| 進一步,海闊天空!——關於“PRC–ROC對等承認”的大情勢與可能路徑的結構性觀察 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
| 送交者: 孞烎Archer 2025年11月09日06:07:39 於 [天下論壇] 發送悄悄話 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||
【政策分析簡報】進一步,海闊天空!Take a step forward and find a clearer situation——關於“PRC–ROC對等承認”的大情勢與可能路徑的結構性觀察— Structural Observation on the Grand Trend and Possible Path of “PRC–ROC Reciprocal Recognition”
撰寫人: 錢宏(Archer Hong Qian) 一、核心判斷摘要未來三年內,美國極有可能正式承認事實上存在的中華民國(ROC)台灣合法政權,並恢復與ROC台灣的外交關係。 亦有可能,日本或歐洲某國或聯合承認ROC台灣合法政府,先於美國採取此行動,類似1971年日本搶先與PRC“邦交正常化”的歷史前例。 一旦美國/盟友開啟此進程,PRC勢必先行“面子反應”,後順勢而為,尊重事實,進入“加速(兩岸)談判”,最終出現PRC與ROC同時宣布結束敵對關係的歷史場景。 率先採取此行動的國家,將在未來亞太、印太秩序乃至全球經貿秩序重塑中,獲得決定性戰略先機。 二、關鍵信號提要川普終於被逼表明美國立場:“Taiwan is Taiwan”——沒有什麼好談的→ 意在承認台灣為既定政治實體,而非附屬議題。 中美“川習釜山會”:首次未設置“台灣議題”→ 亦被解讀為雙方戰略智慧與冷靜試探。 歐盟與日本發出“集體挺台”信號:不是個別國家發聲(如立陶宛、捷克),而是區域力量的“合議與共識”正在生成→ 其政治含義甚至接近“聯合承認ROC合法政府”的前奏。 三、推進順序推演(基於現有判斷)
四、路徑正當性說明(基於ROC既有政策)自小蔣總統經國先生之後,歷任5位總統陸續終止“三不政策”: 汪辜會談(1992)→“小三通”(2001)→“互不隸屬”(陳水扁時代,馬英九勝選向陳水扁“請益”時,雙方進一步求證,沒有文本記錄的“九二共識”,但某種“九二默契”應當存在,否則就沒有雙方安排的“汪辜會”)→“九二默契”與“主權競合”(馬英九時代)→“PRC與ROC互不隸屬”(蔡英文、賴清德時代)→ ROC事實上已默認,乃至正式承認“1949年僭越 ROC 大陸部分成立的 PRC 政權合法性”。 因此: PRC承認ROC台灣合法政權,只不過是遲到的對等禮儀,應不存在心障——禮儀之邦,順勢而為,進一步,海闊天空!其他選項,都會多少明暗付出血的代價,就不說什麼血濃於水啦! 五、戰略分岔點判斷(最早提出於2020.5.20)PRC和美國,誰率先承認ROC台灣合法政府,誰就得到戰略性先機。而且,如果PRC先於美國承認事實,對自身脫困,且更順理成章,有百利無一害——但要贏得此先機,須具備智慧、勇氣和能力。 該判斷發表於2020年9月17日,構成近年來對海峽兩岸與國際秩序互動的最早系統化呈現之一(參見文末參考鏈接)。 六、深層含義與歷史迴響(簡述)“1971模式反轉”的可能性 “現實承認” vs “意識形態否認” 承認現狀不是承認對手,而是承認雙方互相存在,進而恢復互相成就的可能性。 內外困局的反向破解(針對PRC) 一旦PRC依據“主權在民”規則,承認ROC的民選合法政府,其內政困局與外部圍堵都會出現結構性緩解,“民族主義綁架”鏈條被鬆動,民生、金融、外交等問題會轉入“可解階段”(錢宏《國是會議:中華式憲政轉型的典範——從台灣轉型經驗看大陸政體結構躍遷可能性》 http://symbiosism.com.cn/10366.html)。 七、參考資料錢宏:《“鏡”與“燈”:PRC & ROC問題的8個觀察點與8種可能的解決方式》發表時間:2020年9月17日 萬維讀者網:https://blog.creaders.net/user_blog_diary.php?did=NTIwMzQ3 進一步,海闊天空!
