Financial crisis of 2007–2008

2007年－2008年以來的環球金融危機

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2007年－2012年環球金融危機

維基百科，自由的百科全書

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本文介紹的是2000年代後期發生後延續至今的環球金融危機。關於1920年代後期至1930年代的經濟危機，詳見“經濟 大蕭條”。

本條目是下面系列的一部分：

2007年以來的

全球金融危機

顯示▼破產倒閉公司

2007年－2012年環球金融危機，又稱世界金融危機、次貸危機、信用危機，更於2008年起名為金融海嘯及華爾街海嘯等，英國稱其為信貸緊縮，是一場在2007年8月9日開始浮現的金融危機。自次級房屋信貸危機爆發後，投資者開始對

按揭證券的價值失去信心，引發流動性危機。即使多國中央銀行多次向金融市場注入巨額資金，也無法阻止這場金融 危機的爆發。直到2008年9月[1] ，這場金融危機開始失控，並導致多間相當大型的金融機構倒閉或被政府接管。

目錄

   1 歷史背景 1.1 對銀行如何就風險評級的警告

2 美國聯邦儲備局的降息行動

3 2008年9月14日後的一周 3.1 大型金融機構的危機

3.2 貨幣市場基金保險及禁止放空

3.3 美國救市方案

4 2008年9月21日後的一周

5 2008年9月28日後的一周

6 2008年10月5日後的一周

7 美國民眾對政府用國庫資金救大銀行的反應

8 美國聯邦準備理事會開動“印鈔機”與伊朗提出“美元替代方案”

9 未來展望

10 時序 10.1 發生來源

10.2 2007年的事件

10.3 2008年的事件

10.4 2009年的事件

10.5 2010年的事件

10.6 2011年的事件

10.7 2012年的事件

11 相關條目

12 參考資料

13 外部鏈接與延伸閱讀

[1] 歷史背景

北岩銀行2007年擠兌人潮

最初的流動性危機可以在事後被看作是由於早期次級房屋信貸危機所引發的。北岩銀行是首批遭遇衝擊的對象之一， 它是英國的主流銀行。[2] 該行已借不到額外資金來償還2007年9月中旬產生的到期債務。由於沒有持續現金注入，其所經營的高槓桿性質的業務無法支撐，最終導致其被接管，並形成了很快降臨到其他銀行和金融機構的災難的早期跡象。

在鬆弛的簽名承受標準下的過度借貸為美國房貸泡沫的特徵之一。信用泛濫並導致大量的次級按揭（次級貸款），投 資者認為這些高風險的貸款會被資產證券化而緩和。從1989年以來，美國發行MBS的主要機構房利美、房地美、吉利

美（Ginnie Mae）所發行的MBS殖利率平均高於美國十年期公債殖利率137個基本點，吸引許多法人投資。雷曼兄弟

MBS指數顯示無論利率升降，自1996年以來該指數連續十年都是正報酬，最差的1999年也有2.1%的報酬率，同時期 MSCI全球債券指數在1999年、2001年、2005年卻是負報酬率。這個策略似乎以骨牌效應擴展和散布。

由失敗的資產證券化計劃（西方媒體有些人歸咎於華人統計學家李祥林所發明的金融數學公式，然而依照2006年3月 華爾街日報的報道，對倫敦和華爾街金融工程衍生性金融商品設計和評價影響最大的學者是巴黎第六大學數學教授妮可·厄爾·卡露伊（Nicole El Karoui），她是全球最早研究衍生性商品交易的學者，許多倫敦和華爾街投資銀行的金融工程師和專家都出自厄爾·卡露伊教授門下，厄爾·卡露伊教授她也是黑天鵝效應作者Nassim Taleb博士的博士論文口試教授。）導致的損害橫掃了房屋市場及其企業，繼而引發了次級房屋信貸危機。這危機令更大量的銀主盤被銀行在市場上拋售。這些過量的房屋供應使得周邊的住屋價格都大為下跌，造成它們容易遭法院收回拍賣或被放棄。

這個結果替往後的金融危機埋下了伏筆。

最初，受影響的公司只限於那些直接涉足建屋及次級貸款業務的公司如北岩銀行及美國國家金融服務公司。一些從事

按揭證券化的金融機構，例如貝爾斯登，就成為了犧牲品。2008年7月11日，全美最大的受押公司瓦解。印地麥克銀行的資產在他們被緊縮信貸下的壓力壓垮後被聯邦人員查封，由於房房價格的不斷下滑以及房屋回贖權喪失率的上升

。當天，金融市場急劇下跌。投資者想知道政府是否將試圖救助按揭放貸者房利美和房地美。2008年9月7日，已是晚夏時節，雖然聯邦政府接管了房利美和房地美，但危機仍然繼續加劇。

然後，危機開始影響到那些與房地產無關的普通信貸，而且進而影響到那些與按揭貸款沒有直接關係的大型金融機構

。在這些機構擁有的資產里，大多都是從那些與房屋按揭關聯的收益所取得的。對於這些以信用貸款為主要標的的證

券，或稱信用衍生性商品，原本是用來確保這些金融機構免於倒閉的風險。然而由於次級房屋信貸危機的發生，使得

受到這些信用衍生性商品衝擊的成員增加了，包括雷曼兄弟、美國國際集團、美林證券和HBOS。[3][4][5] 而其他的

公司開始面臨了壓力，包括美國最大的存款及借貸公司華盛頓互惠銀行，並影響到大型投資銀行摩根士丹利和高盛證券。[6][7]

[1.1] 對銀行如何就風險評級的警告

納辛·塔雷伯（Nassim Taleb）強烈警告有關銀行處理風險的方法，以及現今不負責任的金融體系環環緊扣的本質。

在他2006年所寫的書，《黑天鵝效應》[8] 里提出：

“全球一體化創造出脆弱和緊扣的經濟，表面上出現不反覆的情況及呈現十分穩定的景象。換言之，它使災難性的黑天鵝理論（意指不可能的事情）出現，而我們卻從未在全球崩潰的威脅下生活過。金融機構不斷的進行整並而成為少數幾間的超大型銀行，幾乎所有的銀行都是互相連結的。因此整個金融體系膨脹成一個由這些巨大、相互依存、疊屋架床的銀行所組成的生態，一旦其中一個倒下，全部都會垮掉。銀行間越趨劇烈的整並似乎有降低金融危機的可能性

，然而一旦發生了，這個危機會變成全球規模性，並且傷害我們至深。過去的多樣化生態是由眾多小型銀行組成，分別擁有各自的借貸政策，而現在所有的金融機構互相摹仿彼此的政策使得整個環境同質性越來越高。確實，失敗的機率降低了，但一旦失敗發生.....結果令我不敢想像。”

對於由政府出資的房屋貸款機構房利美，他認為：

“現在當我看着這場危機，就好比一個人坐在一桶炸藥之上，一個最小的打嗝也要去避免。不過不用害怕：他們（房利美）的大批科學家都認為這事‘非常不可能’發生。”

金融海嘯強大之處在於資本市場的中間圓圈部門被發現全面都是有問題或弊端。

[2] 美國聯邦儲備局的降息行動

聯儲局利率變動（2008年1月1日後）

日期 貼現率 貼現率 貼現率 聯邦基金 聯邦基金利率

Primary

Secondary

利率變動

新利率

新利率

利率變動

新利率

2008年10月8日*

-.50%

1.75%

2.25%

-.50%

1.50%

2008年9月30日

-.25%

2.25%

2.75%

-.25%

2.00%

2008年5月18日

-.75%

2.50%

3.00%

-.75%

2.25%

2008年3月16日

-.25%

3.25%

3.75%

2008年1月30日

-.50%

3.50%

4.00%

-.50%

3.00%

2008年1月22日

-.75%

4.00%

4.50%

-.75%

3.50%

* 配合全球主要央行減息半厘[9]

更多訊息參見 US federal discount rate列表

[3] 2008年9月14日後的一周

[3.1] 大型金融機構的危機

參見：美國國際集團

9月14日星期日，雷曼兄弟在美國聯準會拒絕提供資金支持援助後提出破產申請，而在同一天美林證券宣布被美國銀行收購。這兩件事標誌着接下來這一星期2008年9月全球股市大崩盤的序幕，在9月15日（星期一）和9月17日（星期

三）全球股市發生市值暴跌的情形。在9月16日，美國國際集團（AIG）因持有許多信用已經違約的到期合約而被調低其信用評級，該保險集團自身也陷入了一場清償危機（liquidity crisis）。 在AIG證實其已經無法找到願意給它提 供貸款、拯救它避免破產的出借人的情況下，聯儲局應AIG要求，向AIG提供高達850億美元的同業信貸融資便利服務 （credit facility），條件是獲取AIG 79.9%的權益性資本（equity interest），並有權對之前已經發行的普通股、優先股暫停派發紅利或股息。

[3.2] 貨幣市場基金保險及禁止放空

9月16日，金融市場上一家大型的共同基金Reserve Primary Fund因為披露其持有雷曼兄弟公司的債券，其股價下跌

至1美元以下，這導致投資者贖回他們的基金需求大幅擴散，金融危機進一步惡化[10]。截至9月18日早晨，總市值為4兆美元的市場上，機構投資者要求“賣出”（sell orders）的交易訂單市值高達5千億美元，而美國聯邦儲備系統注入市場的流動性資金僅有1050億美元，此刻立即使市場崩解[11]。 在9月19日，美國財政部提供暫時性的保險

（akin to FDIC insurance of bank accounts）向貨幣市場挹注資金[12]。 到本周末，英國金融服務管理局

（Financial Services Authority）、美國證券交易委員會暫停了對本國的金融類股票短線賣空交易[13]； 其他國家的金融主管單位也採取了類似的因應措施[14]。市場信心也在財政部和美國證券交易管理委員會的努力及公關宣傳

下得到了一定的恢復[15][16]。

[3.3] 美國救市方案

主條目：2008年經濟穩定緊急法案

[5] 2008年9月28日後的一周

布什召開兩院議會緊急經濟會議

星期日早上，美國財政部長和眾議會領袖宣布，他們在重要議題上已取得共識，包括只要保留着按揭保險計劃的可能性，總和7000億元不會變。[34]

根據2008年9月28日（周日）的報道，英國財政部實行了一項對於英國主要房貸銀行布拉福德-賓利銀行（Bradford & Bingley）的援助計劃。[35]

西班牙最大的銀行Grupo Santander計劃接收存款賬戶和辦公室的運作，而按揭和借貸會被國有化。[36]

2008年9月28日，荷比盧三國中的一家大型銀行和資產公司，富通金融集團，其資產部分被國有化，比利時、荷蘭和盧森堡政府共投注112億歐元（約163億美元）的金額給予這家銀行。比利時方面購買了富通金融集團比利時部門49%

的資產，而荷蘭方面與比利時針對富通金融集團的荷蘭部門進行同樣的舉動，盧森堡方面則同意提供借貸予富通金融集團的盧森堡部門49％的可轉換股份。[37]

根據2008年9月29日（周一）早上的報道，美國的第四大銀行Wachovia將被花旗銀行集團所併購。[38][39]

星期一時德國財政部長宣布救援Hypo Real Estate，一家總部設於慕尼黑、由數家地產財務銀行組成的控股公司，但是在10月4日（周日）此項救援方案被中止。同一天冰島政府接管了冰島第三大銀行格里特利爾銀行（Glitnir）。

[40][41]

儘管歐洲和美國投入了資金，股票市場還是在星期一大跌。[42][43]

而在9月29日（周一）美國的紓困計劃，也就是2008年經濟穩定緊急法案（HR 3997（，增長至110頁，於當周內稍後在 眾議院 和參議院引入。[44][45] 此議案在眾議院進行公開表決的40分鐘後，結果以贊成票205票、反對票228票

而未獲得通過。[46][47] 此項結果使得當天美國的股票市場產生重挫的情形，道瓊工業指數在數分鐘內即下跌300點，終場下跌777.68點；納斯達克指數下跌199.61點而跌破2000點大關；標準普爾500指數也下跌8.77％。[48] 最後道

瓊工業指數並在當天創下史上最大跌幅。[49] The S&P 500 Banking Index fell 14% on September 29 with drops in the stock value of a number of US banks generally considered sound, including Bank of New York

Mellon，State Street and Northern Trust; three Ohio banks, National City，Fifth Third，and KeyBank

were down dramatically.[50][51]

9月30日星期二，股市反彈，但借貸市場仍然緊張，倫敦同業拆放利率　(overnight dollar Libor) 從 4.7% 升到6.88%。[52]

而在同一日，法國、比利時和盧森堡三國政府提供90億歐元的資金紓困給法-比銀行德克夏集團（Dexia）。[53]

