菲律宾若执意招惹中国，美国应考虑解除防务盟约 2016-07-14 16:03:31 【7月13日，美国卡托研究所国防与外交政策学会副会长、高级研究员泰德·卡彭特在 美国国际关系杂志《国家利益》网站发表文章，从美国利益的角度出发，认为南海仲裁 是一张好看的废纸，菲律宾应该见好就收，不要挑衅中国，进而把美国拖入一场它不想 打的战争。观察者网全文翻译】 7月12日，海牙常设仲裁庭公布南海仲裁案判决书，可能给本就紧张的南海局势带来新 的冲击。对于这宗菲律宾2013年单方面提起的仲裁案，5名法官做出的决定大大有利于 菲方，几乎拒绝了中国在南海的所有主张。仲裁庭断然否认中国在南海大部分海域享有 历史性权利的说法，判定其缺乏法律依据。仲裁庭的的判决全面否定了中国在南海人工 造岛的行为，认定此类行为违反了《联合国海洋法公约》规定的义务。 对于仲裁庭的判决，菲律宾领导人欣喜若狂。本案菲方首席律师保罗·雷切尔（美籍） 宣称：“这是一个压倒性的胜利。我们在每一个重大事项上都赢了。”总体结果并出人 意料，但判决书部分用词之尖锐明确，甚至连最见多识广的南海观察家们也感到惊讶。 美国国际战略研究中心的邦妮·格拉泽认为：“它（判决书）比大多数人预期的更加激 进，对中国来说是灾难性的。” 北京迅速而猛烈地作出反应。习近平主席强调，南海诸岛自古以来就是中国领土，中国 在南海的领土主权和海洋权益在任何情况下不受所谓菲律宾南海仲裁案裁决的影响。外 交部长王毅的表态更加简洁、尖锐。“这场闹剧已经结束，”他说：“中国反对且不接 受任何基于该仲裁裁决的主张和行动。” 中国作出这样的反应并不奇怪。从最开始，北京就否认了仲裁程序的合法性，随着判决 临近，中方的辞令越来越激烈，在南海的行动越来越大胆，尤以本月初的海军实弹演习 为甚。 目前，马尼拉可能正沉浸在庆祝仲裁“胜利”的喜悦中。毕竟，对菲律宾领导人来说， 这是一场重大的胜利。罗德里戈·杜特尔特刚就任总统，就被发了一手外交和政治宣传 好牌。 作为菲律宾安全的保护者，美国的危险在于，杜特尔特政府可能太把仲裁结果“当回 事”，以为自己真的掌握了对北京施压的砝码。仲裁庭的判决完全没有改变南海海域及 周边地区的国家实力分配。菲律宾仍然是个小国、弱国;中国仍然是个大国、强国。不 管仲裁庭如何裁决，搬弄出多少道道，中国人仍然坚信自己的立场是正当的、正义的。 他们不会退缩。 与任何大国一样，北京决不会因为某个国际法庭突发奇想的判决，就放弃至关重要的国 家利益。我们不应忘记，虽然美国在南海问题上声势浩大，但它本身甚至连《联合国海 洋法公约》缔约国都不是。此外，海牙的判决可能进一步固化北京和莫斯科方面的看 法，即西方自由主义民主国家把国际法变成为自己服务的工具、意识形态的攻城车，所 以中俄必须坚定抵抗西方。 因此，南海动态把美国置于一个尴尬的境地，且可能造成危险。美国与菲律宾之间签订 有安全条约，虽然该条约规定的“互相防卫”义务不过是个可笑的幌子，但不争的事实 是，菲律宾领导人和公众都认为，如果爆发战争，美国有义务保卫菲国。数周前，杜特 尔特已经询问美国是否支持盟友，他肯定期待一个肯定的回答。 这样一来，马尼拉预期获得美国的支持，可能会失去以往的谨慎，进而采取更大胆的立 场。当大国把自身安全事务与附庸小国的议程挂钩，这种危险就必然存在。一旦附庸国 莽撞行事，局势很快将失去控制。1914年，沙俄为了支持弱小的塞尔维亚盟友，与奥匈 帝国反目，后来发生了什么，我们记忆犹新。 中国已经怀疑，菲律宾是美国为打击中国利益故意安插在南海的棋子。而一些中国官员 甚至认为，是华盛顿方面力挺马尼拉把南海争议拿到仲裁庭上的。 华盛顿需要对潜在的危险保持警惕。美国与菲律宾结盟十分不明智，因为前者作出安全 承诺的风险远高于获得的利益。美国应撤销与菲律宾之间的防务协议。 即使美国官方不愿意完全放弃美菲防务联盟，至少应该向杜特尔特政府明确表示，美国 绝不会容忍菲律宾愚蠢地挑衅中国。马尼拉方面既然在仲裁上捞到了好处，就应该满足 于这个象征性的外交胜利。菲律宾绝不应把仲裁庭的判决当令箭，在南海挑战中国实 力，因为这样做，可能会拖累美国陷入武装冲突。 On July 12, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in the Hague issued a decision that could greatly impact the ongoing tensions in the South China Sea. Ruling on a case brought by the Philippines in 2013, the decision of the five-judge panel represented an emphatic victory for Manila’s position and a near total repudiation of China’s claims. In its most significant finding, the tribunal flatly rejected China’s argument that it enjoys historic rights over most of the South China Sea. Such a claim, the panel ruled, had no legal basis. The ruling was a sweeping rebuke of Beijing’s conduct, especially its seizure of uninhabited reefs and its construction of artificial islands. Such actions, the tribunal concluded, violated China’s obligations under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Philippine leaders were ecstatic about the decision. “It’s an overwhelming victory. We won on every significant point,” stated Paul Reichler, Manila’ s chief counsel in the case. The overall decision was not that much of a surprise, but the categorical nature of some of the language was surprising even to seasoned regional observers. “It goes much farther than most people expected that this was going to go. It’s really devastating to China,” concluded Bonnie Glaser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Beijing’s reaction was swift and ferocious. President Xi Jinping reiterated that the waters had been Chinese territory since ancient times and this ruling could not invalidate such history. Foreign Minister Wang Yi was more succinct and caustic. “This farce is now over,” he stated. “China opposes and will never accept any claim or action based on those awards.” The Chinese reaction came as no surprise. Beijing had rejected the legitimacy of the arbitration proceedings from the very beginning, and as a decision drew near, the hostile rhetoric intensified. Moreover, China’s actions in the South China Sea