,

it would be as impossible to concede as it would then

be to fight."—" Were we to assent, would there be any more word of that most important of all places, the

capital?" On the subject of war expenses, his Majesty

said, " Setting aside the impossibility of paying the two

millions of taels by the time named, it is utterly out of

the question to pay at all."—" From of old, it has been

held a disgrace to make treaties under your city walls,

and if one is again to tender gifts, whilst one's face is ashamed, will China be thought still to have a man ? " This head was to be disposed of by applying to us

for monied indemnification for the expenses which the war had entailed upon the Imperial Government.

As to the admission of Mr. Parkes within Pekin, his

Majesty considered that if once conceded, that gentleman, " idly yelping and frantically barking, is certain

to bring forward other conditions," and might not be

subsequently got rid of easily.

The memorial of Sang-ko-lin-sin, dated the 26th

August, two days after the fall of the Takoo forts,

addressed to the Emperor, was one, which, from many

other papers found and translated by Mr. Wade, seems

to have created great sensation amongst all the Imperial

ministers, and to have been condemned most strongly

by every official whom we know to have written to

his Majesty regarding it. The subject of the memorial was advising Hien-fung to start on a hunting tour ; the reasons he urges for the necessity of such a move

seem so inconclusive and so thoroughly untenable before

the great weight of argument brought to bear against

them, that the advice appears interested, and carries

with it a certain amount of what might be intended

treachery. So unanimous are all the civil ministers

in their condemnation of such a proceeding, that it would almost seem that they suspected some ulterior

motives on Sang-ko-lin-sin's part. From all previously

found documents emanating from his pen, and from his

general reputation, there cannot be any doubt regarding his mental ability and ordinarily sound views upon

military matters and public business in general. He

made a great mistake certainly in not fortifying Pehtang as strongly as he had fortified Takoo, but this to a certain extent may have arisen from want of men

and means ; but in the paper which he drew up

regarding the general defences of the coast-line, and

the chances of their being successfully attacked by

the barbarians — to which I have previously referred —his views were most able, and the opinions therein

set forth of the certainty of our complete overthrow

and failure, were based most fairly upon military

grounds, and would have been given under similar

circumstances by any man who was ignorant of our

superiority in guns and discipline.

Knowing the great strength of his position, he was naturally confident of victory. He had a very

large force of cavalry —an arm which he fancied it to be impossible we should be furnished with; he had

numbers of guns in position, to which, in the general

Chinese ignorance regarding field artillery, he thought

we should be able to reply only with small arms. With such data before him, surely it is not surprising

that he should be confident of success! Indeed, so powerful and ample must his resources have appeared

to him, that it was no wonder he regarded our being

able to effect a landing at Peh-tang as rather a matter

of indifference, so sure and certain must our final annihilation have seemed to be. The man who could argue

as clearly and with such soundness of logic, was not

likely to be blind to the insurmountable objections to the proposal which, upon the fall of the forts, he urged

so pressingly upon his Imperial master : for the Emperor to leave his capital at such a critical moment,

and fly away across the frontier of China Proper, was

as objectionable and faulty in a political point of view,

as, regarded in a military light, it was untenable. It afforded the Chinese Commander-in-Chief no advantage

whatever as to position, whilst, morally, it must have

had a most prejudicial effect upon the minds of his

Tartar soldiers. The arguments which he urges in

favour of such a step were, that its adoption would

facilitate measures being taken for attacking and destroying the barbarians ; that it would place him at

liberty to choose his own time and place of attack, to advance or retire as events occurred ; that, should any

fighting take place near Tung-chow, the minds of the

people in Pekin would be greatly agitated, and that,

in the event of a reverse, the numerous merchants

there would take to flight. Amidst such a commotion, should the courage of the soldiers fail, the

Emperor's person would not be safe ; and his Majesty's presence in the capital at such a moment

might not only impede the execution of the necessary

defensive arrangements, but even fill with alarm the

Celestial miiid itself. Of his ultimate success he was

still confident ; he had made all the necessary dis- positions of his troops along the road from Tien-tsin

to Tung-chow ; and he hoped, by sweeping from

off the earth the vile brood, to redeem his previous

shortcomings. The forts, he said, he had lost from

the unforeseen explosion of the powder magazines in

them, not from any want of energy in their defence.

In conclusion, he prays that his Majesty may order the

princes of the Six Leagues to repair with their most

efficient troops at once to Pekin.

So peculiar did he evidently consider the advice he was tendering, that he said " he did not venture to forward his memorial by the regular express," but

sent it sealed by the hands of a special messenger, to be delivered in person to his Majesty.

