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This article is based on the recently declassified Soviet archives and examines the political line of Moscow as well as of its allies, Pyongyang and Beijing, on the Korean Peninsula in 1949-1951, up to the armistice negotiations, which began in the summer of 1951. The paper is divided into eleven sections in order to show more clearly the evolution of the policies of the three communist governments in Korea.

1. Stalin fears an attack from the South

Until the end of 1949 Stalin did not plan any aggression against South Korea. Instead, he was worried about an attack from the South, and did everything to avoid provoking Washington and Seoul. In 1947-1948 Soviet leaders still believed in the possibility of a unification of Korea, and refused to sign a separate friendship and cooperation treaty with North Korean leader Kim Il Sung.1

In the beginning of 1949, the Soviet embassy began to alert the Kremlin to the growing number of violations of the 38th parallel by South Korean police and armed forces. On 3 February 1949, Soviet Ambassador to North Korea, Shtykov, bitterly complained that the North Koreans did not have enough trained personnel, adequate weapons and sufficient numbers of bullets to rebuff intensifying incursions from the South. Receiving Kim Il Sung in the Kremlin on 5 March 1949, Stalin showed an open concern about growing pressure from the opponent in the vicinity of the 38th parallel and emphatically told Kim: "The 38th parallel must be peaceful. It is very important."2

After Kim's return to Korea, the situation did not improve. On 17 April 1949, Stalin warned his ambassador of an imminent attack from the South. The Soviet ambassador confirmed that a large-scale war was being prepared by Seoul with the help of Americans and raised alarm about the inability of North Korean troops to withstand the aggression.3 In May-August 1949, the Kremlin and Pyongyang continued to exchange data about a possible attack from the South. The USSR was clearly afraid of such an attack, and was nervous not knowing how to prevent the war. Stalin repeatedly castigated Ambassador Shtykov for failing to do everything in his power to maintain peace on the 38th parallel.4

2. Kim insists on war, Stalin disagrees

While Stalin tried to prevent a war in Korea in 1949, the North Korean leadership increasingly put pressure on the Kremlin, demanding permission to liberate the South. On 7 March 1949, while talking to Stalin in Moscow. Kim Il Sung said: "We believe that the situation makes it necessary and possible to liberate the whole country through military means." The Soviet leader disagreed, citing the military weakness of the North, the USSR-USA agreement on the 38th parallel, and the possibility of American intervention.

Stalin added that only if the adversary attacked Pyongyang, could they try military reunification by launching a counterattack. "Then," the Kremlin chief explained, "your move will be understood and supported by everyone."5

In August and again in September 1949, North Korean leaders resumed pressure on Moscow, hoping to convince it that: a) peaceful reunification was totally impossible; b) the Korean people wanted liberation and would not understand if the chance for reunification was missed; c) Northern armed forces were superior to the Southern army; d) after the withdrawal of American troops from Korea, the 38th parallel lost its meaning; e) a counterattack was no longer possible since Seoul postponed its plans for an overall offensive against the North.6

Finally Stalin ordered a new appraisal of the situation in Korea, sending on 11 September 1949 instructions to the Soviet embassy in Pyongyang to study the military, political, and international aspects of a possible attack on the South. The embassy gave a negative view on the matter (14 September 1949), and on 24 September 1949, the CPSU CC Politburo rejected the appeal of the North Koreans to start the war, concluding that the North Korean army was not prepared for such an attack militarily, that "little has been done to raise the South Korean masses to an active struggle," and that an unprovoked attack by the North "would give the Americans a pretext for all kinds of interference into Korean affairs."7

As can be seen from this Politburo document, Moscow no longer flatly rejected the idea of military reunification of Korea. Instead it called upon Pyongyang to get better prepared for the operation. Evidently encouraged by this shift in the Kremlin's mood, the North Korean leadership increased pressure to win Soviet support for the war. On 17 January 1950, Kim Il Sung complained to Soviet ambassador Shtykov: "I can't sleep at night because I am thinking of the unification of the whole country. If the cause... is postponed, then I may lose the confidence of the Korean people." Kim Il Sung requested permission to make a new visit to the USSR to receive "orders and permission" from Stalin for the offensive.8

3. Stalin blesses the invasion

After ambassador Shtykov informed Moscow of this wave of demands by Pyongyang, Stalin (on 30 January 1950) replied (through diplomatic channels): "I understand the unhappiness of comrade Kim Il Sung, but he must understand that such a large matter regarding South Korea... requires thorough preparation. It has to be organized in such a way that there will not be a large risk. If he wants to talk to me on this issue, then I'll always be ready to receive him and talk to him.... I am prepared to help him in this matter."9

So, Stalin finally took the decision to initiate preparations for the war. At exactly the same time that the above mentioned exchange of cables between Moscow and Pyongyang took place, Mao Zedong was present in the Soviet capital. Stalin discussed with Mao the Korean situation, but according to all available data. the Soviet dictator never mentioned to the Chinese guest his decision to launch an attack on the South as well as his invitation to Kim Il Sung to come to Moscow.

