憲政自由與機會平等：

共生政治學視野下的美國兩黨“易道對抗”之轉換

Constitutional Liberty and Equality of Opportunity:  

The Transformation of U.S. Two-Party “Changing Lanes” Rivalry in the Symbiopolitics Perspective  

錢宏（Archer Hong Qian）  

2025年10月31日凌晨 · 新加坡  

里根的小故事  

我（里根）和朋友的六歲小女兒聊天。她說長大要當總統。她的父母——一對自由派民主黨人——就站在旁邊。我問：  

“如果你當了總統，第一件事想做什麼？”  

“我要給所有無家可歸的人提供食物和房子。”  

“多麼崇高的目標！”我告訴她：  

“你不必等到當總統。現在就可以做到：來我家割草、拔草、掃人行道和車道，我付你50美元。然後我帶你去雜貨店——那兒常有個無家可歸的人——你把50美元給他，讓他買吃的，或者存着買房子。”  

她想了想，才六歲。當她媽媽怒視我時，小女孩直盯着我的眼睛問：  

“為什麼那個無家可歸的人不自己來幹活，你直接給他50美元呢？”  

我說：“歡迎加入共和黨！”  

一、聯邦立憲與“人民之名”：美國政治的原點  

美國建國之初，從大陸會議到制憲會議，並無現代意義上的政黨。“聯邦黨人”不是政黨，而是一群主張強中央、聯邦憲制與國家信用的思想者；反聯邦派則捍衛地方自治與個體自由，警惕中央權力膨脹。  

正是在這兩種力量的張力中，《美國憲法》以一句“We the People”開篇，宣告國家合法性的唯一源泉——人民主權。  

此後近半個世紀，美國僅有一個“民主共和黨”。隨着領土擴張、工業化與社會分層，該黨逐漸裂解，最終形成民主黨與共和黨。1860年，林肯作為首位共和黨總統當選，以“維護聯邦統一、廢除奴隸制、實現普遍公義”為核心使命，奠定共和黨精神原點。  

二、從“國家統一”到“經濟均衡”：兩黨理念的第一次易道  

19世紀末至20世紀中葉，美國政治主軸從“國家能否統一”轉向“經濟如何均衡”。  

羅斯福新政時期，民主黨以凱恩斯主義為綱，通過政府干預、公共工程與社會保障，確立了“結果平等”導向的福利政治傳統；共和黨則堅持市場自由、財政紀律與個人責任，強調“機會平等”的競爭精神。  

這場關於“政府應為社會做多少”的百年爭論，構成美國政經主旋律：

民主黨代表需求側的“分配公平正義”  

共和黨代表供給側的“自由秩序效率”  

兩黨平衡，驅動憲政體系的“制衡—修正—再平衡”機制。

然而，從二戰至1970年代，從羅斯福新政到卡特，美國經過四次政黨輪替，經濟政策呈現出在“自由市場和政府干預之間搖擺”，但總體上政府在經濟中扮演了積極角色，這就帶來了經濟停滯和高通脹並存的“滯脹”。雖然卡特政府政策應對滯脹的挑戰效果不佳，也為後來的里根經濟學提供了社會呼喚改革的動力。

三、里根革命：從“山巔之城”的隱喻，到“自由負責”的再定義  

“山巔之城”（City Upon a Hill）一詞源自1630年清教徒領袖約翰·溫斯羅普（John Winthrop）的布道詞。從肯尼迪到里根，兩位總統重提這個概念，其意義在於對“American exceptionalism”的詮釋和強調截然不同，反映了各自時代的政治經濟文化氛圍和美國的世界定位。 

重提“山巔之城”的意義，在於話語權的轉移和內涵的演變：肯尼迪將City Upon a Hill用作對美國人民的內在道德要求和責任警示，強調集體犧牲和審慎的國內治理；而里根則將City Upon a Hill重新塑造成外向型、樂觀主義的美國例外論宣言，強調美國作為全球自由燈塔的既定地位和神聖使命。里根的詮釋將這個概念普及化，使其成為後來MAGA運動和現代美國保守派政治詞典中的核心短語之一。