Surely there is much in this letter which will strike even the most superficial reader as suspicious. The

lameness of the arguments urged in favour of the

hunting tour being only equalled by the cleverness

with which he avails himself of the known weakness

and cowardice of his master, to hint in such a marked

manner at the personal danger to which his Majesty

will be exposed, should lie turn a deaf ear to the

advice of " his slave." Unless such was the case, why not send it through

the usual channel of communication ? Why the se- cresy of sending it sealed by a confidential messenger,

to be delivered into the Emperor's own hands ? No man appreciated more the importance attached

by every one in China to the possession of Pekin, than

Sang-ko-lin-sin himself. He must have been aware

that, if once we took it, all China would consider the war over, and hail us as victors ; that, even at the last moment of our assaulting the place (so vast was its circumference, and so numerically weak were we), we

could never block up all the exits from it, and thus

prevent the Emperor's escape ; that nothing would

serve to establish public confidence, or to strengthen

the hearts of its defenders, more than the presence of

the father of his people on the spot. His wished-for

freedom of action was all a myth, as was proved by

his subsequent conduct, when twice he gave us battle

upon the road to Pekin. He was too able a general

not to be aware that if he had fought us twenty

times, instead of twice, it must each time have been on that line, or else at the capital itself. Even granting that his knowledge of war pointed out to him

the advantages which, in a military point of view, he

might gain by forsaking the city and taking up a menacing position upon our line of communications,

as Koutousof did at Moscow, still he must have felt that, politically, such a policy would be fatal to the

cause. China and Russia are totally different countries; nor was the ancient capital of the latter country, like

Pekin, the seat of general government. The loss of

Madrid or Paris has never been considered to involve

the conquest of the country. The possession of European capitals by invaders has never been looked upon

by the population of those countries as the outward

emblem and unanswerable proof of complete conquest,

whilst to every Chinaman the capture of Pekin by any

foreigner would be the most convincing of all other

proofs that the Mantchoo dynasty had ceased to reign.

Under such circumstances the grand struggle must

always have taken place in or about Pekin; his wishedfor " freedom of action " was simply a military phrase

meaning nothing. His insight into human nature was

great, and he seemed to possess a clear idea of the

working of Hien-fung's dastardly mind, when he appealed to his sense of personal risk. This latter consideration seems to have had far greater weight with

him than all the serious objections to his departure

which were raised by every minister to whom at this distressing juncture he appealed for advice. Every

argument which would have had weight with any

ruler but the basest of cowards, was brought forward

by the various ministers of state, who, also appreciating

the power which fear had upon their sovereign's mind,

followed in the summing up of their memorials Sangko-lin-sin's example, and urged in their turn the dangers

to which his Majesty would be exposed personally by

flying from his capital and seeking refuge in Jeho.

No doubt they exaggerated those dangers in order

to strike the greater terror into their pusillanimous

ruler. They dilated upon the vast numbers of robbers,

infesting not only the neighbourhood of Jeho but t he

road to it, where the police could not be expected to be perfect, when such turmoil was rife everywhere

else. They urged that, owing to the falling off in the

yielding of the mines, the people had become so impoverished about Jeho, that they frequently banded

together in very large numbers, and not only robbed

traders and officials, but created great disturbances

in the neighbouring districts ; that beyond the Hoope-kow pass in the Great Wall, there were " numbers

of Eussian barbarians, some of whom have been for a long time pretending to deliver communications

at Pekin for the furtherance of some treacherous

designs

; " that if the strong fortifications of Pekin were not considered sufficient security, surely much

less could any be found in the open and unprotected hunting-grounds beyond the wall ; if the barbarians have been able to reach Tien-tsin, what is to prevent them from penetrating to the Loan river at Jeho? Having thus tried to impress upon the mind

of " the sacred Son of Heaven " the dangers to be en- countered at Jeho, they go on to point out the great

inconvenience and discomfort to which the " Governor

and Tranquilliser of the Universe " would be subject

during his journey in the " still hot weather of au- tumn." As no such journey had been undertaken

for forty years, all the Imperial palaces along the line

of route, having been so long unused, had fallen into

disrepair, and were consequently uninhabitable. An

escort of at least 10,000 persons would be required

for the journey, for whom it would be impossible to provide supplies on the road, and consequently numbers of them would desert, and, falling in with the

numerous banditti who prowl about those regions

wherever they please, would lead to serious disturbances. Jeho was the constant resort of the Mongol

tribes, to whom it had always been customary upon the

visit of former Emperors to bestow presents, amounting

to tens of millions of taels, which the present financial

difficulties would not admit of, and without doing

which it might be difficult to soothe the discontent

of those tributaries.

