1963年以后，由于中国军队在中印边 境的东西两段后撤，再度实行脱离接触隔离政策，双方武装部队直接接触地段仅限于中国和锡金边境（当时印军在锡金有2～3个山地步兵旅），中锡边界的印军不 断地向中国军队进行挑衅，在中锡边境的乃堆拉山口，多次越过已划定的中锡边界，移动界碑，修筑工事，架设电话。飞机也多次侵入中国领空对西藏的康巴宗、亚 东等地进行侦察。
1966年以后，中国国内掀起了“文化大革命”高潮，1967年，各地大规模武斗兴起，冲击军事机关抢夺武器的情况也来此起彼伏，动乱也或多或少地波及西藏。为对中国进行战略侦察，印军出动山地步兵第一一二旅、炮兵第十七旅于1967年9月11日至14日在中锡边界的乃堆拉山口向中国驻军发起了进攻。
此前的9月，印军不断强行越界架设铁丝网，中国驻军多次提出严重警告，印军置之不理。9月7日，印度士兵用刺刀刺伤两名中国士兵。9月11日清晨7时 30分，印军山地步兵第一一二旅一个连在一名中校营长指挥下，分两路向乃堆拉山口的中国哨所逼近。中国驻军严守“不打第一枪”的纪律，保持克制态度，对入 侵印军发出严重警告。印军将中国官兵的克制态度视为软弱可欺，8时零7分，首先开枪射击并投掷手榴弹，正向印军喊话的连长李彦成当场中弹牺牲，另有6名战 士负伤。
当时中央军委对我边防守军有“针锋相对，寸土必争，绝不示弱，绝不吃亏”的指示，我边防团在忍无可忍的情况下，当即发起反 击，仅7分钟，战斗结束，击毙印军官兵67人，用四０火箭筒将印军在中国境内设置的7处工事悉数摧毁。8时15分，印军败逃，我军严守纪律，未出境追 击。
印军不甘失败，其炮兵第十七旅随即向中国境内发起大规模炮击。对此，中国军队早有准备。本来，中国军队对中锡边境的冲突的原则是“人员不能越境，子弹炮弹亦不能打到邻国土地上”，与中印边 境冲突“人员绝不越过境，不能主动向印境内的炮兵射击，但遇敌方境内炮兵向我射击，坚决反击”有所不同，但此次印军气焰嚣张，经中央军委批准，我炮兵第叁 ０八团组织了30余门八二迫击炮和一二０迫击炮向印军还击。炮击历时4天3夜，将印军8个炮击阵地打哑，两个指挥所、两个观察所和23处工事及两辆汽车被 摧毁，毙伤印军官兵540余人，印军炮兵不支，逐于13日22时停止炮击。
情况上报中央后，周恩来总理亲自指示：“敌人不打炮了，我也停止射击。”14日中午时分，我军也停击炮击。
此次作战，印军共伤亡607人，我军除敌挑衅时的一亡九伤外，基本无损。印军被迫打着白旗，到中国境内接受中国移交的印军尸体和武器弹药。
印军仍未死心，10月1日11时20分，印军廓尔喀联队一名排长率7名士兵侵入桌拉山口中国一侧，手持廓尔喀弯刀向中国士兵寻衅，中国士兵当场提出警 告，廓尔喀佬不予置理，一拥而上，想把中国士兵绑架出境。闻讯赶到的附近哨所的中国官兵义愤填膺，抢出战友，将廓尔喀排长推出边界。廓尔喀兵恼羞成怒，拔 出手枪向中国官兵射击，其余廓尔喀士兵也向中国官兵射击，当场打死打伤中国官兵各一人。同时，卓拉山口附近的印军炮兵也用51毫米和81毫米迫击炮向中国 境内射击。
目赌战友牺牲的中国官兵立即还击，将入侵8名廓尔喀兵全部击毙。12时整，中国炮兵用猛烈的炮火压制印军炮火，将挑衅印军两个连的官兵毙伤大半（195名），摧毁工事29处。印军不支，遂于当晚19时55分停止炮击。
当时，兄弟还是个八九岁的毛孩子，有个叔叔在五十四军一叁０师当兵，他们也随之也取消休假，进入战备，待命入藏参战。但未过多久，因印方有和平解决争端的表示，任务取消，他们也就没有入藏。
此后，印军总结了中印边 境战争的教训，知道中国军队有“不打第一枪”的原则，认定只要不开枪，就不会遭到中国军队打击，所以，有恃无恐地突破“各自后撤20公里脱离接触”的限制 （实际上只是中国单方面后撤），不断地越过实际控制线，在中国军队眼皮下设点。到80年代，个别地区，甚至深入实际控制线中国一侧10公里。
1986年到1987年，中国边防守军根据军委指示，曾组织过多次挤占行动，87年局势达到过一触即发的程度，相当紧张。
这里特别需要指出的是，毛泽东后来对于62年撤军的决定也大为后悔，以至于到68年不得不以印度必须归还中国不小心越境的10多只羊为理由准备还击印度，印度马上归还了羊，到69年 中苏局势紧张，使得印度得以幸免，中国自此错过了收复印度的时机
| Every battle has its own share of heroism, faint heartedness, drama and humour. The Nathu La skirmish was no exception. 2 Grenadiers were initially shaken up due to the loss of Capt Dagar and injury to their CO but found their man of the moment in Lieutenant Atar Singh who went round from trench to trench to rally the troops and was later promoted as Captain on the spot. On the lighter side was one artillery observation post officer, my colleague at Sebu La whose radio set was damaged due to shelling and he was out of communication with his guns. He rightly decided to go back to the base at Sherathang in the depth to get another radio set. While he was on his way back, Commander Artillery Brigade was coming up. He stopped the young captain, accused him of running away from the battle and sent him back after reducing him to his substantive rank of a second lieutenant. Casualties could not be evacuated for three days and nights as any move to do so invited a hail of Chinese bullets. Some wounded may well have succumbed to cold and rain. There were awards for bravery as also court martial for cowardice. However, what stood out was the steadfastness of the commanders and bravery of the jawans and junior officers. Indians refused to blink and the mighty Chinese dragon was made to look ordinary. The situation again flared up twenty days later when on 1 October 1967 a face-off between India and China took place at Cho La, another pass on the Sikkim-Tibet border a few kilometers north of Nathu La. Despite initial casualties, 7/11 GR and 10 JAK RIF stood firm and forced the Chinese to withdraw nearly three kilometers away to a feature named Kam Barracks where they remain deployed till date. Cho La Pass is firmly in Indian hands. Indian Army had got better of the Chinese yet again. No wonder, Sino-Indian border has remained peaceful ever since to the extent that today Chinese soldiers come and ask their Indian counterparts at Nathu La for cigarettes, rum and tea, mail is exchanged twice in a week in a hut constructed specially for this purpose and border personnel meeting takes place there twice a year. It was my privilege to command the Nathu La Brigade many years later and conduct the first border personnel meeting at Nathu La is 1995. Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal, SM (Retd), commanded the Nathu La Brigade and an Infantry Division in the Ladakh Sector | The Nathu La skirmish: when Chinese were given a bloody nose | | | Sheru Thapliyal | | E-Mail- thapli@sify.com | | After the debacle of 1962, nothing could have enhanced the self esteem of the Indian Army than the mauling that was given to the Chinese at Nathu La in Sikkim on 11th September 1967 and at Chola on 1st October 1967. It must have come as a rude shock to the Chinese Army and also its political leadership. And by a happy coincidence, the Indian Army leadership which got the better of this eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation was the same that went on to create Bangladesh in 1971. Maj Gen Sagat Singh was GOC Mountain Division in Sikkim, Lt Gen Jagjit Aurora was the Corps Commander and Sam Manekshaw was the Eastern Army Commander. I too served in Nathu La. After finishing my young officer’s course, it was on 21 July 1967 that I reported to my Unit, a mule pack artillery regiment in Sikkim. Those days young officers were made to have their professional mailing by sending them on long-range patrols (LRP) for area familiarisation, take part in khad race to increase their stamina and sending them to remote observations ports on Sikkim-Tibet border for a month. Having done my share of LRPs and having taken part in the khad race, I was sent to the main Sabu La observation post on the Sikkim-Tibet Border. This observation post is about a kilometre south-west of Nathu La. It dominates Nathu La by virtue of taking on higher ground and commands an excellent view of the pass as also the Chinese defense on the feature known as North shoulder. There were two observation posts at Sabu La and had a good old radio set 62 and PRC-10 and of course line communications to the guns deployed in the rear. Nathu La at 14200 feet is an important pass on the Tibet-Sikkim border through which passes the old Gangtok-Yatung-Lhasa Trade Route. Although the Sikkim-Tibet boundary is well defined by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 17 March 1890, the Chinese were not comfortable with Sikkim being an Indian protectorate with the deployment of the Indian Army at that time. During the 1965 War between India and Pakistan, the Chinese gave an ultimatum to India to vacate both Nathu La and Jelep La passes on the Sikkim-Tibet border. For some strange reason, the Mountain Division, under whose jurisdiction Jelep La was at that time, vacated the pass. It remains under Chinese possession till date. However, Lt. Gen Sagat Singh, true to form, refused to vacate Nathu La. Incidentally it is at Nathu La where Chinese and Indian forces are deployed barely thirty yards apart, closest anywhere on the 4000 km Sino-Indian border and the border remains undemacrated. Chinese hold the northern shoulder of the pass while Indian Army holds the southern shoulder. Two dominating features south and north of Nathu La namely Sebu La and Camel’s back were held by the Indians. Artillery observation post officers deployed on these two features have an excellent observation into Chinese depth areas whereas from Northern shoulder, Chinese have very little observations into Indian depth areas. This factor proved crucial in the clash that ensued. At the time of the clash, 2 Grenadiers was holding Nathu La. This battalion was under the command of Lt Col (Later Brigadier) Rai Singh. The battalion was under the Mountain Brigade being commanded by Brig MMS Bakshi, MVC. The daily routine at Nathu La used to start with patrolling by both sides along the perceived border which almost always resulted in arguments. The only one on the Chinese side who could converse in broken