1970年代深陷滯脹美國，里根面對：高通脹（13.5%）、高失業（7.5%）、低增長，凱恩斯主義失靈，國家信用動搖，里根以供給側改革為核心：  

減稅擴大稅基（最高邊際稅率從70%降至28%）  

放鬆管制（廢除4000餘項聯邦法規）與決策透明化  

打擊通脹、重振軍工與科技  

為此，里根政府不惜高利率從華爾街貸款，低利率貸給富有創業、創新精神的中小企業，特別是科技和軍工企業。

里根的名言“政府不是解決問題的辦法，政府本身就是問題”成為20世紀末政治轉折點。自此，三組價值分歧固化為兩黨坐標：

1. 機會平等vs.結果平等

2. 社會秩序自由vs.政治正確自由

3. 減稅擴大稅基vs.增稅提高稅率  

里根革命，不僅重啟經濟（1983–1989年均GDP增長3.5%，新增1900萬就業），更重塑公民自由觀——從依賴政府的受惠者，回歸對自身命運負責的公民主體。  

四、從克林頓到川普：社會代表性的“再易道”  

21世紀，美國裂變從經濟政策轉向代表性結構。  

民主黨：克林頓（NAFTA）、奧巴馬（TPP）時代，重視美國產業鏈、供應鏈高端占有的全球化，將中低端生產轉移給發展中國家，民主黨，也就自然而然地從勞工/中產基礎轉向代表全球化、跨國資本與高科技寡頭，造成“占領華爾街運動”的反彈，卻試圖以“高福利”平息。  

共和黨：在川普（Trupm）重申“City Upon a Hill”美國精神的MAGA-MAHA運動衝擊下，從精英資本之黨逆向重組，轉型為代表中下層工人、“紅脖子”農民、地方中產與“被遺忘者”的回歸真正的民權之黨。  

美國政治從“左右對抗”裂解為“上層-下層”：

民主黨主推身份政治與政治正確  

共和黨捍衛文化傳統與社會秩序  

張力從制度博弈升格為文明觀對抗。  

五、憲政自由與民權回潮：美國政治的第三階段  

在全球化2.0互害機制的衝擊下，“民主黨”不再代表人民，“共和黨”轉而捍衛憲法民權，美國政治進入新周期。

全球化2.0的系統性互害是指： 

權貴與資本：沆瀣一氣又勾心鬥角，特別是在中國權貴與美國資本“雙贏”博弈中，兩國國民淪為被損害的“韭菜”或“炮灰”。 

中國：鄉村敗落、勞工低人權、土地、空氣、微生物環境污染、貿易順差、權勢集團坐大（全官尋租化、全民佃戶化）。 

美國：城市空心化、產業出走（2000-2010年製造業崗位減少600萬個）、“中產階級占領華爾街”、國債高築（2024年貿易赤字1.2萬億美元）、貿易逆差過大、內生能力塌陷。

 雙方各自結構性失衡被包裝為“互利共贏”話術，結果WTO規則被破壞而喪失公孞力，自由貿易烏托邦的破滅：以川普為代表的實幹家和美國民眾意識到，新古典經濟學的“自由貿易”理論，成為經濟烏托邦，試圖砸爛其枷鎖，終結全球化2.0。

 順便說一句，這一轉折動力很大程度上來自社會底層年輕世代，如查理·柯克的“美國轉折點”運動。所以，川普不是孤立現象，而是社會自我校正：

揭露官僚特權、行政腐敗、利益集團控制  

喚醒“沉默多數”——被全球化邊緣化、被技術經濟淘汰的普通美國人  

民權vs.官僚特權的對抗，成為憲政再生的動力。  

這正是“We the People”的制度重啟——不只是口號，而是不斷復甦的公民意志。

六、從對抗到共生：政治文明的自修機制  

縱觀美國250年政治演化：  

1. 第一階段：聯邦建制 → 解決國家統一  

2. 第二階段：經濟再分配 → 解決工業社會公平  

3. 第三階段：民權回潮 → 直面全球化代表性危機  

每一次危機，都是體系自我更新。美國未陷極權或分裂，根源在於憲政設計的共生性修復機制：  

立法、行政、司法三權互動  

黨派輪替  

社會自治  

這種平衡不是靜態妥協，而是持續自我糾偏。  

這便是美國政治文明之“易道”——在對抗中生成共生的自組織秩序。  

七、世界視野：從兩黨易道到人類共生政治  

今日，全球多極化、科技革命、AI治理重塑人類社會，美國“兩黨易道”已成現代政治系統演化原型：  

揭示自由與秩序的永恆張力  

展示競爭與共生可共構  

預示文明更新非暴力革命，而是制度與意識同步演化  

未來政治不再是“左”與“右”，而是“交互共生”vs.“壟斷操縱”。  

美國“兩黨政治”的經驗，若能超越黨派互斗，進入文明自覺，特別是民主黨重新找到自己的應有的位置，便可為人類提供基於生命自組織連接動態平衡的交互主體共生政治創新（Symbiopolitics）與再組織、再選擇的新範式。  

