菲律賓若執意招惹中國，美國應考慮解除防務盟約 2016-07-14 16:03:31 【7月13日，美國卡托研究所國防與外交政策學會副會長、高級研究員泰德·卡彭特在 美國國際關係雜誌《國家利益》網站發表文章，從美國利益的角度出發，認為南海仲裁 是一張好看的廢紙，菲律賓應該見好就收，不要挑釁中國，進而把美國拖入一場它不想 打的戰爭。觀察者網全文翻譯】 7月12日，海牙常設仲裁庭公布南海仲裁案判決書，可能給本就緊張的南海局勢帶來新 的衝擊。對於這宗菲律賓2013年單方面提起的仲裁案，5名法官做出的決定大大有利於 菲方，幾乎拒絕了中國在南海的所有主張。仲裁庭斷然否認中國在南海大部分海域享有 歷史性權利的說法，判定其缺乏法律依據。仲裁庭的的判決全面否定了中國在南海人工 造島的行為，認定此類行為違反了《聯合國海洋法公約》規定的義務。 對於仲裁庭的判決，菲律賓領導人欣喜若狂。本案菲方首席律師保羅·雷切爾（美籍） 宣稱：“這是一個壓倒性的勝利。我們在每一個重大事項上都贏了。”總體結果並出人 意料，但判決書部分用詞之尖銳明確，甚至連最見多識廣的南海觀察家們也感到驚訝。 美國國際戰略研究中心的邦妮·格拉澤認為：“它（判決書）比大多數人預期的更加激 進，對中國來說是災難性的。” 北京迅速而猛烈地作出反應。習近平主席強調，南海諸島自古以來就是中國領土，中國 在南海的領土主權和海洋權益在任何情況下不受所謂菲律賓南海仲裁案裁決的影響。外 交部長王毅的表態更加簡潔、尖銳。“這場鬧劇已經結束，”他說：“中國反對且不接 受任何基於該仲裁裁決的主張和行動。” 中國作出這樣的反應並不奇怪。從最開始，北京就否認了仲裁程序的合法性，隨着判決 臨近，中方的辭令越來越激烈，在南海的行動越來越大膽，尤以本月初的海軍實彈演習 為甚。 目前，馬尼拉可能正沉浸在慶祝仲裁“勝利”的喜悅中。畢竟，對菲律賓領導人來說， 這是一場重大的勝利。羅德里戈·杜特爾特剛就任總統，就被發了一手外交和政治宣傳 好牌。 作為菲律賓安全的保護者，美國的危險在於，杜特爾特政府可能太把仲裁結果“當回 事”，以為自己真的掌握了對北京施壓的砝碼。仲裁庭的判決完全沒有改變南海海域及 周邊地區的國家實力分配。菲律賓仍然是個小國、弱國;中國仍然是個大國、強國。不 管仲裁庭如何裁決，搬弄出多少道道，中國人仍然堅信自己的立場是正當的、正義的。 他們不會退縮。 與任何大國一樣，北京決不會因為某個國際法庭突發奇想的判決，就放棄至關重要的國 家利益。我們不應忘記，雖然美國在南海問題上聲勢浩大，但它本身甚至連《聯合國海 洋法公約》締約國都不是。此外，海牙的判決可能進一步固化北京和莫斯科方面的看 法，即西方自由主義民主國家把國際法變成為自己服務的工具、意識形態的攻城車，所 以中俄必須堅定抵抗西方。 因此，南海動態把美國置於一個尷尬的境地，且可能造成危險。美國與菲律賓之間簽訂 有安全條約，雖然該條約規定的“互相防衛”義務不過是個可笑的幌子，但不爭的事實 是，菲律賓領導人和公眾都認為，如果爆發戰爭，美國有義務保衛菲國。數周前，杜特 爾特已經詢問美國是否支持盟友，他肯定期待一個肯定的回答。 這樣一來，馬尼拉預期獲得美國的支持，可能會失去以往的謹慎，進而採取更大膽的立 場。當大國把自身安全事務與附庸小國的議程掛鈎，這種危險就必然存在。一旦附庸國 莽撞行事，局勢很快將失去控制。1914年，沙俄為了支持弱小的塞爾維亞盟友，與奧匈 帝國反目，後來發生了什麼，我們記憶猶新。 中國已經懷疑，菲律賓是美國為打擊中國利益故意安插在南海的棋子。而一些中國官員 甚至認為，是華盛頓方面力挺馬尼拉把南海爭議拿到仲裁庭上的。 華盛頓需要對潛在的危險保持警惕。美國與菲律賓結盟十分不明智，因為前者作出安全 承諾的風險遠高於獲得的利益。美國應撤銷與菲律賓之間的防務協議。 即使美國官方不願意完全放棄美菲防務聯盟，至少應該向杜特爾特政府明確表示，美國 絕不會容忍菲律賓愚蠢地挑釁中國。馬尼拉方面既然在仲裁上撈到了好處，就應該滿足 於這個象徵性的外交勝利。菲律賓絕不應把仲裁庭的判決當令箭，在南海挑戰中國實 力，因為這樣做，可能會拖累美國陷入武裝衝突。 On July 12, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague issued a decision that could greatly impact the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea. Ruling on a case brought by the Philippines in 2013, the decision of the five-judge panel represented an emphatic victory for Manila’s position and a near total repudiation of China’s claims. In its most significant finding, the tribunal flatly rejected China’s argument that it enjoys historic rights over most of the South China Sea. Such a claim, the panel ruled, had no legal basis. The ruling was a sweeping rebuke of Beijing’s conduct, especially its seizure of uninhabited reefs and its construction of artificial islands. Such actions, the tribunal concluded, violated China’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Philippine leaders were ecstatic about the decision. “It’s an overwhelming victory. We won on every significant point,” stated Paul Reichler, Manila’ s chief counsel in the case. The overall decision was not that much of a surprise, but the categorical nature of some of the language was surprising even to seasoned regional observers. “It goes much farther than most people expected that this was going to go. It’s really devastating to China,” concluded Bonnie Glaser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Beijing’s reaction was swift and ferocious. President Xi Jinping reiterated that the waters had been Chinese territory since ancient times and this ruling could not invalidate such history. Foreign Minister Wang Yi was more succinct and caustic. “This farce is now over,” he stated. “China opposes and will never accept any claim or action based on those awards.” The Chinese reaction came as no surprise. Beijing had rejected the legitimacy of the arbitration proceedings from the very beginning, and as a decision drew near, the hostile rhetoric intensified. Moreover, China’s actions in the