接《贸易战一关键:市场换技术乃天经地义？》

 《再谈中国的市场换技术兼回丝丝博》

逸草：从本博上面数月前的两博文可见，中国在国际贸易中所作所为会触犯众怒，是必然的结果。该声明中不放中国的名字，却基本上条条针对中国。

重磅: 美欧日发表《联合声明》精准打击中国! (附全文)

来也喵 Today

来源：国际法务

美欧日昨天（2020年1月14日）发表《联合声明》，呼吁世界贸易组织对政府补贴实施更严格的限制。评论称，该建议针对的是中国经济模式的核心部分，旨在堵住中国政府“利用”的WTO规则中的漏洞。

美国、欧盟和日本已就所谓“中国政府支持的资本主义模式”加大了对中国方面的压力，呼吁世界贸易组织对政府补贴实施更严格的限制。

美国特朗普政府在解决贸易问题上，罕见向盟友寻求，美欧日1月14日发表了一份联合声明，提议制定更严格的全球规则，以防止中国企业依靠政府支持获得对外国对手的优势。

报道指出，美欧日提出建议的规则变化针对的是中国经济模式的核心部分，提议呼吁在WTO范围内更广泛地禁止各种形式的政府支持，并要求各国政府采取更多行动，证明对企业的援助不会扭曲贸易行为。

评论称，该提议相当于一份联合宣言，旨在堵住美国和其他国家所声称的中国政府利用的WTO规则中的漏洞。

欧盟贸易专员菲霍根表示：

“这是朝着解决扭曲全球贸易的一些基本问题迈出的重要一步，欧盟一直认为，多边解决方案可以有效地解决这些问题。”

分析称，通过与东京和布鲁塞尔达成协议，可能有助于特朗普政府转移外界的批评，即特朗普与中国达成的协议未能解决工业补贴问题，美国与盟友合作不够，未能向中国政府施压。

美国、日本和欧盟希望通过一项“多边”协议来实施这些计划。根据这项协议，一个国家联盟将同意实施这些措施。

这样一项协议不需要所有164个世贸组织成员的支持才能生效，只对参与国有约束力。

这份长达3页的提案将扩大世贸组织现有补贴禁令的范围，因为一些“市场和扭曲贸易的”做法目前并不违法。这些计划还将要求各国政府证明，某些被允许的国家援助形式不会提供不公平的优势，或导致市场供应过剩。

欧盟官员1月14日表示，他们已经发现了一些中国政府勾销其向企业提供贷款，以及向破产企业提供巨额补贴的案例。

联合声明还重申了美国、欧盟和日本的呼吁，要求中国停止强迫外国公司与中国合作伙伴分享技术。

声明称，这种“不公平的做法与基于市场原则的国际贸易体系不一致，损害了增长和发展”。

以下是《联合声明》全文：

Joint Statement of the Trilateral Meeting of the Trade Ministers of Japan, the United States and the European Union

Mr. KAJIYAMA Hiroshi, Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry of Japan, Ambassador Robert E. Lighthizer, United States Trade Representative, and Mr. Phil Hogan, European Commissioner for Trade, met in Washington, D.C. on 14 January 2020.

On industrial subsidies, the Ministers discussed ways to strengthen existing WTO rules on industrial subsidies and agreed upon the following:

1. The current list of prohibited subsidies provided for in Article 3.1 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) is insufficient to tackle market and trade distorting subsidization existing in certain jurisdictions. Therefore, new types of unconditionally prohibited subsidies need to be added to the ASCM. These are:

1. unlimited guarantees;

2. subsidies to an insolvent or ailing enterprise in the absence of a credible restructuring plan;

3. subsidies to enterprises unable to obtain long-term financing or investment from independent commercial sources operating in sectors or industries in overcapacity;

4. certain direct forgiveness of debt.

Ministers agreed to continue working on identifying the scope of prohibitions and additional categories of unconditionally prohibited subsidies.

2. Certain other types of subsidies have such a harmful effect so as to justify a reversal of the burden of proof so that the subsidizing Member must demonstrate that there are no serious negative trade or capacity effects and that there is effective transparency about the subsidy in question. Subsidies having been discussed in this category include, but are not limited to: excessively large subsidies; subsidies that prop up uncompetitive firms and prevent their exit from the market; subsidies creating massive manufacturing capacity, without private commercial participation; and, subsidies that lower input prices domestically in comparison to prices of the same goods when destined for export. If such subsidy is found to exist and the absence of serious negative effect cannot be demonstrated, the subsidizing Member must withdraw the subsidy in question immediately.

Ministers agreed to continue working on the scope of such provisions, and to identify additional instances of harmful subsidization and their scope.

3. The current rules of the ASCM identify in Article 6.3 instances of serious prejudice to the interests of another Member. However, these instances do not refer to situations where the subsidy in question distorts capacity. An additional type of serious prejudice linked to capacity should be therefore added to Article 6.3 ASCM. Further, work will continue on a provision defining the threat of serious prejudice.

4. The current rules of the ASCM do not provide for any incentive for WTO Members to properly notify their subsidies. Therefore, the state-of-play of subsidies notifications is dismal. Hence, a new strong incentive to notify subsidies properly should be added to Article 25 ASCM, rendering prohibited any non-notified subsidies that were counter-notified by another Member, unless the subsidizing Member provides the required information in writing within set timeframes.

5. The current rules of the ASCM are insufficiently prescriptive when it comes to the determination of the proper benchmark for subsidies consisting of the provision of goods or services or purchase of goods by a government in situations where the domestic market of the subsidizing Member is distorted. Therefore, the ASCM should be amended to describe the circumstances in which domestic prices can be rejected and how a proper benchmark can be established, including the use prices outside of the market of the subsidizing Member.

6. The Ministers observed that many subsidies are granted through State Enterprises and discussed the importance of ensuring that these subsidizing entities are captured by the term “public body”. The Ministers agreed that the interpretation of “public body” by the WTO Appellate Body in several reports undermines the effectiveness of WTO subsidy rules.  To determine that an entity is a public body, it is not necessary to find that the entity “possesses, exercises or is vested with governmental authority.”  The Ministers agreed to continue working on a definition of "public body" on this basis.

On forced technology transfers, the Ministers reaffirmed that technology transfer between firms in different countries is an important part of global trade and investment. Technology transfer that is fair, voluntary and based on market principles can be mutually beneficial for growth and development. They also reaffirmed that when one country engages in forced technology transfer, it deprives other countries of the opportunity to benefit from the fair, voluntary and market-based flow of technology and innovation.  These unfair practices are inconsistent with an international trading system based on market principles and undermines growth and development.

The Ministers discussed possible elements of core disciplines that aim to prevent forced technology transfer practices of third countries, the need to reach out to and build consensus with other WTO Members on the need to address forced technology transfer issues and their commitment to effective means to stop harmful forced technology transfer policies and practices, including through export controls, investment review for national security purposes, their respective enforcement tools, and the development of new rules.

The Ministers also took stock of the progress on the discussion and the joint actions on the following items and agreed to continue cooperating on them:

• the importance of market oriented conditions for a free, fair, and mutually advantageous trading system;

• reform of the WTO, to include increasing WTO Member compliance with existing WTO notification obligations and pressing advanced WTO Members claiming developing country status to undertake full commitments in ongoing and future WTO negotiations;

• international rule-making on trade-related aspects of electronic commerce at the WTO; and

• international forums such as the Global Forum on Steel Excess Capacity and the Governments/Authorities’ Meeting on Semiconductors.