在愛爾蘭的銀行受到影響後，9月29日星期一愛爾蘭政府宣布將為6家愛爾蘭銀行（聯合愛爾蘭銀行（Allied Irish anks）、愛爾蘭銀行（Bank of Ireland）、英愛爾蘭銀行（Anglo Irish Bank）、愛爾蘭人壽（Irish Life and Permanent）、愛爾蘭全國金融 (Irish Nationwide) 和 EBS金融 (EBS Building Society)）承擔一個兩年的“安排 ，去擔保所有存款（零售、商業、機構及同業），包括債券、senior debt和dated subordinated debt (lower tier II)”，涉及債項為4000億美金左右。[54]

美國參議院的7000億美元紓困計劃（HR1424），修正為將存款保障上限提高至25萬美元，並包括1000億元的稅務優惠 ，紓緩公司和另類能源所面臨的壓力，最後以74-25的票數，得到兩黨支持而於10月1日獲得通過，[55] 而眾議院的 反應則不一。[56][57] 但於周五的一次投票中，眾議院以兩黨票數263－171，通過由參議院更改的2008年緊急經濟穩定法案。[58]

在歐洲，關於穩定金融體系的討論仍然持續著，最後於星期六下午在巴黎舉行會議，由法國總統薩科奇主持。據報道

，意大利的UniCredit成為最新一家受影響的銀行。[59] 在10月2日晚上，希臘政府也跟進愛爾蘭的政策，宣布保障該國所有銀行的存款。[60]

根據10月3日的報道，that Wachovia had rejected the previous offer from Citigroup in favor of

acquisition by 富國銀行，[61] resulting in a legal dispute with Citigroup.[62]

在10月3日，英國政府財政部門宣布將銀行存戶的存款保障總額度由35000英鎊提高到50000英鎊的政策，並於10月7日 生效。[63] 在10月3日（周五）， 荷蘭政府接收富通金融集團於荷蘭的業務來取代9月28日的挹注資金方案。[64]

[6] 2008年10月5日後的一周

在一個星期之後的10月6日（周一），冰島發生一個重大的銀行和財政危機，並導致冰島的主要貨幣冰島克朗對歐元 的匯率貶值30%。[65]在當天晚上冰島國會舉行的一項會議中通過了一個緊急法案，授與政府有較大的權限來接管和整頓銀行。冰島國家銀行（Landsbanki）和格里特利爾銀行（Glitnir）兩家銀行被政府接管，同時政府也對冰島最 大的銀行Kaupthing提供紓困方案。[66]

10月6日，冰島金融監督管理局決定暫時停止管制市場下由 格里特利爾銀行、Kaupthing銀行、冰島國家銀行、Straumur投信、Spron投信、Exista投信等銀行所發行的所有金融工具的交易。[67]

在10月6日工作日開始前，法國銀行BNP Paribas繼荷蘭政府將富通金融集團（Fortis）於荷蘭的業務國有化後，接收其所餘下的資產。[68]在10月6日星期一，丹麥、奧地利、可能還有德國，以及愛爾蘭和希臘，替國內的銀行存款做

擔保。[69][70]其後，代表英國重要上市公司的金融時報100指數錄得歷來最大的跌幅。[71]10月7號周二消費者貸款

救援計劃排入英國國會議程。[72]在10月6日德國總理安格拉·多羅特亞·梅克爾宣布政府會對德國私有銀行的所有 存款進行保障。 政府又宣布一個挽救德國借貸公司The Hypo Real Estate (HRE)的計劃。[73][74][75]在同一日美國紐約的道瓊工業指數重挫，在收盤時指數跌破了10,000點，即從2007年10月9日時的指數創下超過14,000點的高點

時，所累積的跌幅為30%。[76]在巴西和俄羅斯的股票交易市場於當周一宣布休市，以防止之後可能發生的股價重挫情形。[77]

美國電氣城金融海嘯中裁掉全部35000名員工後歇業情況

10月7日，冰島金融監督管理局布接管冰島國家銀行。[78][79]同一天，冰島中央銀行宣布俄羅斯答允將提供40億歐 元借貸。[80][81]然而這個消息很快的遭到俄羅斯官方的否認，並要求冰島財政部長必須更正稍早之前所做出，有關俄羅斯接受借貸給冰島的討論聲明，這一項否認是出於俄羅斯財政部副部長Dmitry Pankin。然而，稍後俄羅斯財政部長Alexei Kudrin便承認有收到這樣的請求，而俄羅斯正面回應，僅表示周內稍後冰島有派員到莫斯科開會，為金融議題展開討論。[82]

標準普爾更將冰島的外匯信用評級由A-/A-2下調至BBB/A-3，又將當地貨幣信用評級由A+/A-1

降至BBB+/A-2。標準普爾又將冰島銀行業風險組別由第五組改為第八組，並表示“於經濟嚴重衰退的情況中，累積的違約和重整貸款恐占冰島銀行業總輸出貸款35%到50%，等同於一半的放款有被倒帳風險。”[82]

就在同一日，俄羅斯總統宣示了一項對於俄羅斯國內銀行360億美元的紓困案。[83] 一些國家宣布了增加或更新的存款保證金額度：台灣政府提出將存款保障金額度提高兩倍至新台幣300萬元（92,000美元），[84] 而歐盟協議增加存款保障金額度為每一位歐盟存戶至少5萬歐元，部分歐盟國家宣布提高存款保障金的上限：荷蘭、西班牙和比利時政府宣布他們給予每一位存戶存款保障金上限至10萬歐元。[83]

而英國政府在10月8日星期三早上宣布，將提供250億英鎊購買"第一層機構"（等於政府入股買下優先股，簡

稱"PIBS"）的紓困案給下列金融機構，包括：艾比銀行、巴克萊銀行、HBOS、滙豐、Lloyds TSB、全國房產協會、蘇格蘭皇家銀行集團和渣打銀行。而其他金融機構會有另外的250億英鎊的紓困，包括在英國設立分行的外國銀行。 "

總體來講政府在英國銀行系統和經濟中扮演公共團體的角色".計劃也包含增加政府舉債上限，提供公平互助，履約國際承諾。[85]計劃被認為是將企業半國有化。[86]

10月8日星期三，歐洲央行、英格蘭銀行、美國聯邦儲備系統、加拿大央行、瑞典銀行和瑞士銀行於國際標準時間

11:00時共同宣布調降基準利率0.5% [87][88][89][90]，而中國人民銀行也隨後跟進調降基準利率。[91] 在10月8日

當天全球股市均呈現重挫，其中日本跌幅更達到9%，俄羅斯股市盤中暫停交易，而印尼股市在早盤大跌之後也停止交易。在美國，受到聯準會調降利率影響，股市停止下跌。[92]同一天美國聯準會再提供378億美元借貸給AIG集團，援

助AIG集團的總金額達到850億美元。[93]

10月9日星期四，冰島金融監督管理局接手掌管冰島國內最大的銀行 Kaupthing Bank。[94][95] Kaupthing也宣布讓政府接管。This came about when "Britain transferred control of the business of Kaupthing Edge, its

Internet bank, to ING Direct and put Kaupthing's UK operations into administration" placing Kaupthing

in technical default according to loan agreements.[96] 由於冰島限制當地銀行所有存戶提款（當中包括海外

客戶存款），所以造成冰島和英國的關繫緊張。

[7] 美國民眾對政府用國庫資金救大銀行的反應

對於美國政府的7000億美元紓困案，有65%的美國民眾反對。美國民眾指出，大銀行們先是主張資本主義式的放任型

擴張，現在出了事卻要求以社會主義的方式掏國庫的錢救大銀行的資本家們，民眾卻失業，信用破產與失去房子。

[97] 除此之外，國際上也有一些學者認為，7000億美元根本遠遠不夠。[98]

[8] 美國聯邦準備理事會開動“印鈔機”與伊朗提出“美元替代方案”

本條目中立性有爭議。內容、語調可能帶有明顯的個人觀點或地方色彩。（2010年5月6日）

加上此模板的編輯者需在討論頁說明此文中立性有爭議的原因，以便讓各編輯者討論和改善。

在編輯之前請務必察看討論頁。

《貨幣戰爭》一書的作者宋鴻兵於2009年3月5日在“美國國債是有史以來最大的騙局”一文中表示：“（美國）商業銀行體系把它的爛賬轉移至美國政府的資產負債表上，美國政府再把資產負債表上的爛賬轉移至每個納稅人的家庭資產…而這一切最終以國債的形式來體現…這些國債誰來買？如果最後賣不動，最後的購買者是誰？那就是美聯儲。”[99] 之後，由於金融危機愈演愈烈，美聯儲在2009年3月18日宣布將在未來幾個月內收購3000億美元的長期美

國國債和最多1.25兆美元房利美與房地美發行的按揭貸款支持證券，即所謂的“量化寬鬆”貨幣政策。“美聯儲的真

正家底是8200噸黃金儲備，但即使將其全部拋售也僅值2700億美元左右，連此次購買長期國債的錢都不夠。” 這也

顯示出各界憂慮美聯儲開印鈔機救市，將導致美元的通貨膨脹。[100]

 

[9] 未來展望

主流經濟學家都同意，如果資金流動性危機不解除，全球性衰退將成定局，另有許多媒體認為最佳狀況下也會有5年

的經濟低迷。[103][104] 2009年4月13日經濟學權威克魯曼於演講中表示，如果各國政府目前的做法依然不變，甚至 認為金融海嘯已經近尾聲，那麼很快史上最慘烈的大蕭條即將來襲，因為不管股市反彈與否、數據降幅縮小與否、銀

行業打消狀況好壞，整體世界經濟下墜中並且工作數量持續下墜是不可扭轉的既定事實，30年代大蕭條也是先有一段看似好轉期後續第二波的主海嘯卻突然來襲，就算在最佳狀態的假設成立；真的觸底也會陷入日本失落十年重演，到了底部後就從此盤整再也沒有爬起來，而現在與未來的世界情勢卻比當年日本面對的嚴重十倍。[105]

[10] 時序

[10.1] 發生來源

次級房屋信貸危機

[10.2] 2007年的事件

2007年8月9日－爆發流動性危機[106][107]

2007年10月9日－道瓊斯工業平均指數創歷史新高14,164點[108]

[10.3] 2008年的事件

2008年環球股災

貝爾斯登被接管

美聯儲接管房利美和房貸美

2008年9月流動性危機

美國國際集團陷入財困

美林證券被美國銀行收購

雷曼兄弟申請破產保護

華盛頓互惠宣布破產，被美聯儲接管後售予摩根大通

Wachovia的存款業務可能被花旗銀行收購[109]，但富國銀行也有意併購[61]

2008年經濟穩定緊急法案

Hypo Real Estate接受德國政府擔保

冰島瀕臨破產，三大銀行被接管

美國宣布7000億美金救市計劃的前半段2900億救助金融業不理想，後續改為救助消費者，等於宣示經濟衰退已經從短期風暴變成長期抗戰

布什總統宣布以134億美金緊急紓困即將瀕臨倒閉的通用、福特、克萊斯勒等三大車廠

[10.4] 2009年的事件

2009年歐盟失業率 中國家電下鄉和汽車下鄉。

西班牙一月失業率升高到13.3%創歷史新高。

日元大幅升值影響，日本主要的汽車與電子公司財報總虧損超過2.6兆日幣。

英鎊大貶值。

美國一月失業率升到7.4%。

德國奇夢達與加拿大北電網絡均宣告申請破產保護。

美國總統奧巴馬於2月18日簽署通過7870億美元振興經濟方案，即日起將正式生效，藉由減稅、擴大公共建設與社會福利，補助地方政府等措施，來振興經濟，並期望未來2年創造350萬個工作機會。

韓圓大幅貶值，但隨後又大幅升值到33元，新台幣貶破35元關卡。

3月2日美國財政部及聯邦儲備委員會再提供給美國國際集團300億美元資金援助。

美國克萊斯勒汽車4月30日宣告申請破產保護，意大利菲亞特汽車將合併重整克萊斯勒。

英國五月失業率攀升至7.3%，失業人數高達227萬人，創12年來最高。

美國五月失業率升高至9.4%，再創26年新高。

美國通用汽車公司6月1日向曼哈頓區法庭宣告申請破產保護並組織重整，並由美國和加拿大兩政府接管，宣布將再 裁員1萬人。

德國百貨零售與旅遊業巨擘Arcandor集團6月向法院聲請破產保護，將造成4萬3千多人失業。

全世界發行量最大的老牌月刊讀者文摘8月宣告申請破產保護。

美國八月份失業率再次升高至9.7%。

中華民國（台灣）8月失業率再次增為6.13%，全國失業人數為67萬2千多人，繼續創歷史新高。

俄羅斯最大汽車製造商奧托瓦茲汽車集團（Avtovaz），9月25日宣布將大幅度裁員2萬7600人。

由於全球避險需求增加，國際金價10月衝破每盎斯1000美元，年底金價預估恐破1200美元。

德國與芬蘭合資的電信大廠諾基亞西門子通信將裁員5800人。美國嬌生公司為了節省成本全球將裁員逾7000人。

國際金價11月再次衝破每盎斯1101美元，繼續創新高。

擁有百年歷史，同時是全美國最大，中小企業商業貸款機構的CIT集團，11月2日正式申請破產保護，成為全美國第五大的企業破產案。

 