Kim Il Sung and his delegation spent almost the whole of April 1950 in the Soviet Union. The first issue on the agenda was: ways and methods of unification of Korea through military means.10 Stalin gave his approval to an invasion of the South and outlined his view on how the war had to be prepared. Unfortunately, memorandums of conversations between Stalin and Kim in April 1950 have not been found as yet in the Russian archives. However, from some secondary sources (testimonies of people involved in the negotiations, reports of the Foreign Ministry of the USSR) and from earlier and later statements and positions of Moscow and Pyongyang, the following conclusions can be drawn:

1. Stalin changed his mind on the Korean war because of: a) the victory of the communists in China; b) the Soviet acquisition of the atom bomb (first tested by Moscow in August 1949); c) the establishment of NATO and general aggravation of Soviet relations with the West; and d) a perceived weakening of Washington's positions and of its will to get involved militarily in Asia. Stalin was now more confident of the Communist bloc's strength, less respectful of American capabilities and less interested in the reaction of Western public opinion to communist moves.

2. Stalin did not consult Mao in advance because he wanted to work out the plans for the Korean war himself without Chinese interference and objections and then present Beijing with a fait accompli when Mao would have no choice but to agree with the invasion and assist it. While in Moscow, Mao insisted on the liberation of Taiwan. Stalin was negative to the idea. It would be hard for Stalin to convince Mao in Moscow to help the Koreans before the Chinese had completed the reunification of their own country.

4. China's position on "liberating" the South

China was involved in the process of working out communist strategy in Korea in the late 1940s. Basically Mao supported Kim's desire "to liberate" the South and even promised to help with troops if necessary. Mao, however, recommended not to hurry things up, to wait until the Chinese completed their revolutionary war.

In the beginning of May 1949, North Korean Politburo member Kim Il had meetings with Chinese leaders. Mao Zedong expressed the opinion that a war in Korea could start at any moment. If the war dragged on, the Japanese could interfere, but this was not a reason for worry. Mao pointed out: "If necessary, we can throw in for you Chinese soldiers, all of us are black, Americans will not see the difference." Mao at the same time warned Kim not to advance to the South in the near future. He cited the unfavorable situation in the world and the preoccupation of Chinese communists with the civil war. Mao Zedong recommended to postpone the war until China was united under the leadership of the Communist party.11

In the end of March 1950, Mao Zedong, talking to the North Korean ambassador, stressed that peaceful unification in Korea was impossible, it was necessary to employ military means. Mao said one should not be afraid of Americans because "they would not start a third world war over such a small territory."12

After completion of Kim Il Sung's April 1950 visit to the USSR, of which Mao seemed to know nothing, Stalin authorized the Soviet ambassador in China to tell the Chinese leadership the following: "Korean comrades visited us recently. I'll inform you shortly about the results of our conversations."13 Simultaneously Kim Il Sung requested a visit to Beijing to ????ute Stalin's instructions: to continue with the war plans only if Chinese supported the idea. On the eve of the visit Kim II Sung said to the Soviet ambassador that he did not intend to ask anything from the Chinese since "all his requests had been met in Moscow."14

Upon hearing from Kim Il Sung about the decision to attack South Korea, Mao requested additional information from Stalin. On 14 May 1950, Stalin sent the following cable to Mao Zedong: "In the conversations with Korean comrades Filippov [Stalin's alias] and his friends expressed the opinion that due to the changed international situation they agreed with the proposals by the Koreans to set upon unification. The final decision of the issue must be made jointly by Chinese and Korean comrades. If the Chinese comrades disagree, the decision must be postponed till a new discussion."15

In talks with North Korean leaders Mao approved their analysis of the situation and stressed that he supported a speedy military solution of the Korean problem. He was sure of its success. Mao did not exclude the possibility of American interference. In such an event, China would help.16

5. Preparations for the war

Even before Kim Il Sung received, in January 1950, the first hints from the Kremlin that Stalin had become more favorably disposed to a war in Korea, Pyongyang had embarked upon a concerted effort to upgrade its military potential. Stalin responded positively. After Kim's talks in Moscow in April 1950 the war was energetically prepared by the two sides jointly.