Constitutional Liberty and Equality of Opportunity:

The Transformation of U.S. Two-Party “Changing Lanes” Rivalry in the Symbiopolitics Perspective

By Archer Hong Qian 

October 31, 2025, Dawn · Singapore

Reagan’s Little Story

I (Reagan) was chatting with a friend’s six-year-old daughter. She said she wanted to be president when she grew up. Her parents—a pair of liberal Democrats—stood nearby. I asked:

“If you became president, what’s the first thing you’d do?”

“I’d give food and homes to all the homeless.”

“What a noble goal!” I told her.

“You don’t have to wait to be president. Come mow my lawn, pull weeds, sweep the sidewalk and driveway—I’ll pay you $50. Then I’ll take you to the grocery store where a homeless man often hangs out. You give him the $50 to buy food… or save for a house.”

She thought for a moment. She was only six. As her mother glared at me, the girl looked me in the eye and asked:

“Why doesn’t the homeless man just come do the work and you pay him the $50?”

I said:

“Welcome to the Republican Party!”

I. Federal Constitutionalism and “We the People”: The Origin of American Politics

At America’s founding—from the Continental Congress to the Constitutional Convention—there were no modern parties. “Federalists” were not a party but thinkers advocating strong central government, federal structure, and national credit. Anti-Federalists defended local autonomy and individual liberty, wary of centralized power.

In the tension between these forces, the U.S. Constitution opens with “We the People”, declaring popular sovereignty as the sole source of legitimacy.

For nearly half a century, America had only the “Democratic-Republican Party.” As territory expanded, industrialization accelerated, and social stratification deepened, it split—eventually forming the Democratic and Republican parties. In 1860, Abraham Lincoln, the first Republican president, was elected with the mission of preserving the Union, abolishing slavery, and achieving universal justice—cementing the GOP’s spiritual origin.

II. From “National Unity” to “Economic Equilibrium”: The First “Changing Lanes” of Two-Party Ideas

From the late 19th to mid-20th century, America’s political axis changed lanes from “Can the nation stay united?” to “How should the economy be balanced?”

During FDR’s New Deal, Democrats, guided by Keynesianism, used government intervention, public works, and social security to establish a welfare tradition oriented toward equality of outcome. Republicans defended market freedom, fiscal restraint, and personal responsibility, emphasizing equality of opportunity through competition.

This century-long debate—“How much should government do for society?”—became America’s political-economic leitmotif:

· Democrats: demand-side distributive justice

· Republicans: supply-side freedom, order, and efficiency

Their balance powered the constitutional cycle of checks, correction, and rebalancing. Yet, from WWII to the 1970s—spanning Roosevelt to Carter—four party alternations saw policy oscillate between free markets and intervention, with government generally dominant. This bred stagflation. Though Carter’s response faltered, it built social momentum for Reaganomics.

III. The Reagan Revolution: From “City Upon a Hill” Metaphor to the Redefinition of “Responsible Freedom”

“City Upon a Hill” originates from John Winthrop’s 1630 sermon. Kennedy used it as an internal moral call for sacrifice and prudent governance; Reagan reshaped it into an outward, optimistic American exceptionalism declaration—America as the world’s beacon of freedom. Reagan’s version popularized the phrase, making it core to MAGA and modern conservative lexicon.