美國勞工部公布十月份失業率突破10%，以10.2%再次續創26年來新高，聯邦參議院通過將失業給付再延長14周，失業率超過8.5%的州另額外延長6周。

阿拉伯聯合酋長國迪拜財政部11月25日宣布國營企業迪拜世界總負債590億美元，爆發債務危機，恐危及全球股票型基金與投資，當日全球股市均受重挫。

12月16日，標準普爾分級將希臘國家信用等級從A-下降一級為BBB+，引發歐元拋售，並帶動一連串歐洲國家評級下 降，觸發了歐洲主權債務危機。

[10.5] 2010年的事件

日本最大的航空公司日本航空公司1月19日正式向東京地方法院申請破產保護，並宣布再裁員1萬5千人。

瑞典電信大廠愛立信1月25日宣布由於09年實施整頓支出增加，導致獲利萎縮，將因此裁員6500人。

西班牙一月份全國失業率高達19.3％，再續創30年來最高記錄，也是歐盟地區失業率最高的國家。

日本一月份全國平均失業率為5.1%，全國失業人數為317萬人。

由於希臘政府出現公債危機及財政赤字影響下，歐元兌換美元重貶1.40元。

2月5日受到歐元區債信危機影響下，全球爆發大股災，歐、美、亞洲股市均重挫大跌，葡萄牙、西班牙股市大跌逾

5%，亞洲股市跌幅超過3％，台灣股市重挫324點。

美國1月份失業率下滑至9.7%。

2月24日希臘發起全國性百萬人大罷工，以抗議歐盟及希臘政府因債信危機所進行的削減社會福利及緊縮政策，並且爆發嚴重警民衝突。同時德國、法國、英國的航空業及其它交通運輸業人員憂心未來就業權益受損下，也發動全面性的大罷工事件。

高盛集團於4月16日遭到美國證券交易委員會控告涉嫌詐欺，並隱瞞次貸危機案等重要金融資訊誤導投資人，當日高

盛股價應聲崩落16%。而全球股市與石油、黃金價格也跟着大跌倒地不起。

4月27日國際信用評級機構標準普爾公司將希臘的長期主權信用評級降至垃圾級，而對葡萄牙的評等降兩級至A-，再 掉四級就會進入垃圾等級，歐美金融市場受此影響均下挫。

5月2日歐元區成員國和國際貨幣基金組織決定在未來三年內共同向希臘提供1100億歐元的貸款，以幫助陷入債務危機的希臘渡過難關。

歐元兌換美元於5月19日再次重貶1.2144元，同時德國當局也宣布限制投機性放空交易行為，全球股市均再次重挫。

6月的調查顯示，美國人自購健康保險的費用飆漲20%。 [110]

近期美元走弱和歐債危機影響下，以及人民幣匯率升值帶動亞洲貨幣走強之外，國際金價6月份以每盎斯1261美元作收，再續創歷史新高紀錄。

由於西班牙長期經濟不穩、成長前景疲弱，穆迪信評機構已將其主權債信等級“列入可能降級觀察”，把西班牙列入調降評等的觀察名單。

美國6月份全國失業率下降至9.5%，創下今年新低紀錄。

[10.6] 2011年的事件

6月29日，希臘議會經表決通過了政府的中期緊縮方案。由於一再實施緊縮政策，希臘經濟已經連續三年衰退，失業率已達到16%。[111] 希臘民眾與工會則認為政府的緊縮政策是壓迫低收入者及其他經濟拮据的民眾，來解決上層權貴自己造成的問題，因而發動了大罷工來回應。[112]

7月21日，美國金融業監督單位消費者金融保護局開始營運，可以派駐“金融警察”到大型金融機構監督業務。

8月5日，標準普爾宣布調降將美國債信評等由AAA調降至AA+，為該公司自1941年來首次調降美國債信評等。[113]

9月17日，占領華爾街運動，金融危機的受害者們紛紛走上街頭表示不滿。

9月21日，美國聯邦儲備局宣布採用扭曲操作。

10月9日，美國明富環球控股公司宣布破產保護。

[10.7] 2012年的事件

2月19日針對歐洲與美國的制裁，伊朗宣布切斷對英國、法國的供油，加速歐美的衰退。[114][115]

6月17日希臘新民主黨在選舉中微弱執政，退出歐元區的市場恐慌風暴暫時平息。

7月11日美國百利金融集團傳出倒閉，總執行長自殺未遂，客戶資金2.2億美金去向不明。

[編輯] 相關條目

歐洲主權債務危機

歐豬五國

次級房屋信貸危機

雷曼兄弟

各國信用評級列表

1920年-1930年經濟大蕭條

1997年亞洲金融危機

2008年冰島金融危機

汽車沙皇

存款保險

檸檬社會主義

金融工程學

日本病

美國各州失業率列表

金融學領域

[編輯] 參考資料

1.^ 商業周刊-國際-全球-金融海嘯：雷曼兄弟破產啟示錄. 商業周刊. 2008-09-22 [2008-09-23].

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10.^ "Money Market Funds Enter a World of Risk" article by Tara Siegel Bernard in The New York Times

September 17, 2008

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21.^ Draft Proposal for Bailout Plan (September 21, 2008). New York Times

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Jump to:

For an overview of major global economic issues since 2007, see 2007–2012 global economic crisis.

The examples and perspective in this article may not represent a worldwide view of the subject. Please

improve this article and discuss the issue on the talk page. (October 2012)

The TED spread (in red) increased significantly during the financial crisis, reflecting an increase in

perceived credit risk.

World map showing real GDP growth rates for 2009. (Countries in brown were in recession.)

2007–2012 global economic crisis

Major dimensions[show]

Countries[show]

Causes[show]

Summits[show]

Legislation and spending[show]

Company bailouts[show]

The financial crisis of 2007–2008, also known as the global financial crisis and 2008 financial

crisis, is considered by many economists to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression

of the 1930s.[1][2] It resulted in the threat of total collapse of large financial institutions, the

bailout of banks by national governments, and downturns in stock markets around the world. In many

areas, the housing market also suffered, resulting in evictions, foreclosures and prolonged

unemployment. The crisis played a significant role in the failure of key businesses, declines in

consumer wealth estimated in trillions of US dollars, and a downturn in economic activity leading to

the 2008–2012 global recession and contributing to the European sovereign-debt crisis.[3][4] The

active phase of the crisis, which manifested as a liquidity crisis, can be dated from August 7, 2007

when BNP Paribas terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds citing "a complete evaporation of

liquidity".[5]

The bursting of the U.S. housing bubble, which peaked in 2006,[6] caused the values of securities tied

to U.S. real estate pricing to plummet, damaging financial institutions globally.[7][8] The financial

crisis was triggered by a complex interplay of government policies that encouraged home ownership,

providing easier access to loans for subprime borrowers, overvaluation of bundled sub-prime mortgages

based on the theory that housing prices would continue to escalate, questionable trading practices on

behalf of both buyers and sellers, compensation structures that prioritize short-term deal flow over

long-term value creation, and a lack of adequate capital holdings from banks and insurance companies

to back the financial commitments they were making.[9][10][11][12] Questions regarding bank solvency,

declines in credit availability and damaged investor confidence had an impact on global stock markets,

where securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 2009. Economies worldwide slowed during

this period, as credit tightened and international trade declined.[13] Governments and central banks

responded with unprecedented fiscal stimulus, monetary policy expansion and institutional bailouts.

Although there have been aftershocks, the financial crisis itself ended sometime between late-2008 and

mid-2009.[14][15][16] In the U.S., Congress passed the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009.

In the EU, the UK responded with austerity measures of spending cuts and tax increases without export

growth and it has since slid into a double-dip recession.[17][18]

Many causes for the financial crisis have been suggested, with varying weight assigned by experts.[19]

The U.S. Senate's Levin–Coburn Report asserted that the crisis was the result of "high risk, complex

financial products; undisclosed conflicts of interest; the failure of regulators, the credit rating

agencies, and the market itself to rein in the excesses of Wall Street."[20] The 1999 repeal of the

Glass–Steagall Act effectively removed the separation between investment banks and depository banks

in the United States.[21] Critics argued that credit rating agencies and investors failed to

accurately price the risk involved with mortgage-related financial products, and that governments did

not adjust their regulatory practices to address 21st-century financial markets.[22] Research into the

causes of the financial crisis has also focused on the role of interest rate spreads.[23]

In the immediate aftermath of the financial crisis palliative fiscal and monetary policies were

adopted to lessen the shock to the economy.[24] In July, 2010, the Dodd-Frank regulatory reforms were

enacted to lessen the chance of a recurrence. [25]

Contents

 1 Background

1.1 Subprime lending

1.2 Growth of the housing bubble

1.3 Easy credit conditions

1.4 Weak and fraudulent underwriting practices

1.5 Predatory lending

1.6 Deregulation

1.7 Increased debt burden or over-leveraging

1.8 Financial innovation and complexity

1.9 Incorrect pricing of risk

1.10 Boom and collapse of the shadow banking system

1.11 Commodities boom

1.12 Systemic crisis

1.13 Role of economic forecasting

2 Impact on financial markets 2.1 US stock market

2.2 Financial institutions

2.3 Credit markets and the shadow banking system

2.4 Wealth effects

2.5 European contagion

3 Effects on the global economy 3.1 Global effects

3.2 U.S. economic effects 3.2.1 Real gross domestic product

3.2.2 Distribution of wealth in the USA

3.3 Official economic projections

4 Government responses 4.1 Emergency and short-term responses

4.2 Regulatory proposals and long-term responses

4.3 United States Congress response

4.4 Court proceedings

4.5 Continuation of the financial crisis in the U.S. housing market

5 Stabilization

6 Media coverage

7 Emerging and developing economies drive global economic growth

 See also  References

 External links and further reading

[1] Background

Main article: Causes of the late-2000s financial crisis

The immediate cause or trigger of the crisis was the bursting of the United States housing bubble

which peaked in approximately 2005–2006.[26][27] Already-rising default rates on "subprime" and

adjustable-rate mortgages (ARM) began to increase quickly thereafter. As banks began to give out more

loans to potential home owners, housing prices began to rise.

Easy availability of credit in the US, fueled by large inflows of foreign funds after the Russian debt

crisis and Asian financial crisis of the 1997-1998 period, led to a housing construction boom and

facilitated debt-financed consumer spending. Lax lending standards and rising real estate prices also

contributed to the Real estate bubble. Loans of various types (e.g., mortgage, credit card, and auto)

were easy to obtain and consumers assumed an unprecedented debt load.[28] [29][30]

As part of the housing and credit booms, the number of financial agreements called mortgage-backed

securities (MBS) and collateralized debt obligations (CDO), which derived their value from mortgage

payments and housing prices, greatly increased.[8] Such financial innovation enabled institutions and

investors around the world to invest in the U.S. housing market. As housing prices declined, major

global financial institutions that had borrowed and invested heavily in subprime MBS reported

significant losses.[31]

Falling prices also resulted in homes worth less than the mortgage loan, providing a financial

incentive to enter foreclosure. The ongoing foreclosure epidemic that began in late 2006 in the U.S.

continues to drain wealth from consumers and erodes the financial strength of banking institutions.

Defaults and losses on other loan types also increased significantly as the crisis expanded from the

housing market to other parts of the economy. Total losses are estimated in the trillions of U.S.

dollars globally.[31]

Share in GDP of U.S. financial sector since 1860[32]

While the housing and credit bubbles were building, a series of factors caused the financial system to

both expand and become increasingly fragile, a process called financialization. U.S. Government policy

from the 1970s onward has emphasized deregulation to encourage business, which resulted in less

oversight of activities and less disclosure of information about new activities undertaken by banks

and other evolving financial institutions. Thus, policymakers did not immediately recognize the

increasingly important role played by financial institutions such as investment banks and hedge funds,

also known as the shadow banking system. Some experts believe these institutions had become as

important as commercial (depository) banks in providing credit to the U.S. economy, but they were not

subject to the same regulations.[33]

These institutions, as well as certain regulated banks, had also assumed significant debt burdens

while providing the loans described above and did not have a financial cushion sufficient to absorb

large loan defaults or MBS losses.[34] These losses impacted the ability of financial institutions to

lend, slowing economic activity. Concerns regarding the stability of key financial institutions drove

central banks to provide funds to encourage lending and restore faith in the commercial paper markets,

which are integral to funding business operations. Governments also bailed out key financial

institutions and implemented economic stimulus programs, assuming significant additional financial

commitments.