became more brazen, most notably a live-fire drill by the Chinese navy earlier this month. There is likely to be much celebrating in Manila regarding the tribunal ruling. It is about as definitive a legal victory for the position taken by the Philippines’ government as any leader there could have hoped. New president Rodrigo Duterte has been given a diplomatic and propaganda bonanza. The danger for the United States as Manila’s security guarantor is that Duterte and his government may take the ruling too seriously and believe they have a mandate to really press Beijing. The tribunal’s decision does nothing to change the configuration of power in and around the South China Sea. The Philippines is still a small, weak country; China is still a large, powerful country. And regardless of the tribunal’s ruling and reasoning, the Chinese still believe that their position is right and just. They are not about to back down. Like any great power, Beijing is not about to subordinate what it sees as vital national interests to the whim of an international tribunal. In this regard, it is worth remembering that the United States, for all its huffing and puffing, is not even a signatory to the Law of the Sea Treaty. If anything, the ruling may well harden the perception in Beijing and Moscow that the Western liberal democracies use international law as an ideological battering ram when convenient—and that it is imperative for them to stand up to the West. That is why this dynamic places the United States in an awkward and potentially dangerous position. Washington maintains a security treaty with Manila, and however much the “mutual” aspect of that treaty obligation is a laughable fiction, it does not change the underlying reality that Philippine leaders and the Philippine public believe the United States has an obligation to come to their defense if a war breaks out. Weeks ago, Duterte already asked whether the United States backed its treaty ally, and he certainly expected a positive answer. The danger is that the expectation of U.S. support might encourage Manila to take a bolder stance than it might otherwise think prudent—or would in fact be prudent. That is an inherent danger whenever a major power links its security to the agenda of a small client state. Matters can get out of hand quickly if the client acts in a reckless manner. One need only recall what happened to czarist Russia with its fateful decision to back its small Serbian ally against Austria-Hungary in 1914. China is already suspicious that the United States is using the Philippines as a pawn against Beijing’s interests in the South China Sea. Indeed, some Chinese officials even believe that Washington prodded Manila to pursue the case with the arbitration panel. Washington needs to be alert to potential dangers. The defense alliance with the Philippines is an unwise commitment that provides far more risks than benefits to America. It should be rescinded. But even if U.S. officials are not willing to go that far, they should at least make it very clear to the Duterte government that the United States will not tolerate foolish provocations directed against Beijing. Manila should be content to pocket the tribunal’s decision for the symbolic diplomatic victory that it is. The decision does not give the Philippines a writ to challenge China’s power in the South China Sea. It certainly does not give Manila a writ to do so if it risks dragging America into an armed conflict. Ted Galen Carpenter, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and a contributing editor at the National Interest, is the author of 10 books and more than 600 articles on international affairs.