Archer Hong Qian 2025年11月9日於Singapore途中
川普最近明確表示:“Taiwan is Taiwan"(沒有什麼好談的)!”“川習APEC場邊元首會”也沒有設置“台灣議題”,更顯雙方智慧和勇氣!
接着剛剛,歐盟和日本不約而同明確發出“集體挺台”(非單個國家,如立陶宛、捷克)的政治信號,乃至以“聯合承認ROC合法政府”方式進行,國際時局正悄俏地速變……我堅持今年7月在蘇格蘭的預測: 美國很可能在未來三年內(當然日本或歐洲某國可能搶在美國前與ROC台灣建交,先例是1971年日本搶先與PRC“邦交正常化”,歷史很可能把所謂顛倒的歷史再顛倒過來),正式宣布承認事實存在的ROC台灣合法政權,恢復與ROC恢復外交關係。此後,PRC面子上會鬧騰一陣子,私底下會加速談判,然後,PRC與ROC同時宣布: 結束敵對、對峙、對立關係——事實上ROC小蔣總統之後的5位總統,結束“三一政策”,從汪辜會談、“小三通”到“互不隸屬”,ROC都早已默認-正式承認1949年僭越ROC大陸部分成立的PRC政權合法性,如今PRC承認ROC台灣合法政權,只是遲到的對等禮儀而已,當無太大心理障礙(禮儀之邦麼,只是承認一個事實有那麼難嗎?)而且,我幾乎可以肯定,PRC一旦根據“主權在民”現代政治文明規則,坦蕩承認ROC台灣民選合法政府,其自身目前遭遇的內外困局,都將慢慢迎刃而解——開啟和解共生之路! 早在2020年5月20日,我就撰文指出,如果從美中實際利益博弈的維度看,歷史已經來到這樣的關鍵時刻: PRC和美國,誰率先承認ROC台灣合法政府,誰就得到戰略性先機。但要贏得這個歷史先機,需要智慧、勇氣、能力!
參考: 錢宏《“鏡”與“燈”:PRC & ROC問題的8個觀察點與8種可能的解決方式》2020.9.17 共生網 http://symbiosism.com.cn/4289.html;萬維讀者網 https://blog.creaders.net/user_blog_diary.php?did=NTIwMzQ3 錢宏《國是會議:中華式憲政轉型的典範——從台灣轉型經驗看大陸政體結構躍遷可能性(National Affairs Conference: A Constitutional Transition Model with Chinese Characteristics— Exploring the Possibility of Structural Transformation in Mainland China Inspired by Taiwan’s Experience)》2025年7月12日,溫哥華http://symbiosism.com.cn/10366.html
【Policy Analysis Brief】Take a step forward and find a clearer situation——Structural Observation on the PRC–ROC Reciprocal Recognition LandscapePrepared by: Archer Hong Qian Context: Consolidated from recent commentaries and previous analyses (including “Mirror” and “Lamp”: Eight Observational Points and Eight Possible Solutions to the PRC & ROC Question, 2020.9.17)
I. Core Assessment SummaryWithin the next three years, the United States is highly likely to officially recognize the legitimately existing government of the Republic of China (ROC) in Taiwan, and restore diplomatic relations with ROC Taiwan. It is also possible that Japan or one or more European countries — or a joint coalition — will act before the United States to recognize the ROC Taiwan’s legitimate government, much like Japan took the lead in normalizing relations with the PRC in 1971 ahead of the U.S. Once the U.S. and/or allied governments begin this process, the PRC will almost certainly respond with an initial “face-saving reaction,” before shifting to respect the facts on the ground and entering a phase of “accelerated (cross-Strait) negotiations.” The likely result is a historic moment in which the PRC and ROC simultaneously announce the end of hostile relations. Whoever takes the lead in this recognition will gain decisive strategic advantage in the restructuring of the Asia-Pacific, Indo-Pacific, and eventually global economic and trade order. II. Key Signal Indicators1. Trump’s Explicit Statement 2. Trump–Xi “Busan Meeting” 3. EU–Japan “Collective Support for Taiwan” Signaling III. Projected Sequential Progression (Based on Current Assessment)
IV. Justification of the Path (Based on Existing ROC Policy)Since President Chiang Ching-kuo, five successive ROC presidents have successively ended the “Three Noes Policy”: 1992 Koo–Wang Talks 2001 “Mini Three Links” Chen Shui-bian Era: “Mutual Non-Subordination” Ma Ying-jeou Era: “1992 Tacit Understanding” and “Sovereignty Competition–Cooperation” Tsai Ing-wen & Lai Ching-te Era: “PRC and ROC are not subordinate to each other” → Thus, the ROC has, in effect — and in certain cases formally — long acknowledged the legitimacy of the PRC, established in 1949 on the mainland portion of former ROC territory. Therefore: As a “nation of rites”, why should acknowledging a fact be so difficult? V. Strategic Fork Assessment (First Proposed on May 20, 2020)“Between the PRC and the United States, whoever first recognizes the ROC Taiwan legitimate government will gain the strategic initiative.” But to win this historical advantage, one must possess wisdom, courage, and capability. This judgment was first presented publicly on September 17, 2020, and remains one of the earliest systematic interpretations of cross-Strait and global structural dynamics in recent years. VI. Deeper Implications and Historical Echoes (Brief Notes)1. A Possible Reversal of the “1971 Model”Then: Japan recognized the PRC first → The U.S. followed Now: Japan or the EU may recognize the ROC first → The U.S. then consolidates the structure 2. “Recognition of Reality” vs. “Denial by Ideology”To recognize the present reality is not to acknowledge an adversary, but to acknowledge mutual existence, which makes mutual contribution possible again. 