The U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission reported its findings in January 2011. It concluded that

"the crisis was avoidable and was caused by: Widespread failures in financial regulation, including

the Federal Reserve’s failure to stem the tide of toxic mortgages; Dramatic breakdowns in corporate

governance including too many financial firms acting recklessly and taking on too much risk; An

explosive mix of excessive borrowing and risk by households and Wall Street that put the financial

system on a collision course with crisis; Key policy makers ill prepared for the crisis, lacking a

full understanding of the financial system they oversaw; and systemic breaches in accountability and

ethics at all levels."[35][36]

[1.1] Subprime lending

Main article: Subprime mortgage crisis

Intense competition between mortgage lenders for revenue and market share, and the limited supply of

creditworthy borrowers, caused mortgage lenders to relax underwriting standards and originate riskier

mortgages to less creditworthy borrowers.[8] Before 2003, when the mortgage securitization market was

dominated by regulated and relatively conservative Government Sponsored Enterprises, GSEs policed

mortgage originators and maintained relatively high underwriting standards. However, as market power

shifted from securitizers to originators and as intense competition from private securitizers

undermined GSE power, mortgage standards declined and risky loans proliferated.[8] The worst loans

were originated in 2004–2007, the years of the most intense competition between securitizers and the

lowest market share for the GSEs.

U.S. subprime lending expanded dramatically 2004–2006

As well as easy credit conditions, there is evidence that competitive pressures contributed to an

increase in the amount of subprime lending during the years preceding the crisis. Major U.S.

investment banks and government sponsored enterprises like Fannie Mae played an important role in the

expansion of lending, with GSEs eventually relaxing their standards to try to catch up with the

private banks.[37][38]

Subprime mortgages remained below 10% of all mortgage originations until 2004, when they spiked to

nearly 20% and remained there through the 2005–2006 peak of the United States housing bubble.[39]

Some long-time critics of government and the GSEs, like American Enterprise Institute fellow Peter J.

Wallison,[40] claim that the roots of the crisis can be traced directly to risky lending by government

sponsored entities Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Although Wallison's claims have received widespread

attention in the media and by policy makers, the majority report of the Financial Crisis Inquiry

Commission, several studies by Federal Reserve economists, and the work of independent scholars

suggest that Wallison's claims are not supported by data.[8] In fact, the GSEs loans performed far

better than loans securitized by private investment banks, and GSE loans performed better than some

loans originated by institutions that held loans in their own portfolios.[8]

Wallison has been widely criticized for attempting to politicize the investigation of the Financial

Crisis Inquiry Commission, and his critics include fellow Republican Commissioners.[41] Morgenson and

Rosner also highlight the role of the GSEs in non-prime lending.[42] Others agree[43][44] and

disagree.[45][46]

On September 30, 1999, The New York Times reported that the Clinton Administration pushed for more

lending to low and moderate income borrowers, while the mortgage industry sought guarantees for sub-

prime loans:

Fannie Mae, the nation's biggest underwriter of home mortgages, has been under increasing pressure

from the Clinton Administration to expand mortgage loans among low and moderate income people and felt

pressure from stock holders to maintain its phenomenal growth in profits. In addition, banks, thrift

institutions and mortgage companies have been pressing Fannie Mae to help them make more loans to so-

called subprime borrowers... In moving, even tentatively, into this new area of lending, Fannie Mae is

taking on significantly more risk, which may not pose any difficulties during flush economic times.

But the government-subsidized corporation may run into trouble in an economic downturn, prompting a

government rescue similar to that of the savings and loan industry in the 1980s.[47]

In the early and mid-2000s (decade), the Bush administration called numerous times[48] for

investigation into the safety and soundness of the GSEs and their swelling portfolio of subprime

mortgages. On September 10, 2003 the House Financial Services Committee held a hearing at the urging

of the administration to assess safety and soundness issues and to review a recent report by the

Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) that had uncovered accounting discrepancies

within the two entities.[49] The hearings never resulted in new legislation or formal investigation of

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, as many of the committee members refused to accept the report and instead

rebuked OFHEO for their attempt at regulation.[50] Some believe this was an early warning to the

systemic risk that the growing market in subprime mortgages posed to the U.S. financial system that

went unheeded.[51]

A 2000 United States Department of the Treasury study of lending trends for 305 cities from 1993 to

1998 showed that $467 billion of mortgage lending was made by Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)-covered

lenders into low and mid level income (LMI) borrowers and neighborhoods, representing 10% of all U.S.

mortgage lending during the period. The majority of these were prime loans. Sub-prime loans made by

CRA-covered institutions constituted a 3% market share of LMI loans in 1998,[52] but in the run-up to

the crisis, fully 25% of all sub-prime lending occurred at CRA-covered institutions and another 25% of

sub-prime loans had some connection with CRA.[53]

An analysis by the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas in 2009, however, concluded unequivocally that the

CRA was not responsible for the mortgage loan crisis, pointing out that CRA rules have been in place

since 1995 whereas the poor lending emerged only a decade later.[54] Furthermore, most sub-prime loans

were not made to the LMI borrowers targeted by the CRA, especially in the years 2005–2006 leading up

to the crisis. Nor did it find any evidence that lending under the CRA rules increased delinquency

rates or that the CRA indirectly influenced independent mortgage lenders to ramp up sub-prime lending.

Economist Paul Krugman argued in January 2010 that the simultaneous growth of the residential and

commercial real estate pricing bubbles undermines the case made by those who argue that Fannie Mae,

Freddie Mac, CRA or predatory lending were primary causes of the crisis. In other words, bubbles in

both markets developed even though only the residential market was affected by these potential

causes.[55] Others have pointed out that there were not enough of these loans made to cause a crisis

of this magnitude. In an article in Portfolio Magazine, Michael Lewis spoke with one trader who noted

that "There weren’t enough Americans with [bad] credit taking out [bad loans] to satisfy investors'

appetite for the end product." Essentially, investment banks and hedge funds used financial innovation

to enable large wagers to be made, far beyond the actual value of the underlying mortgage loans, using

derivatives called credit default swaps, collateralized debt obligations and synthetic CDOs.[56]

As of March 2011 the FDIC has had to pay out $9 billion to cover losses on bad loans at 165 failed

financial institutions.[57]

[1.2] Growth of the housing bubble

Main article: United States housing bubble

A graph showing the median and average sales prices of new homes sold in the United States between

1963 and 2008 (not adjusted for inflation)[58]

Between 1997 and 2006, the price of the typical American house increased by 124%.[59] During the two

decades ending in 2001, the national median home price ranged from 2.9 to 3.1 times median household

income. This ratio rose to 4.0 in 2004, and 4.6 in 2006.[60] This housing bubble resulted in many

homeowners refinancing their homes at lower interest rates, or financing consumer spending by taking

out second mortgages secured by the price appreciation.

In a Peabody Award winning program, NPR correspondents argued that a "Giant Pool of Money"

(represented by $70 trillion in worldwide fixed income investments) sought higher yields than those

offered by U.S. Treasury bonds early in the decade. This pool of money had roughly doubled in size

from 2000 to 2007, yet the supply of relatively safe, income generating investments had not grown as

fast. Investment banks on Wall Street answered this demand with products such as the mortgage-backed

security and the collateralized debt obligation that were assigned safe ratings by the credit rating

agencies.[61]

In effect, Wall Street connected this pool of money to the mortgage market in the U.S., with enormous

fees accruing to those throughout the mortgage supply chain, from the mortgage broker selling the

loans, to small banks that funded the brokers and the large investment banks behind them. By

approximately 2003, the supply of mortgages originated at traditional lending standards had been

exhausted, and continued strong demand began to drive down lending standards.[61]

The collateralized debt obligation in particular enabled financial institutions to obtain investor

funds to finance subprime and other lending, extending or increasing the housing bubble and generating

large fees. This essentially places cash payments from multiple mortgages or other debt obligations

into a single pool from which specific securities draw in a specific sequence of priority. Those

securities first in line received investment-grade ratings from rating agencies. Securities with lower

priority had lower credit ratings but theoretically a higher rate of return on the amount invested.

[62][63]

By September 2008, average U.S. housing prices had declined by over 20% from their mid-2006 peak.[64]

[65] As prices declined, borrowers with adjustable-rate mortgages could not refinance to avoid the

higher payments associated with rising interest rates and began to default. During 2007, lenders began

foreclosure proceedings on nearly 1.3 million properties, a 79% increase over 2006.[66] This increased

to 2.3 million in 2008, an 81% increase vs. 2007.[67] By August 2008, 9.2% of all U.S. mortgages

outstanding were either delinquent or in foreclosure.[68] By September 2009, this had risen to 14.4%.

[69]

[1.3] Easy credit conditions

Lower interest rates encouraged borrowing. From 2000 to 2003, the Federal Reserve lowered the federal

funds rate target from 6.5% to 1.0%.[70] This was done to soften the effects of the collapse of the

dot-com bubble and the September 2001 terrorist attacks, as well as to combat a perceived risk of

deflation.[71] As early as 2002 it was apparent that credit was fueling housing instead of business

investment as some economists went so far as to advocate that the Fed "needs to create a housing

bubble to replace the Nasdaq bubble".[72]

U.S. current account deficit.

Additional downward pressure on interest rates was created by the high and rising U.S. current account

deficit, which peaked along with the housing bubble in 2006. Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke

explained how trade deficits required the U.S. to borrow money from abroad, in the process bidding up

bond prices and lowering interest rates.[73]

Bernanke explained that between 1996 and 2004, the U.S. current account deficit increased by $650

billion, from 1.5% to 5.8% of GDP. Financing these deficits required the country to borrow large sums

from abroad, much of it from countries running trade surpluses. These were mainly the emerging

economies in Asia and oil-exporting nations. The balance of payments identity requires that a country

(such as the U.S.) running a current account deficit also have a capital account (investment) surplus

of the same amount. Hence large and growing amounts of foreign funds (capital) flowed into the U.S. to

finance its imports.

All of this created demand for various types of financial assets, raising the prices of those assets

while lowering interest rates. Foreign investors had these funds to lend either because they had very

high personal savings rates (as high as 40% in China) or because of high oil prices. Ben Bernanke has

referred to this as a "saving glut".[74]

A flood of funds (capital or liquidity) reached the U.S. financial markets. Foreign governments

supplied funds by purchasing Treasury bonds and thus avoided much of the direct impact of the crisis.

U.S. households, on the other hand, used funds borrowed from foreigners to finance consumption or to

bid up the prices of housing and financial assets. Financial institutions invested foreign funds in

mortgage-backed securities.

The Fed then raised the Fed funds rate significantly between July 2004 and July 2006.[75] This

contributed to an increase in 1-year and 5-year adjustable-rate mortgage (ARM) rates, making ARM

interest rate resets more expensive for homeowners.[76] This may have also contributed to the

deflating of the housing bubble, as asset prices generally move inversely to interest rates, and it

became riskier to speculate in housing.[77][78] U.S. housing and financial assets dramatically

declined in value after the housing bubble burst.[79][80]

[1.4] Weak and fraudulent underwriting practices

Testimony given to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission by Richard M. Bowen III on events during

his tenure as the Business Chief Underwriter for Correspondent Lending in the Consumer Lending Group

for Citigroup (where he was responsible for over 220 professional underwriters) suggests that by the

final years of the U.S. housing bubble (2006–2007), the collapse of mortgage underwriting standards

was endemic. His testimony stated that by 2006, 60% of mortgages purchased by Citi from some 1,600

mortgage companies were "defective" (were not underwritten to policy, or did not contain all policy-

required documents) - this, despite the fact that each of these 1,600 originators were contractually

responsible (certified via representations and warrantees) that their mortgage originations met Citi's

standards. Moreover, during 2007, "defective mortgages (from mortgage originators contractually bound

to perform underwriting to Citi's standards) increased... to over 80% of production".[81]

In separate testimony to Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, officers of Clayton Holdings—the

largest residential loan due diligence and securitization surveillance company in the United States

and Europe—testified that Clayton's review of over 900,000 mortgages issued from January 2006 to June

2007 revealed that scarcely 54% of the loans met their originators’ underwriting standards. The

analysis (conducted on behalf of 23 investment and commercial banks, including 7 "too big to fail"

banks) additionally showed that 28% of the sampled loans did not meet the minimal standards of any

issuer. Clayton's analysis further showed that 39% of these loans (i.e. those not meeting any issuer's

minimal underwriting standards) were subsequently securitized and sold to investors.[82][83]

There is strong evidence that the GSEs — due to their large size and market power — were far more

effective at policing underwriting by originators and forcing underwriters to repurchase defective

loans. By contrast, private securitizers have been far less aggressive and less effective in

recovering losses from originators on behalf of investors.[8]

[1.5] Predatory lending

Predatory lending refers to the practice of unscrupulous lenders, enticing borrowers to enter into

"unsafe" or "unsound" secured loans for inappropriate purposes.[84] A classic bait-and-switch method

was used by Countrywide Financial, advertising low interest rates for home refinancing. Such loans

were written into extensively detailed contracts, and swapped for more expensive loan products on the

day of closing. Whereas the advertisement might state that 1% or 1.5% interest would be charged, the

consumer would be put into an adjustable rate mortgage (ARM) in which the interest charged would be

greater than the amount of interest paid. This created negative amortization, which the credit

consumer might not notice until long after the loan transaction had been consummated.