Facing 1970s stagflation—13.5% inflation, 7.5% unemployment, near-zero growth—Reagan’s supply-side revolution:

· Tax cuts to expand the base (top rate: 70% → 28%)

· Deregulation (eliminating 4,000+ federal rules) and decision transparency

· High-interest loans from Wall Street, low-interest loans to innovative SMEs (tech, defense)

· Inflation control, military-industrial revival

His maxim—“Government is not the solution; government is the problem”—marked the late-20th-century turning point. Three enduring divides crystallized:

1. Equality of opportunity vs. equality of outcome

2. Ordered liberty vs. politically correct liberty

3. Tax cuts to broaden the base vs. tax hikes to raise rates

The Reagan Revolution not only restored growth (3.5% annual GDP, 19 million jobs, 1983–1989) but reshaped citizenship—from government-dependent beneficiaries to self-reliant agents of destiny.

IV. From Clinton to Trump: The Second “Changing Lanes” in Social Representation

In the 21st century, America’s fissures changed lanes from economic policy to representational structure.

· Democrats: Under Clinton (NAFTA) and Obama (TPP), prioritized high-end global supply chains, offshoring mid/low-end production. Naturally shifted from labor/middle-class roots to representing globalization, multinational capital, and tech oligarchs—sparking Occupy Wall Street, quelled with high welfare.

· Republicans: Under Trump’s MAGA-MAHA movement reaffirming “City Upon a Hill” American spirit, underwent reverse reorganization—from elite capital to a true civil-rights party for working-class, “redneck” farmers, local middle-class, and the “forgotten.”

Politics fractured from “left-right” to “elite vs. populist”:

· Democrats: identity politics and political correctness

· Republicans: cultural tradition and social order

The tension escalated from institutional gamesmanship to civilizational confrontation.

V. Constitutional Liberty and Populist Backlash: The Third Phase of American Politics

Under Globalization 2.0’s mutual-harm mechanism, “Democrats” ceased representing the people; “Republicans” took up constitutional civil rights—ushering a new cycle.

Globalization 2.0 systemic mutual harm:

· Elites and capital: Collusion and rivalry; in China-U.S. “win-win,” citizens become “leeks” or “cannon fodder.”

· China: Rural decay, low labor rights, pollution, trade surpluses, entrenched power (full rent-seeking, tenant society).

· U.S.: Urban hollowing, industrial flight (6 million manufacturing jobs lost 2000–2010), Occupy Wall Street, soaring debt (2024 trade deficit $1.2 trillion), endogenous collapse.

“Mutual benefit” rhetoric masked imbalances; WTO rules eroded credibility. Free-trade utopia shattered. Trump and pragmatic Americans saw neoclassical “free trade” as economic utopia—smashing its shackles to end Globalization 2.0.

Much momentum came from grassroots youth, like Charlie Kirk’s Turning Point USA. Trump was not an anomaly but societal self-correction:

· Exposing bureaucratic privilege, administrative corruption, interest-group capture

· Awakening the “silent majority”—globalization’s marginalized, tech-economy casualties

Civil rights vs. bureaucratic privilege became the engine of constitutional renewal. This is the reactivation of “We the People”—not mere rhetoric, but perpetually rebooting civic will.

VI. From Confrontation to Symbiosis: The Self-Repairing Mechanism of Political Civilization

Across 250 years of American political evolution:

1. Phase I: Federal establishment → resolved national unity

2. Phase II: Economic redistribution → resolved industrial fairness

3. Phase III: Populist resurgence → confronts globalization’s representation crisis

Each crisis triggers systemic renewal. America avoided tyranny or fragmentation due to its symbiotic repair mechanism:

· Legislative, executive, judicial interaction

· Party alternation

· Social self-governance

This balance is not static compromise but continuous self-correction. This is the “Changing Lanes” of American political civilization—a self-organizing order born of confrontation, sustained by symbiosis.

VII. Global Perspective: From Two-Party “Changing Lanes” to Human Symbiotic Politics

Today, amid multipolarity, technological revolution, and AI governance, America’s two-party “Changing Lanes” transcends domestic politics to become a prototype of modern political evolution:

· Revealing the eternal tension between freedom and order

· Demonstrating that competition and symbiosis can coexist

· Foretelling that civilizational renewal occurs not through violent revolution but synchronized institutional and conscious evolution

Future politics is no longer “left” vs. “right,” but “interactive symbiosis” vs. “monopolistic manipulation”.

If America’s two-party experience transcends partisan strife—especially if Democrats rediscover their proper role—it may offer humanity a new paradigm of Symbiopolitics:

political innovation grounded in life’s self-organizing connectivity and dynamic equilibrium among interactive subjects, enabling re-organization and re-selection.