3. Reverse Resolution of Structural Impasses (for the PRC)Once the PRC openly acknowledges the ROC’s democratically elected government — in accordance with the modern political principle that “sovereignty resides in the people” — its current internal and external predicaments will begin to dissolve. The mechanism of “nationalist capture” will loosen, and problems of livelihoods, finance, and diplomacy will re-enter a solvable phase. VII. ReferencesQian, Hong. “‘Mirror’ and ‘Lamp’: Eight Observational Points and Eight Possible Solutions to the PRC & ROC Question.” Qian, Hong. “National Affairs Conference: A Constitutional Transition Model with Chinese Characteristics — Exploring the Possibility of Structural Transformation in Mainland China Inspired by Taiwan’s Experience.”
Further, to the Open Sea!— A Reflection on Recent Signals Concerning PRC–ROC Relations and Global StrategyArcher Hong Qian Trump recently stated clearly: “Taiwan is Taiwan” — “there is nothing more to talk about.” Immediately afterward, both the European Union and Japan issued political signals of collective support for Taiwan — not merely from one or two individual countries (such as Lithuania or the Czech Republic), but as a unified position, possibly even moving toward a joint recognition of the legitimate government of the ROC. This confirms the prediction I made in Scotland this past July: Within the next three years, it is highly likely that the United States will formally recognize the legitimately existing ROC government in Taiwan and restore diplomatic relations. And it is also very possible that Japan — or one or more European states — may act before the U.S., just as Japan took the lead in 1971 in “normalizing relations” with the PRC. Once such a step is taken, the PRC will — for face-saving reasons — raise objections for a period of time, but will then move quickly into private negotiations. And then, we are likely to see a scene of extraordinary historical significance: The PRC and ROC simultaneously announce an end to hostility, confrontation, and opposition. After all — since President Chiang Ching-kuo, the five ROC presidents who followed have already ended the “Three Noes Policy.” Thus, for the PRC to formally recognize the ROC Taiwan’s legitimate government is nothing more than a belated gesture of diplomatic reciprocity — one that should not require any major psychological barrier. If the PRC, as a “nation of rites,” truly believes in its own civilizational self-image, then what is so difficult about recognizing a fact? Moreover, I am almost certain that once the PRC openly recognizes the democratically elected government of ROC Taiwan — in accordance with the modern political principle that “sovereignty resides in the people” — the internal and external predicaments it currently faces will begin to dissolve, and the door toward reconciliation and symbiosis will open. As early as May 20, 2020, I wrote that from the standpoint of U.S.–PRC strategic competition: Whoever first recognizes the legitimate government of ROC Taiwan will gain the strategic initiative. But to seize this historical initiative requires wisdom, courage, and capacity. Reference: Symbiosism: http://symbiosism.com.cn/4289.html Creaders: https://blog.creaders.net/user_blog_diary.php?did=NTIwMzQ3 |
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