Countrywide, sued by California Attorney General Jerry Brown for "unfair business practices" and

"false advertising" was making high cost mortgages "to homeowners with weak credit, adjustable rate

mortgages (ARMs) that allowed homeowners to make interest-only payments".[85] When housing prices

decreased, homeowners in ARMs then had little incentive to pay their monthly payments, since their

home equity had disappeared. This caused Countrywide's financial condition to deteriorate, ultimately

resulting in a decision by the Office of Thrift Supervision to seize the lender.

Former employees from Ameriquest, which was United States' leading wholesale lender,[86] described a

system in which they were pushed to falsify mortgage documents and then sell the mortgages to Wall

Street banks eager to make fast profits.[86] There is growing evidence that such mortgage frauds may

be a cause of the crisis.[86]

[1.6] Deregulation

Further information: Government policies and the subprime mortgage crisis

Critics such as economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner have argued that

the regulatory framework did not keep pace with financial innovation, such as the increasing

importance of the shadow banking system, derivatives and off-balance sheet financing. A recent OECD

study[87] suggest that bank regulation based on the Basel accords encourage unconventional business

practices and contributed to or even reinforced the financial crisis. In other cases, laws were

changed or enforcement weakened in parts of the financial system. Key examples include:

Jimmy Carter's Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) phased

out a number of restrictions on banks' financial practices, broadened their lending powers, allowed

credit unions and savings and loans to offer checkable deposits, and raised the deposit insurance

limit from $40,000 to $100,000 (thereby potentially lessening depositor scrutiny of lenders' risk

management policies.)[88]

In October 1982, U.S. President Ronald Reagan signed into law the Garn–St. Germain Depository

Institutions Act, which provided for adjustable-rate mortgage loans, began the process of banking

deregulation,[citation needed] and contributed to the savings and loan crisis of the late 1980s/early

1990s.[89]

In November 1999, U.S. President Bill Clinton signed into law the Gramm–Leach–Bliley Act, which

repealed part of the Glass–Steagall Act of 1933. This repeal has been criticized for reducing the

separation between commercial banks (which traditionally had fiscally conservative policies) and

investment banks (which had a more risk-taking culture).[90][91] However, the vast majority of

failures were at institutions that were created by Glass-Steagall.[92]

In 2004, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission relaxed the net capital rule, which enabled

investment banks to substantially increase the level of debt they were taking on, fueling the growth

in mortgage-backed securities supporting subprime mortgages. The SEC has conceded that self-regulation

of investment banks contributed to the crisis.[93][94]

Financial institutions in the shadow banking system are not subject to the same regulation as

depository banks, allowing them to assume additional debt obligations relative to their financial

cushion or capital base.[95] This was the case despite the Long-Term Capital Management debacle in

1998, where a highly-leveraged shadow institution failed with systemic implications.

Regulators and accounting standard-setters allowed depository banks such as Citigroup to move

significant amounts of assets and liabilities off-balance sheet into complex legal entities called

structured investment vehicles, masking the weakness of the capital base of the firm or degree of

leverage or risk taken. One news agency estimated that the top four U.S. banks will have to return

between $500 billion and $1 trillion to their balance sheets during 2009.[96] This increased

uncertainty during the crisis regarding the financial position of the major banks.[97] Off-balance

sheet entities were also used by Enron as part of the scandal that brought down that company in 2001.

[98]

As early as 1997, Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan fought to keep the derivatives market

unregulated.[99] With the advice of the President's Working Group on Financial Markets,[100] the U.S.

Congress and President allowed the self-regulation of the over-the-counter derivatives market when

they enacted the Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000. Derivatives such as credit default swaps

(CDS) can be used to hedge or speculate against particular credit risks. The volume of CDS outstanding

increased 100-fold from 1998 to 2008, with estimates of the debt covered by CDS contracts, as of

November 2008, ranging from US$33 to $47 trillion. Total over-the-counter (OTC) derivative notional

value rose to $683 trillion by June 2008.[101] Warren Buffett famously referred to derivatives as

"financial weapons of mass destruction" in early 2003.[102][103]

[1.7] Increased debt burden or over-leveraging

Leverage ratios of investment banks increased significantly 2003–07

Prior to the crisis, financial Institutions became highly leveraged, increasing their appetite for

risky investments and reducing their resilience in case of losses. Much of this leverage was achieved

using complex financial instruments such as off-balance sheet securitization and derivatives, which

made it difficult for creditors and regulators to monitor and try to reduce financial institution risk

levels.[10] These instruments also made it virtually impossible to reorganize financial institutions

in bankruptcy, and contributed to the need for government bailouts.[10]

Household debt relative to disposable income and GDP.

U.S. households and financial institutions became increasingly indebted or overleveraged during the

years preceding the crisis.[104] This increased their vulnerability to the collapse of the housing

bubble and worsened the ensuing economic downturn.[105] Key statistics include:

Free cash used by consumers from home equity extraction doubled from $627 billion in 2001 to $1,428

billion in 2005 as the housing bubble built, a total of nearly $5 trillion dollars over the period,

contributing to economic growth worldwide.[106][107][108] U.S. home mortgage debt relative to GDP

increased from an average of 46% during the 1990s to 73% during 2008, reaching $10.5 trillion.[109]

USA household debt as a percentage of annual disposable personal income was 127% at the end of 2007,

versus 77% in 1990.[104] In 1981, U.S. private debt was 123% of GDP; by the third quarter of 2008, it

was 290%.[110]

From 2004–07, the top five U.S. investment banks each significantly increased their financial

leverage (see diagram), which increased their vulnerability to a financial shock. Changes in capital

requirements, intended to keep U.S. banks competitive with their European counterparts, allowed lower

risk weightings for AAA securities. The shift from first-loss tranches to AAA tranches was seen by

regulators as a risk reduction that compensated the higher leverage.[111] These five institutions

reported over $4.1 trillion in debt for fiscal year 2007, about 30% of USA nominal GDP for 2007.

Lehman Brothers was liquidated, Bear Stearns and Merrill Lynch were sold at fire-sale prices, and

Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley became commercial banks, subjecting themselves to more stringent

regulation. With the exception of Lehman, these companies required or received government support.

[112]

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, two U.S. Government sponsored enterprises, owned or guaranteed nearly $5

trillion in mortgage obligations at the time they were placed into conservatorship by the U.S.

government in September 2008.[113][114]

These seven entities were highly leveraged and had $9 trillion in debt or guarantee obligations; yet

they were not subject to the same regulation as depository banks.[95][115]

Behavior that may be optimal for an individual (e.g., saving more during adverse economic conditions)

can be detrimental if too many individuals pursue the same behavior, as ultimately one person's

consumption is another person's income. Too many consumers attempting to save (or pay down debt)

simultaneously is called the paradox of thrift and can cause or deepen a recession. Economist Hyman

Minsky also described a "paradox of deleveraging" as financial institutions that have too much

leverage (debt relative to equity) cannot all de-leverage simultaneously without significant declines

in the value of their assets.[105]

During April 2009, U.S. Federal Reserve Vice Chair Janet Yellen discussed these paradoxes: "Once this

massive credit crunch hit, it didn’t take long before we were in a recession. The recession, in turn,

deepened the credit crunch as demand and employment fell, and credit losses of financial institutions

surged. Indeed, we have been in the grips of precisely this adverse feedback loop for more than a

year. A process of balance sheet deleveraging has spread to nearly every corner of the economy.

Consumers are pulling back on purchases, especially on durable goods, to build their savings.

Businesses are cancelling planned investments and laying off workers to preserve cash. And, financial

institutions are shrinking assets to bolster capital and improve their chances of weathering the

current storm. Once again, Minsky understood this dynamic. He spoke of the paradox of deleveraging, in

which precautions that may be smart for individuals and firms—and indeed essential to return the

economy to a normal state—nevertheless magnify the distress of the economy as a whole."[105]

[1.8] Financial innovation and complexity

This section may stray from the topic of the article into the topic of another article, financial

innovation. Please help improve this section or discuss this issue on the talk page. (December 2011)

IMF Diagram of CDO and RMBS

The term financial innovation refers to the ongoing development of financial products designed to

achieve particular client objectives, such as offsetting a particular risk exposure (such as the

default of a borrower) or to assist with obtaining financing. Examples pertinent to this crisis

included: the adjustable-rate mortgage; the bundling of subprime mortgages into mortgage-backed

securities (MBS) or collateralized debt obligations (CDO) for sale to investors, a type of

securitization; and a form of credit insurance called credit default swaps (CDS). The usage of these

products expanded dramatically in the years leading up to the crisis. These products vary in

complexity and the ease with which they can be valued on the books of financial institutions.

CDO issuance grew from an estimated $20 billion in Q1 2004 to its peak of over $180 billion by Q1

2007, then declined back under $20 billion by Q1 2008. Further, the credit quality of CDO's declined

from 2000–2007, as the level of subprime and other non-prime mortgage debt increased from 5% to 36%

of CDO assets.[116] As described in the section on subprime lending, the CDS and portfolio of CDS

called synthetic CDO[dubious – discuss][citation needed] enabled a theoretically infinite amount to

be wagered on the finite value of housing loans outstanding, provided that buyers and sellers of the

derivatives could be found. For example, buying a CDS to insure a CDO ended up giving the seller the

same risk[citation needed] as if they owned the CDO, when those CDO's became worthless.[117]

Diagram of CMLTI 2006 – NC2

This boom in innovative financial products went hand in hand with more complexity. It multiplied the

number of actors connected to a single mortgage (including mortgage brokers, specialized originators,

the securitizers and their due diligence firms, managing agents and trading desks, and finally

investors, insurances and providers of repo funding). With increasing distance from the underlying

asset these actors relied more and more on indirect information (including FICO scores on

creditworthiness, appraisals and due diligence checks by third party organizations, and most

importantly the computer models of rating agencies and risk management desks). Instead of spreading

risk this provided the ground for fraudulent acts, misjudgments and finally market collapse.[118]

Martin Wolf further wrote in June 2009 that certain financial innovations enabled firms to circumvent

regulations, such as off-balance sheet financing that affects the leverage or capital cushion reported

by major banks, stating: "...an enormous part of what banks did in the early part of this decade –

the off-balance-sheet vehicles, the derivatives and the 'shadow banking system' itself – was to find

a way round regulation."[119]

[1.9] Incorrect pricing of risk

A protester on Wall Street in the wake of the AIG bonus payments controversy is interviewed by news

media.

The pricing of risk refers to the incremental compensation required by investors for taking on

additional risk, which may be measured by interest rates or fees. Several scholars have argued that a

lack of transparency about banks' risk exposures prevented markets from correctly pricing risk before

the crisis, enabled the mortgage market to grow larger than it otherwise would have, and made the

financial crisis far more disruptive than it would have been if risk levels had been disclosed in a

straightforward, readily understandable format.[8][10]

For a variety of reasons, market participants did not accurately measure the risk inherent with

financial innovation such as MBS and CDOs or understand its impact on the overall stability of the

financial system.[22] For example, the pricing model for CDOs clearly did not reflect the level of

risk they introduced into the system. Banks estimated that $450bn of CDO were sold between "late 2005

to the middle of 2007"; among the $102bn of those that had been liquidated, JPMorgan estimated that

the average recovery rate for "high quality" CDOs was approximately 32 cents on the dollar, while the

recovery rate for mezzanine CDO was approximately five cents for every dollar.[120]

Another example relates to AIG, which insured obligations of various financial institutions through

the usage of credit default swaps. The basic CDS transaction involved AIG receiving a premium in

exchange for a promise to pay money to party A in the event party B defaulted. However, AIG did not

have the financial strength to support its many CDS commitments as the crisis progressed and was taken

over by the government in September 2008. U.S. taxpayers provided over $180 billion in government

support to AIG during 2008 and early 2009, through which the money flowed to various counterparties to

CDS transactions, including many large global financial institutions.[121][122]

The limitations of a widely-used financial model also were not properly understood.[123][124] This

formula assumed that the price of CDS was correlated with and could predict the correct price of

mortgage-backed securities. Because it was highly tractable, it rapidly came to be used by a huge

percentage of CDO and CDS investors, issuers, and rating agencies.[124] According to one wired.com

article:

Then the model fell apart. Cracks started appearing early on, when financial markets began behaving in

ways that users of Li's formula hadn't expected. The cracks became full-fledged canyons in 2008—when

ruptures in the financial system's foundation swallowed up trillions of dollars and put the survival

of the global banking system in serious peril... Li's Gaussian copula formula will go down in history

as instrumental in causing the unfathomable losses that brought the world financial system to its

knees.[124]

As financial assets became more and more complex, and harder and harder to value, investors were

reassured by the fact that both the international bond rating agencies and bank regulators, who came

to rely on them, accepted as valid some complex mathematical models which theoretically showed the

risks were much smaller than they actually proved to be.[125] George Soros commented that "The super-

boom got out of hand when the new products became so complicated that the authorities could no longer

calculate the risks and started relying on the risk management methods of the banks themselves.