In this manner they appealed to his Majesty's sense of personal risk and inconvenience, whilst they put

forward, in a startlingly straightforward manner, the

political objections to his journey, urging their arguments upon him with a force and plainness of speech

which few European ministers could presume to use with their sovereigns, and in a manner the very

opposite to all our preconceived notions of Chinese

court etiquette or the style of address usual from the

Mandarins to their despotic Emperor. The papers

which fell into our hands were memorials from various

ministers of state, all signed by several others who

agreed in the substance of them. One was countersigned by as many as seventy-six ministers ; that of

the earliest date was from Kia-ching, and signed by

twenty-five others, dated the 9th September.

It was evidently written in answer to a communication from the Emperor, in which he had demanded an

opinion upon Sang-ko-lin-sin's advice, enclosing a copy

at the same time of the memorial from that general.

Eumours of the intended flight of his Majesty had

been in circulation for some time previous at Pekin ; and so when his Majesty declared that he intended

proceeding to Tung-chow and taking command of the

army in person, the ministers appear to have seen through the artifice, and perceived that such was only an excuse for his departure, and that once on the move

he would follow his general's advice and make quickly

for Jeho.

In another paper from the minister Tsuien-king, dated

four days later, the most sarcastic censure is poured forth

upon a proposed plan which had emanated from the

Celestial mind, which was that, assembling a large force,

he should take up a position to the north of Pekin.

" They admired the awe-inspiring demeanour and the

well-devised strategy thus displayed. But the common

people are extremely slow of comprehension ; they

easily suspect and with difficulty are led to appreciate;

they will say that as the barbarians are to the southeastward of the capital, Tung-chow should be the

position front which to support Sang-ko-lin-sin ; that a

position to the north of Pekin would be without the

general hue of operations ; that what was undertaken

under the semblance of strategy would in reality be

flight. If his Majesty was in such a critical time careless of the preservation of his empire and only re- gardful of his personal safety, where could such be more securely assured to him than within the thick

and lofty walls of Pekin ? " One and all of these

memorials denote with startling plainness what should

be the Emperor's line of conduct at such a critical conjuncture, and urge that at such times of public

danger, " the man of heroic conduct is prepared to

die at his post."— "Your Majesty is well aware of

the maxim, that the prince is bound to sacrifice him-

self for his country ; but far be it from your ministers

at such a time as this to desire to wound your Majesty's feelings by adverting to such thoughts." —"In

what light does your Majesty regard your people,

and the altars of your Gods ? Will you cast away

the inheritance of your ancestors like a damaged shoe ? What would history say of your Majesty for a thousand

future generations." No sovereign hitherto has ever gone on a hunting tour in times of danger. Such a journey would then greatly endanger the whole state,

and compromise the reigning dynasty ; his departure

would occasion the most serious disorders within the

capital and lead to a revolution. All people, they said,

throughout the empire then looked to the throne, as

to the centre from which all plans for safety must emanate ; the minds of people, they added, will become dis- turbed, shaking the courage of the troops and inspiring

the rebels with renewed energy ; the capital " is the

honourable seat of majesty, and at such a moment es- pecially the sovereign ought to remain within it ; " to leave it would embolden the barbarians to make fresh

enterprises, and should peace be negotiated, the great

distance of Jeho from Pekin would cause considerable

delay in communicating with his Majesty there. Although, the barbarians' vessels had reached Tien-tsin,

yet that was a long distance from Pekin ; their force was only 10,000, whilst the army under Sang-ko-lin-sin

numbered 30,000, and men, women, and children were ready to fight for their tutelary gods. " The

danger was most threatening," and " a puff of breath

is now sufficient to decide the balance in which hangs

the loss or preservation of the succession of your ances-

. . .

https://ia800208.us.archive.org/10/items/narrativeofwarwi00wols/narrativeofwarwi00wols.pdf

  1860年，和硕恭亲王奕訢坐镇北平，

        神机妙算 戏耍智斗英法联军，

          大涨皇家园林的荣光声望，

         为大清争来 200 两白银 ！!

當初若是他恭亲王當上了中國皇帝，

八國聯軍根本無法踏進北京半步 ！！

1900年8月14日星期二，

八国联军进入北京，黎民百姓 扶洋灭清

历史上的今天，1912年2月12日，隆裕皇太后签署退位诏书，

清帝退位。没有血流成河，没有生灵涂炭。汉，满， 蒙，

回 (新疆)，藏也没有要求独立，是为五族共和。

满清王朝留给中华民国4万万同胞 近1300万平方公里的辽阔疆土，

国破 山河在!