English was the Political Commissar who could be recognised by a red patch on his cap. Sentries of both the forces used to stand barely one meter apart in the centre of the Pass which is marked by Nehru Stone, commemorating Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s trek to Bhutan through Nathu La and Chumbi Valley in 1959. Argument between the two sides soon changed to pushing and shoving and on 6 September 1967 a scuffle took place in which Political Commissar fell down and broke his spectacles. These incidents only added to the excitement. I developed excellent rapport with Capt Dagar of 2 Grenadiers and a few days before the clash we had gone to Gangtok together on “liberty” to see a movie. Little did I know that within a week, Dagar would be a martyr. In order to de-escalate the situation it was decided by the Indian military hierarchy to lay a wire in the centre of the Pass from Nathu La to Sebu La to demarcate the perceived border. This task was to be carried out by the jawans of 70 Field Company of Engineers assisted by a company of 18 Rajput deployed at Yak La pass further north of Nathu La. The wire laying was to commence at first light on the fateful morning of 11 September 1967. That morning dawned bright and sunny unlike the normal foggy days. The engineers and jawans started erecting long iron pickets from Nathu La to Sebu La along the perceived border while 2 Grenadiers and Artillery Observation Post Officers at Sebu La and Camel’s Back were on alert. Immediately the Chinese Political Commissar, with a section of Infantry came to the centre of the Pass where Lt. Col Rai Singh, CO 2 Grenadiers was standing with his commando platoon. The Commissar asked Lt Col Rai Singh to stop laying the wire. Orders to the Indian Army were clear. They were not to blink. An argument started which soon built up into a scuffle. In the ensuing melee, the commissar got roughed up. Thereafter the Chinese went up back to their bunkers and engineers resumed laying the wire. Within a few minutes of this, a whistle was heard on the Chinese side followed by murderous medium machine gun fire from north shoulder. The pass is completely devoid of cover and the jawans of 70 Field Company and 18 Rajput were caught in the open and suffered heavy casualties which included Col Rai Singh who was wounded. He was awarded MVC later. Two brave officers – Capt Dagar of 2 Grenadiers and Major Harbhajan Singh of 18 Rajput rallied a few troops and tried to assault the Chinese MMG but both died a heroic death. They were posthumously awarded Vir Chakra and MVC respectively. 2 Grenadier opened small arms fire on North shoulder but it was not very effective. Within the first ten minutes, there were nearly seventy dead and scores wounded lying in the open on the pass. Within half an hour, Chinese artillery opened up on the pass as well as in the depth areas but it was mostly prophylactic fire due to lack of observation and failed to do much damage. Meanwhile we as artillery observation post officers asked for artillery fire, permission for which came a little later. Because of excellent domination and observation from Sebu La and Camel’s back, artillery fire was most effective and most of the Chinese bunkers on North shoulder and in depth were completely destroyed and Chinese suffered very heavy casualties which by their own estimates were over 400. The artillery duel thereafter carried on day and night. For the next three days, the Chinese were taught a lesson. On 14 September, Chinese threatened use of Air Force if shelling did not stop. By then the lesson had been driven home and an uneasy ceasefire came about. The Chinese, true to form, had pulled over dead bodies to their side of the perceived border at night and accused us of violating the border. Dead bodies were exchanged on 15 September at which time: Sam Manekshaw, Aurora and Sagat were present on the Pass. | |