Similarly, the rating agencies relied on the information provided by the originators of synthetic

products. It was a shocking abdication of responsibility."[126]

Moreover, a conflict of interest between professional investment managers and their institutional

clients, combined with a global glut in investment capital, led to bad investments by asset managers

in over-priced credit assets. Professional investment managers generally are compensated based on the

volume of client assets under management. There is, therefore, an incentive for asset managers to

expand their assets under management in order to maximize their compensation. As the glut in global

investment capital caused the yields on credit assets to decline, asset managers were faced with the

choice of either investing in assets where returns did not reflect true credit risk or returning funds

to clients. Many asset managers chose to continue to invest client funds in over-priced (under-

yielding) investments, to the detriment of their clients, in order to maintain their assets under

management. This choice was supported by a "plausible deniability" of the risks associated with

subprime-based credit assets because the loss experience with early "vintages" of subprime loans was

so low.[127]

Despite the dominance of the above formula, there are documented attempts of the financial industry,

occurring before the crisis, to address the formula limitations, specifically the lack of dependence

dynamics and the poor representation of extreme events.[128] The volume "Credit Correlation: Life

After Copulas", published in 2007 by World Scientific, summarizes a 2006 conference held by Merrill

Lynch in London where several practitioners attempted to propose models rectifying some of the copula

limitations. See also the article by Donnelly and Embrechts[129] and the book by Brigo, Pallavicini

and Torresetti, that reports relevant warnings and research on CDOs appeared in 2006.[130]

Mortgage risks were underestimated by every institution in the chain from originator to investor by

underweighting the possibility of falling housing prices based on historical trends of the past 50

years. Limitations of default and prepayment models, the heart of pricing models, led to overvaluation

of mortgage and asset-backed products and their derivatives by originators, securitizers, broker-

dealers, rating-agencies, insurance underwriters and investors. [131][132]

[1.10] Boom and collapse of the shadow banking system

Securitization markets were impaired during the crisis

There is strong evidence that the riskiest, worst performing mortgages were funded through the "shadow

banking system" and that competition from the shadow banking system may have pressured more

traditional institutions to lower their own underwriting standards and originate riskier loans.[8]

In a June 2008 speech, President and CEO of the New York Federal Reserve Bank Timothy Geithner—who in

2009 became Secretary of the United States Treasury—placed significant blame for the freezing of

credit markets on a "run" on the entities in the "parallel" banking system, also called the shadow

banking system. These entities became critical to the credit markets underpinning the financial

system, but were not subject to the same regulatory controls. Further, these entities were vulnerable

because of maturity mismatch, meaning that they borrowed short-term in liquid markets to purchase

long-term, illiquid and risky assets. This meant that disruptions in credit markets would make them

subject to rapid deleveraging, selling their long-term assets at depressed prices. He described the

significance of these entities:

In early 2007, asset-backed commercial paper conduits, in structured investment vehicles, in auction-

rate preferred securities, tender option bonds and variable rate demand notes, had a combined asset

size of roughly $2.2 trillion. Assets financed overnight in triparty repo grew to $2.5 trillion.

Assets held in hedge funds grew to roughly $1.8 trillion. The combined balance sheets of the then five

major investment banks totaled $4 trillion. In comparison, the total assets of the top five bank

holding companies in the United States at that point were just over $6 trillion, and total assets of

the entire banking system were about $10 trillion. The combined effect of these factors was a

financial system vulnerable to self-reinforcing asset price and credit cycles.[33]

Paul Krugman, laureate of the Nobel Prize in Economics, described the run on the shadow banking system

as the "core of what happened" to cause the crisis. He referred to this lack of controls as "malign

neglect" and argued that regulation should have been imposed on all banking-like activity.[95]

The securitization markets supported by the shadow banking system started to close down in the spring

of 2007 and nearly shut-down in the fall of 2008. More than a third of the private credit markets thus

became unavailable as a source of funds.[133] According to the Brookings Institution, the traditional

banking system does not have the capital to close this gap as of June 2009: "It would take a number of

years of strong profits to generate sufficient capital to support that additional lending volume." The

authors also indicate that some forms of securitization are "likely to vanish forever, having been an

artifact of excessively loose credit conditions."[134]

Economist Mark Zandi testified to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in January 2010: "The

securitization markets also remain impaired, as investors anticipate more loan losses. Investors are

also uncertain about coming legal and accounting rule changes and regulatory reforms. Private bond

issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities, and CDOs

peaked in 2006 at close to $2 trillion...In 2009, private issuance was less than $150 billion, and

almost all of it was asset-backed issuance supported by the Federal Reserve's TALF program to aid

credit card, auto and small-business lenders. Issuance of residential and commercial mortgage-backed

securities and CDOs remains dormant."[135]

[1.11] Commodities boom

Main article: 2000s commodities boom

Rapid increases in a number of commodity prices followed the collapse in the housing bubble. The price

of oil nearly tripled from $50 to $147 from early 2007 to 2008, before plunging as the financial

crisis began to take hold in late 2008.[136] Experts debate the causes, with some attributing it to

speculative flow of money from housing and other investments into commodities, some to monetary

policy,[137] and some to the increasing feeling of raw materials scarcity in a fast growing world,

leading to long positions taken on those markets, such as Chinese increasing presence in Africa. An

increase in oil prices tends to divert a larger share of consumer spending into gasoline, which

creates downward pressure on economic growth in oil importing countries, as wealth flows to oil-

producing states.[138] A pattern of spiking instability in the price of oil over the decade leading up

to the price high of 2008 has been recently identified.[139] The destabilizing effects of this price

variance has been proposed as a contributory factor in the financial crisis.

In testimony before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on June 3, 2008,

former director of the CFTC Division of Trading & Markets (responsible for enforcement) Michael

Greenberger specifically named the Atlanta-based IntercontinentalExchange, founded by Goldman Sachs,

Morgan Stanley and BP as playing a key role in speculative run-up of oil futures prices traded off the

regulated futures exchanges in London and New York.[140] However, the IntercontinentalExchange (ICE)

had been regulated by both European and U.S. authorities since its purchase of the International

Petroleum Exchange in 2001. Mr Greenberger was later corrected on this matter.[141]

Global copper prices

Copper prices increased at the same time as the oil prices. Copper traded at about $2,500 per tonne

from 1990 until 1999, when it fell to about $1,600. The price slump lasted until 2004 which saw a

price surge that had copper reaching $7,040 per tonne in 2008.[142]

Nickel prices boomed in the late 1990s, then the price of nickel imploded from around $51,000 /£36,700

per metric ton in May 2007 to about $11,550/£8,300 per metric ton in January 2009. Prices were only

just starting to recover as of January 2010, but most of Australia's nickel mines had gone bankrupt by

then.[143] As the price for high grade nickel sulphate ore recovered in 2010, so did the Australian

nickel mining industry.[144]

Coincidentally with these price fluctuations, long-only commodity index funds became popular – by one

estimate investment increased from $90 billion in 2006 to $200 billion at the end of 2007, while

commodity prices increased 71% – which raised concern as to whether these index funds caused the

commodity bubble.[145] The empirical research has been mixed.[145]

[1.12] Systemic crisis

Another analysis, different from the mainstream explanation, is that the financial crisis is merely a

symptom of another, deeper crisis, which is a systemic crisis of capitalism itself.[146]

Ravi Batra's theory is that growing inequality of financial capitalism produces speculative bubbles

that burst and result in depression and major political changes. He has also suggested that a "demand

gap" related to differing wage and productivity growth explains deficit and debt dynamics important to

stock market developments.[147][148]

John Bellamy Foster, a political economy analyst and editor of the Monthly Review, believes that the

decrease in GDP growth rates since the early 1970s is due to increasing market saturation.[149]

John C. Bogle wrote during 2005 that a series of unresolved challenges face capitalism that have

contributed to past financial crises and have not been sufficiently addressed:

Corporate America went astray largely because the power of managers went virtually unchecked by our

gatekeepers for far too long... They failed to 'keep an eye on these geniuses' to whom they had

entrusted the responsibility of the management of America's great corporations.

Echoing the central thesis of James Burnham's 1941 seminal book, The Managerial Revolution, Bolge

cites particular issues, including:[150][151]

that "Manager's capitalism" has replaced "owner's capitalism", meaning management runs the firm for

its benefit rather than for the shareholders, a variation on the principal–agent problem;

the burgeoning executive compensation;

the management of earnings, mainly a focus on share price rather than the creation of genuine value;

and

the failure of gatekeepers, including auditors, boards of directors, Wall Street analysts, and career

politicians.

An analysis conducted by Mark Roeder, a former executive at the Swiss-based UBS Bank, suggested that

large scale momentum, or The Big Mo "played a pivotal role" in the 2008–09 global financial crisis.

Roeder suggested that "recent technological advances, such as computer-driven trading programs,

together with the increasingly interconnected nature of markets, has magnified the momentum effect.

This has made the financial sector inherently unstable."[152]

Robert Reich has attributed the current economic downturn to the stagnation of wages in the United

States, particularly those of the hourly workers who comprise 80% of the workforce. His claim is that

this stagnation forced the population to borrow in order to meet the cost of living.[153]

[1.13] Role of economic forecasting

The financial crisis was not widely predicted by mainstream economists, who instead spoke of the Great

Moderation. A number of heterodox economists predicted the crisis, with varying arguments. Dirk

Bezemer in his research[154] credits (with supporting argument and estimates of timing) 12 economists

with predicting the crisis: Dean Baker (US), Wynne Godley (UK), Fred Harrison (UK), Michael Hudson

(US), Eric Janszen (US), Steve Keen (Australia), Jakob Brøchner Madsen & Jens Kjaer Sørensen

(Denmark), Kurt Richebächer (US), Nouriel Roubini (US), Peter Schiff (US), and Robert Shiller (US).