South China Sea became more brazen, most notably a live-fire drill by the Chinese navy earlier this month. There is likely to be much celebrating in Manila regarding the tribunal ruling. It is about as definitive a legal victory for the position taken by the Philippines’ government as any leader there could have hoped. New president Rodrigo Duterte has been given a diplomatic and propaganda bonanza. The danger for the United States as Manila’s security guarantor is that Duterte and his government may take the ruling too seriously and believe they have a mandate to really press Beijing. The tribunal’s decision does nothing to change the configuration of power in and around the South China Sea. The Philippines is still a small, weak country; China is still a large, powerful country. And regardless of the tribunal’s ruling and reasoning, the Chinese still believe that their position is right and just. They are not about to back down. Like any great power, Beijing is not about to subordinate what it sees as vital national interests to the whim of an international tribunal. In this regard, it is worth remembering that the United States, for all its huffing and puffing, is not even a signatory to the Law of the Sea Treaty. If anything, the ruling may well harden the perception in Beijing and Moscow that the Western liberal democracies use international law as an ideological battering ram when convenient—and that it is imperative for them to stand up to the West. That is why this dynamic places the United States in an awkward and potentially dangerous position. Washington maintains a security treaty with Manila, and however much the “mutual” aspect of that treaty obligation is a laughable fiction, it does not change the underlying reality that Philippine leaders and the Philippine public believe the United States has an obligation to come to their defense if a war breaks out. Weeks ago, Duterte already asked whether the United States backed its treaty ally, and he certainly expected a positive answer. The danger is that the expectation of U.S. support might encourage Manila to take a bolder stance than it might otherwise think prudent—or would in fact be prudent. That is an inherent danger whenever a major power links its security to the agenda of a small client state. Matters can get out of hand quickly if the client acts in a reckless manner. One need only recall what happened to czarist Russia with its fateful decision to back its small Serbian ally against Austria-Hungary in 1914. China is already suspicious that the United States is using the Philippines as a pawn against Beijing’s interests in the South China Sea. Indeed, some Chinese officials even believe that Washington prodded Manila to pursue the case with the arbitration panel. Washington needs to be alert to potential dangers. The defense alliance with the Philippines is an unwise commitment that provides far more risks than benefits to America. It should be rescinded. But even if U.S. officials are not willing to go that far, they should at least make it very clear to the Duterte government that the United States will not tolerate foolish provocations directed against Beijing. Manila should be content to pocket the tribunal’s decision for the symbolic diplomatic victory that it is. The decision does not give the Philippines a writ to challenge China’s power in the South China Sea. It certainly does not give Manila a writ to do so if it risks dragging America into an armed conflict. Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at the National Interest, is the author of 10 books and more than 600 articles on international affairs.