Examples of other experts who gave indications of a financial crisis have also been given.[155][156]

[157] Not surprisingly, the Austrian economic school regarded the crisis as a vindication and classic

example of a predictable credit-fueled bubble that could not forestall the disregarded but inevitable

effect of an artificial, manufactured laxity in monetary supply,[158] a perspective that even former

Fed Chair Alan Greenspan in Congressional testimony confessed himself forced to return to.[159]

A cover story in BusinessWeek magazine claims that economists mostly failed to predict the worst

international economic crisis since the Great Depression of 1930s.[160] The Wharton School of the

University of Pennsylvania's online business journal examines why economists failed to predict a major

global financial crisis.[161] Popular articles published in the mass media have led the general public

to believe that the majority of economists have failed in their obligation to predict the financial

crisis. For example, an article in the New York Times informs that economist Nouriel Roubini warned of

such crisis as early as September 2006, and the article goes on to state that the profession of

economics is bad at predicting recessions.[162] According to The Guardian, Roubini was ridiculed for

predicting a collapse of the housing market and worldwide recession, while The New York Times labelled

him "Dr. Doom".[163]

Shiller, an expert in housing markets, wrote an article a year before the collapse of Lehman Brothers

in which he predicted that a slowing US housing market would cause the housing bubble to burst,

leading to financial collapse.[164] Schiff regularly appeared on television in the years before the

crisis and warned of the impending real estate collapse.[165]

Within mainstream financial economics, most believe that financial crises are simply unpredictable,

[166] following Eugene Fama's efficient-market hypothesis and the related random-walk hypothesis,

which state respectively that markets contain all information about possible future movements, and

that the movement of financial prices are random and unpredictable. Recent research casts doubt on the

accuracy of "early warning" systems of potential crises, which must also predict their timing.[167]

Lebanese-American trader and financial risk engineer Nassim Nicholas Taleb, author of the 2007 book

The Black Swan, spent years warning against the breakdown of the banking system in particular and the

economy in general owing to their use of bad risk models and reliance on forecasting, and their

reliance on bad models, and framed the problem as part of "robustness and fragility".[168][169] He

also took action against the establishment view by making a big financial bet on banking stocks and

making a fortune from the crisis ("They didn't listen, so I took their money").[170] According to

David Brooks from the New York Times, "Taleb not only has an explanation for what’s happening, he saw

it coming."[171]

[2] Impact on financial markets

[2.1] US stock market

The US stock market peaked in October 2007, when the Dow Jones Industrial Average index exceeded

14,000 points. It then entered a pronounced decline, which accelerated markedly in October 2008. By

March 2009, the Dow Jones average had reached a trough of around 6,600. It has since recovered much of

the decline, exceeding 12,000 during most of 2011, and occasionally reaching 13,000 in 2012. It is

probable, but debated, whether the Federal Reserve's aggressive policy of quantitative easing spurred

the partial recovery in the stock market.[172][173][174]

Market strategist Phil Dow believes distinctions exist "between the current market malaise" and the

Great Depression. He says the Dow Jones average's fall of more than 50% over a period of 17 months is

similar to a 54.7% fall in the Great Depression, followed by a total drop of 89% over the following 16

months. "It's very troubling if you have a mirror image," said Dow.[175] Floyd Norris, the chief

financial correspondent of The New York Times, wrote in a blog entry in March 2009 that the decline

has not been a mirror image of the Great Depression, explaining that although the decline amounts were

nearly the same at the time, the rates of decline had started much faster in 2007, and that the past

year had only ranked eighth among the worst recorded years of percentage drops in the Dow. The past

two years ranked third, however.[176]

[2.2] Financial institutions

See also: Nationalisation of Northern Rock and Federal takeover of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac

2007 bank run on Northern Rock, a UK bank

The first notable event signaling a possible financial crisis occurred in the United Kingdom on August

9, 2007 when BNP Paribas, citing "a complete evaporation of liquidity", blocked withdrawals from three

hedge funds. The significance of this event was not immediately recognized but soon led to a panic as

investors and savers attempted to liquidate assets deposited in highly-leveraged financial

institutions.[5]

The International Monetary Fund estimated that large U.S. and European banks lost more than $1

trillion on toxic assets and from bad loans from January 2007 to September 2009. These losses are

expected to top $2.8 trillion from 2007–10. U.S. banks losses were forecast to hit $1 trillion and

European bank losses will reach $1.6 trillion. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimated that

U.S. banks were about 60% through their losses, but British and eurozone banks only 40%.[177]

One of the first victims was Northern Rock, a medium-sized British bank.[178] The highly leveraged

nature of its business led the bank to request security from the Bank of England. This in turn led to

investor panic and a bank run[179] in mid-September 2007. Calls by Liberal Democrat Treasury Spokesman

Vince Cable to nationalise the institution were initially ignored; in February 2008, however, the

British government (having failed to find a private sector buyer) relented, and the bank was taken

into public hands. Northern Rock's problems proved to be an early indication of the troubles that

would soon befall other banks and financial institutions.

Initially the companies affected were those directly involved in home construction and mortgage

lending such as Northern Rock and Countrywide Financial, as they could no longer obtain financing

through the credit markets. Over 100 mortgage lenders went bankrupt during 2007 and 2008. Concerns

that investment bank Bear Stearns would collapse in March 2008 resulted in its fire-sale to JP Morgan

Chase. The financial institution crisis hit its peak in September and October 2008. Several major

institutions either failed, were acquired under duress, or were subject to government takeover. These

included Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Washington Mutual, Wachovia,

Citigroup, and AIG.[180]

[2.3] Credit markets and the shadow banking system

TED spread and components during 2008

During September 2008, the crisis hit its most critical stage. There was the equivalent of a bank run

on the money market mutual funds, which frequently invest in commercial paper issued by corporations

to fund their operations and payrolls. Withdrawal from money markets were $144.5 billion during one

week, versus $7.1 billion the week prior. This interrupted the ability of corporations to rollover

(replace) their short-term debt. The U.S. government responded by extending insurance for money market

accounts analogous to bank deposit insurance via a temporary guarantee[181] and with Federal Reserve

programs to purchase commercial paper. The TED spread, an indicator of perceived credit risk in the

general economy, spiked up in July 2007, remained volatile for a year, then spiked even higher in

September 2008,[182] reaching a record 4.65% on October 10, 2008.

In a dramatic meeting on September 18, 2008, Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Fed Chairman Ben

Bernanke met with key legislators to propose a $700 billion emergency bailout. Bernanke reportedly

told them: "If we don't do this, we may not have an economy on Monday."[183] The Emergency Economic

Stabilization Act, which implemented the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), was signed into law on

October 3, 2008.[184]

Economist Paul Krugman and U.S. Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner explain the credit crisis via the

implosion of the shadow banking system, which had grown to nearly equal the importance of the

traditional commercial banking sector as described above. Without the ability to obtain investor funds

in exchange for most types of mortgage-backed securities or asset-backed commercial paper, investment

banks and other entities in the shadow banking system could not provide funds to mortgage firms and

other corporations.[33][95]

This meant that nearly one-third of the U.S. lending mechanism was frozen and continued to be frozen

into June 2009.[133] According to the Brookings Institution, the traditional banking system does not

have the capital to close this gap as of June 2009: "It would take a number of years of strong profits

to generate sufficient capital to support that additional lending volume." The authors also indicate

that some forms of securitization are "likely to vanish forever, having been an artifact of

excessively loose credit conditions." While traditional banks have raised their lending standards, it

was the collapse of the shadow banking system that is the primary cause of the reduction in funds

available for borrowing.[185]

[2.4] Wealth effects

The New York City headquarters of Lehman Brothers

There is a direct relationship between declines in wealth, and declines in consumption and business

investment, which along with government spending represent the economic engine. Between June 2007 and

November 2008, Americans lost an estimated average of more than a quarter of their collective net

worth.[citation needed] By early November 2008, a broad U.S. stock index the S&P 500, was down 45%

from its 2007 high. Housing prices had dropped 20% from their 2006 peak, with futures markets

signaling a 30–35% potential drop. Total home equity in the United States, which was valued at $13

trillion at its peak in 2006, had dropped to $8.8 trillion by mid-2008 and was still falling in late

2008. Total retirement assets, Americans' second-largest household asset, dropped by 22%, from $10.3

trillion in 2006 to $8 trillion in mid-2008. During the same period, savings and investment assets

(apart from retirement savings) lost $1.2 trillion and pension assets lost $1.3 trillion. Taken

together, these losses total a staggering $8.3 trillion.[186] Since peaking in the second quarter of

2007, household wealth is down $14 trillion.[187]

Further, U.S. homeowners had extracted significant equity in their homes in the years leading up to

the crisis, which they could no longer do once housing prices collapsed. Free cash used by consumers

from home equity extraction doubled from $627 billion in 2001 to $1,428 billion in 2005 as the housing

bubble built, a total of nearly $5 trillion over the period.[106][107][108] U.S. home mortgage debt

relative to GDP increased from an average of 46% during the 1990s to 73% during 2008, reaching $10.5

trillion.[109]

To offset this decline in consumption and lending capacity, the U.S. government and U.S. Federal

Reserve have committed $13.9 trillion, of which $6.8 trillion has been invested or spent, as of June

2009.[188] In effect, the Fed has gone from being the "lender of last resort" to the "lender of only

resort" for a significant portion of the economy. In some cases the Fed can now be considered the

"buyer of last resort".

In November, 2008, economist Dean Baker observed: "There is a really good reason for tighter credit.

Tens of millions of homeowners who had substantial equity in their homes two years ago have little or

nothing today. Businesses are facing the worst downturn since the Great Depression. This matters for

credit decisions. A homeowner with equity in her home is very unlikely to default on a car loan or

credit card debt. They will draw on this equity rather than lose their car and/or have a default

placed on their credit record. On the other hand, a homeowner who has no equity is a serious default

risk. In the case of businesses, their creditworthiness depends on their future profits. Profit

prospects look much worse in November 2008 than they did in November 2007... While many banks are

obviously at the brink, consumers and businesses would be facing a much harder time getting credit

right now even if the financial system were rock solid. The problem with the economy is the loss of

close to $6 trillion in housing wealth and an even larger amount of stock wealth.[189]

At the heart of the portfolios of many of these institutions were investments whose assets had been

derived from bundled home mortgages. Exposure to these mortgage-backed securities, or to the credit

derivatives used to insure them against failure, caused the collapse or takeover of several key firms

such as Lehman Brothers, AIG, Merrill Lynch, and HBOS.[190][191][192]

[2.5] European contagion

The crisis rapidly developed and spread into a global economic shock, resulting in a number of

European bank failures, declines in various stock indexes, and large reductions in the market value of

equities[193] and commodities.[194]

Both MBS and CDO were purchased by corporate and institutional investors globally. Derivatives such as

credit default swaps also increased the linkage between large financial institutions. Moreover, the

de-leveraging of financial institutions, as assets were sold to pay back obligations that could not be

refinanced in frozen credit markets, further accelerated the solvency crisis and caused a decrease in

international trade.

World political leaders, national ministers of finance and central bank directors coordinated their

efforts[195] to reduce fears, but the crisis continued. At the end of October 2008 a currency crisis

developed, with investors transferring vast capital resources into stronger currencies such as the

yen, the dollar and the Swiss franc, leading many emergent economies to seek aid from the

International Monetary Fund.[196][197]

[3] Effects on the global economy

Main article: 2008–2012 global recession

[3.1] Global effects

A number of commentators have suggested that if the liquidity crisis continues, there could be an

extended recession or worse.[198] The continuing development of the crisis has prompted in some

quarters fears of a global economic collapse although there are now many cautiously optimistic

forecasters in addition to some prominent sources who remain negative.[199] The financial crisis is

likely to yield the biggest banking shakeout since the savings-and-loan meltdown.[200] Investment bank

UBS stated on October 6 that 2008 would see a clear global recession, with recovery unlikely for at

least two years.[201] Three days later UBS economists announced that the "beginning of the end" of the

crisis had begun, with the world starting to make the necessary actions to fix the crisis: capital

injection by governments; injection made systemically; interest rate cuts to help borrowers. The

United Kingdom had started systemic injection, and the world's central banks were now cutting interest

rates. UBS emphasized the United States needed to implement systemic injection. UBS further emphasized

that this fixes only the financial crisis, but that in economic terms "the worst is still to come".

[202] UBS quantified their expected recession durations on October 16: the Eurozone's would last two

quarters, the United States' would last three quarters, and the United Kingdom's would last four

quarters.[203] The economic crisis in Iceland involved all three of the country's major banks.

Relative to the size of its economy, Iceland’s banking collapse is the largest suffered by any

country in economic history.[204]

At the end of October UBS revised its outlook downwards: the forthcoming recession would be the worst

since the early 1980s recession with negative 2009 growth for the U.S., Eurozone, UK; very limited

recovery in 2010; but not as bad as the Great Depression.[205]

The Brookings Institution reported in June 2009 that U.S. consumption accounted for more than a third

of the growth in global consumption between 2000 and 2007. "The US economy has been spending too much

and borrowing too much for years and the rest of the world depended on the U.S. consumer as a source

of global demand." With a recession in the U.S. and the increased savings rate of U.S. consumers,

declines in growth elsewhere have been dramatic. For the first quarter of 2009, the annualized rate of

decline in GDP was 14.4% in Germany, 15.2% in Japan, 7.4% in the UK, 18% in Latvia,[206] 9.8% in the

Euro area and 21.5% for Mexico.[207]

Some developing countries that had seen strong economic growth saw significant slowdowns. For example,

growth forecasts in Cambodia show a fall from more than 10% in 2007 to close to zero in 2009, and

Kenya may achieve only 3–4% growth in 2009, down from 7% in 2007. According to the research by the

Overseas Development Institute, reductions in growth can be attributed to falls in trade, commodity

prices, investment and remittances sent from migrant workers (which reached a record $251 billion in

2007, but have fallen in many countries since).[208] This has stark implications and has led to a

dramatic rise in the number of households living below the poverty line, be it 300,000 in Bangladesh

or 230,000 in Ghana.[208]

The World Bank reported in February 2009 that the Arab World was far less severely affected by the

credit crunch. With generally good balance of payments positions coming into the crisis or with

alternative sources of financing for their large current account deficits, such as remittances,

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) or foreign aid, Arab countries were able to avoid going to the market

in the latter part of 2008. This group is in the best position to absorb the economic shocks. They

entered the crisis in exceptionally strong positions. This gives them a significant cushion against

the global downturn. The greatest impact of the global economic crisis will come in the form of lower

oil prices, which remains the single most important determinant of economic performance. Steadily

declining oil prices would force them to draw down reserves and cut down on investments. Significantly

lower oil prices could cause a reversal of economic performance as has been the case in past oil

shocks. Initial impact will be seen on public finances and employment for foreign workers.[209]

[3.2] U.S. economic effects

[3.2.1] Real gross domestic product

The output of goods and services produced by labor and property located in the United States—

decreased at an annual rate of approximately 6% in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first quarter of

2009, versus activity in the year-ago periods.[210] The U.S. unemployment rate increased to 10.1% by

October 2009, the highest rate since 1983 and roughly twice the pre-crisis rate. The average hours per

work week declined to 33, the lowest level since the government began collecting the data in 1964.

[211][212]

[3.2.2] Distribution of wealth in the USA

U.S. inequality from 1913–2008.

Typical American families did not fare as well, nor did those "wealthy-but-not wealthiest" families

just beneath the pyramid's top. On the other hand, half of the poorest families did not have wealth

declines at all during the crisis. The Federal Reserve surveyed 4,000 households between 2007 and

2009, and found that the total wealth of 63 percent of all Americans declined in that period. 77

percent of the richest families had a decrease in total wealth, while only 50 percent of those on the

bottom of the pyramid suffered a decrease.[213][214][215]

[3.3] Official economic projections

On November 3, 2008, the European Commission at Brussels predicted for 2009 an extremely weak growth

of GDP, by 0.1%, for the countries of the Eurozone (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium etc.) and even

negative number for the UK (−1.0%), Ireland and Spain. On November 6, the IMF at Washington, D.C.,

launched numbers predicting a worldwide recession by −0.3% for 2009, averaged over the developed

economies. On the same day, the Bank of England and the European Central Bank, respectively, reduced

their interest rates from 4.5% down to 3%, and from 3.75% down to 3.25%. As a consequence, starting

from November 2008, several countries launched large "help packages" for their economies.

The U.S. Federal Reserve Open Market Committee release in June 2009 stated:

...the pace of economic contraction is slowing. Conditions in financial markets have generally

improved in recent months. Household spending has shown further signs of stabilizing but remains

constrained by ongoing job losses, lower housing wealth, and tight credit. Businesses are cutting back

on fixed investment and staffing but appear to be making progress in bringing inventory stocks into

better alignment with sales. Although economic activity is likely to remain weak for a time, the

Committee continues to anticipate that policy actions to stabilize financial markets and institutions,

fiscal and monetary stimulus, and market forces will contribute to a gradual resumption of sustainable

economic growth in a context of price stability.[216] Economic projections from the Federal Reserve

and Reserve Bank Presidents include a return to typical growth levels (GDP) of 2–3% in 2010; an

unemployment plateau in 2009 and 2010 around 10% with moderation in 2011; and inflation that remains

at typical levels around 1–2%.[217]

[4] Government responses

[4.1] Emergency and short-term responses

Main article: Subprime mortgage crisis#Responses

The U.S. Federal Reserve and central banks around the world have taken steps to expand money supplies

to avoid the risk of a deflationary spiral, in which lower wages and higher unemployment lead to a

self-reinforcing decline in global consumption. In addition, governments have enacted large fiscal

stimulus packages, by borrowing and spending to offset the reduction in private sector demand caused

by the crisis. The U.S. executed two stimulus packages, totaling nearly $1 trillion during 2008 and

2009.[218] The U.S. Federal Reserve's new and expanded liquidity facilities were intended to enable

the central bank to fulfill its traditional lender-of-last-resort role during the crisis while

mitigating stigma, broadening the set of institutions with access to liquidity, and increasing the

flexibility with which institutions could tap such liquidity.[219]

This credit freeze brought the global financial system to the brink of collapse. The response of the

Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, and other central banks was immediate and dramatic. During

the last quarter of 2008, these central banks purchased US$2.5 trillion of government debt and

troubled private assets from banks. This was the largest liquidity injection into the credit market,

and the largest monetary policy action, in world history. The governments of European nations and the

USA also raised the capital of their national banking systems by $1.5 trillion, by purchasing newly

issued preferred stock in their major banks.[180] In October 2010, Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz

explained how the U.S. Federal Reserve was implementing another monetary policy —creating currency—

as a method to combat the liquidity trap.[220] By creating $600,000,000,000 and inserting this

directly into banks, the Federal Reserve intended to spur banks to finance more domestic loans and

refinance mortgages. However, banks instead were spending the money in more profitable areas by

investing internationally in emerging markets. Banks were also investing in foreign currencies, which

Stiglitz and others point out may lead to currency wars while China redirects its currency holdings

away from the United States.[221]

Governments have also bailed out a variety of firms as discussed above, incurring large financial

obligations. To date, various U.S. government agencies have committed or spent trillions of dollars in

loans, asset purchases, guarantees, and direct spending. For a summary of U.S. government financial

commitments and investments related to the crisis, see CNN – Bailout Scorecard. Significant

controversy has accompanied the bailout, leading to the development of a variety of "decision making

frameworks", to help balance competing policy interests during times of financial crisis.[222]

[4.2] Regulatory proposals and long-term responses

Further information: Obama financial regulatory reform plan of 2009, Regulatory responses to the

subprime crisis, and Subprime mortgage crisis solutions debate

United States President Barack Obama and key advisers introduced a series of regulatory proposals in

June 2009. The proposals address consumer protection, executive pay, bank financial cushions or

capital requirements, expanded regulation of the shadow banking system and derivatives, and enhanced

authority for the Federal Reserve to safely wind-down systemically important institutions, among

others.[223][224][225] In January 2010, Obama proposed additional regulations limiting the ability of

banks to engage in proprietary trading. The proposals were dubbed "The Volcker Rule", in recognition

of Paul Volcker, who has publicly argued for the proposed changes.[226][227]

The U.S. Senate passed a regulatory reform bill in May 2010, following the House which passed a bill

in December 2009. These bills must now be reconciled. The New York Times provided a comparative

summary of the features of the two bills, which address to varying extent the principles enumerated by

the Obama administration.[228] For instance, the Volcker Rule against proprietary trading is not part

of the legislation, though in the Senate bill regulators have the discretion but not the obligation to

prohibit these trades.

European regulators introduced Basel III regulations for banks.[229] It increased capital ratios,

limits on leverage, narrow definition of capital (to exclude subordinated debt), limit counter-party

risk, and new liquidity requirements.[230] Critics argue that Basel III doesn’t address the problem

of faulty risk-weightings. Major banks suffered losses from AAA-rated created by financial engineering

(which creates apparently risk-free assets out of high risk collateral) that required less capital

according to Basel II. Lending to AA-rated sovereigns has a risk-weight of zero, thus increasing

lending to governments and leading to the next crisis.[231] Johan Norberg argues that regulations

(Basel III among others) have indeed led to excessive lending to risky governments (see European

sovereign-debt crisis) and the ECB pursues even more lending as the solution.[232]

[4.3] United States Congress response

On December 11, 2009 – House cleared bill H.R.4173 – Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act

of 2009.[233]

On April 15, 2010 – Senate introduced bill S.3217 – Restoring American Financial Stability Act of

2010.[234]

On July 21, 2010 – the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act was enacted.[235]

[236]

[4.4] Court proceedings

In Iceland in April 2012, the special Landsdómur court convicted former Prime Minister Geir Haarde of

mishandling the 2008–2012 Icelandic financial crisis.

[4.5] Continuation of the financial crisis in the U.S. housing market

As of 2012, in the United States, a large volume of troubled mortgages remained in place. It had

proved impossible for most homeowners facing foreclosure to refinance or modify their mortgages and

foreclosure rates remained high.[237]

[5] Stabilization

The US recession that began in December 2007 ended in June 2009, according to the U.S. National Bureau

of Economic Research (NBER)[238] and the financial crisis appears to have ended about the same time.

In April 2009 TIME Magazine declared "More Quickly Than It Began, The Banking Crisis Is Over."[14] The

United States Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission dates the crisis to 2008.[15][16] President Barack

Obama declared on January 27, 2010, "the markets are now stabilized, and we've recovered most of the

money we spent on the banks."[239]

The New York Times identifies March, 2009 as the "nadir of the crisis" and notes that "Most stock

markets around the world are at least 75 percent higher than they were then. Financial stocks, which

led the markets down, have also led them up." Nevertheless, the lack of fundamental changes in banking

and financial markets, worries many market participants, including the International Monetary Fund.

[240]

[6] Media coverage

The financial crises generated many articles and books outside of the scholarly and financial press,

including articles and books by author William Greider, economist Michael Hudson, author and former

bond salesman Michael Lewis, Kevin Phillips, and investment broker Peter Schiff.

In May 2010 premiered Overdose: A Film about the Next Financial Crisis,[241] a documentary about how

the financial crisis came about and how the solutions that have been applied by many governments are

setting the stage for the next crisis. The film is based on the book Financial Fiasco by Johan Norberg

and features Alan Greenspan, with funding from the libertarian think tank The Cato Institute.

Greenspan is responsible for de-regulating the derivatives market while chairman of the Federal

Reserve.

In October 2010, a documentary film about the crisis, Inside Job directed by Charles Ferguson, was

released by Sony Pictures Classics. It was awarded an Academy Award for Best Documentary of 2010.

Time Magazine named "25 People to Blame for the Financial Crisis".[242]

[7] Emerging and developing economies drive global economic growth

The financial crisis has caused the "emerging" and "developing" economies to replace "advanced"

economies to lead global economic growth. Previously "advanced" economies accounted for only 29% of

incremental global nominal GDP while emerging and developing economies accounted for 71% of

incremental global nominal GDP from 2007 to 2012 according to International Monetary Fund.[243] In

this graph, the names of emergent economies are shown in boldface type, while the names of declining

developed economies are in Roman (regular) type.

The Twenty Largest Economies By Incremental Nominal GDP From 2007 to 2012

Economy

Nominal GDP (billions in USD)

(01)  China

4,756.006

(02)  Japan

1,628.043

(03)  United States

1,624.691

(04)  Brazil

1,058.832

(05)  India

794.189

(06)  Russia

653.852

(07)  Australia

596.361

(08)  Indonesia

462.684

(09)  Canada

346.017

(10)  Saudi Arabia

272.107

(11)  Argentina

214.741

(12)  Iran

176.425

(13)  Switzerland

172.325

(14)  Colombia

154.837

(15)  Turkey

133.939

(16)  Thailand

130.012

(17)  Mexico

127.588

(18)  Egypt

124.655

(19)  Malaysia

113.564

(20)  Venezuela

107.936

The twenty largest economies contributing to global nominal GDP growth (2007 - 2012)[244]

 

2009 G-20 London summit protests

2008 Greek riots

2009 Icelandic financial crisis protests

2008–2011 bank failures in the United States

2008–2009 Keynesian resurgence

2009 May Day protests

2009 Moldova civil unrest

2010 United States foreclosure crisis

2012 May Day protests

Crisis (Marxian)

Europeans for Financial Reform

Financial Crisis Responsibility Fee

Kondratiev wave

List of acquired or bankrupt banks in the late 2000s financial crisis

List of acquired or bankrupt United States banks in the late 2000s financial crisis

List of acronyms: European sovereign-debt crisis

List of economic crises

List of entities involved in 2007–2008 financial crises

List of largest U.S. bank failures

Low-Income Countries Under Stress

Mark-to-market accounting

Occupy movement

Pessimism porn

PIGS (economics)

Private equity in the 2000s

Subprime crisis impact timeline

Wall Street Crash of 1929

[edit] References

1.^ Two top economists agree 2009 worst financial crisis since great depression; risks increase if

right steps are not taken. (February 29, 2009). Reuters. Retrieved 2009-09-30, from Business Wire News

database.

2.^ Haidar, Jamal Ibrahim, 2012. "Sovereign Credit Risk in the Eurozone," World Economics, vol. 13

(1), pages 123-136, March

3.^ "Brookings-Financial Crisis" (PDF). Retrieved May 1, 2010.

4.^ Williams, Carol J. (May 22, 2012). "Euro crisis imperils recovering global economy, OECD warns".

Los Angeles Times. Retrieved May 23, 2012.

5.^ a b Larry Elliott, economics editor of The Guardian (August 5, 2012). "Three myths that sustain

the economic crisis" (blog by expert). The Guardian. Retrieved August 6, 2012. "Five years ago the

banks stopped lending to each other."

6.^ Tully, Shawn (2006-05-05). "Welcome to the Dead Zone". Fortune. Retrieved 2008-03-17. This

article classified several U.S. real-estate regions as "Dead Zones", "Danger Zones", and "Safe

Havens".