On June 1949 a special protocol was signed between the USSR and the People's Democratic Republic of Korea (North Korea) on military-technical assistance. Moscow agreed to supply its ally with large numbers of air force planes, tanks, cannons, landing ships, machine-guns, engineering equipment, etc.17

At the end of 1949 Kim ll Sung again addressed himself to Moscow a request for large quantities of armaments and ammunitions necessary for the creation of new 5 round units and enlargement of the fleet.18 In March 1950, Kim Il Sung asked to use the Soviet credit allocated for 1951 in 1950 and to acquire additional quantities of military hardware; these requests were met.

In April 1950, leaders of the guerilla movement in the South arrived in Pyongyang to work out a program of action for before and after the invasion. On 12 May 1950, Kim Il Sung informed the Soviet ambassador that his General Staff had already started to plan the operation. Pyongyang wanted to attack in June but was not sure that preparations could be completed by that time.19 By the end of May, the armaments which had been promised by Stalin arrived and the plan of the invasion was ready. Kim Il Sung insisted on an attack in June, not in July as Soviet advisers preferred, arguing that information about the imminent attack could leak to the South; and that in July rain would slow the advancement of troops.

While making final preparations for the war, the North continued a propaganda campaign, proposing initiatives on the peaceful unification of Korea. Initially the communists wanted to strike at the Ongjin peninsula, but at the last moment the strategy was changed. It was believed that Seoul had learned about the attack and beefed up its defenses in the Ongjin direction. The North Koreans now asked Moscow for permission to attack along the whole front.

Unfortunately the final period (May-June 1950) before the attack is not well documented, and additional research in the archives is required to get a clearer and more detailed picture of the final preparations by the communist side for the war.

6. The initial stage of the war

Throughout the initial stage of the Korean War Stalin was clearly in charge: his word was final on the date of the invasion, he told the Koreans how to fight and he kept instructing the Sino-Korean command on its every move. As for the mood of both Stalin and Kim Il Sung, it was quickly changing for the worse as the adversary hit back harder and harder.

Already on 1 July 1950, Stalin seemed to be worried about a halt in the advancement of North Korean troops and the impact of American air raids on North Korean territory.20 Soviet Ambassador Shtykov admitted that American air raids had worsened the political mood in the North. Doubts regarding final victory surfaced and some officials began to hint that it was difficult for Pyongyang to rely purely on its own forces in the war with America.21

Meeting with the Soviet ambassador on July 3, Kim Il Sung confirmed the seriousness of the situation on the front due to American bombing. He wanted Soviet advice on how to reorganize the command of the military actions, and also hoped for new supplies of weapons.

On July 8, Kim Il Sung requested Soviet military advisers in order to strengthen his army. Stalin agreed to provide some of these advisers, but his main preoccupation was to give moral support to Pyongyang. In an August 28 cable to Kim, he emphasized the fact that "the great liberation struggle of the Korean people ... was conducted with brilliant success," that Kim Il Sung "should not feel embarrassed ... because of delays in advancement and because of some local defeats... The biggest success of Korea is that it has become the most popular country in the world and has turned into the banner of the liberation movement in Asia against the imperialist yoke."22 Kim Il Sung expressed deep gratitude to Stalin for this letter, and for "fatherly care and assistance."23

But the outlook for the North Koreans soured following the successful U.S./UN landing at Inchon in mid-September. On September 27, the Soviet Politburo, frustrated by problems at the front, approved a letter to Ambassador Shtykov which contained devastating criticism of the North Korean military leadership and Soviet military advisers. The letter explained in detail what to do and how to do it in the course of the fighting. With the situation getting more and more complicated for the North Koreans, Stalin, after persistent requests from both Kim Il Sung and Moscow's representatives in Korea, consented to station air force units in the North. Meanwhile, the situation for the communists was becoming desperate.24

The North Korean leadership forwarded on September 30 a letter to Stalin literally begging for direct military assistance by the Soviet Union or "volunteer units of China and other countries of people's democracy."25 Realizing that the situation was desperate, Moscow responded in the following ways: 1 ) giving constant advice to North Koreans on tactical matters; 2) withdrawing Soviet representatives from Korea; 3) preparing plans for the evacuation of the Pyongyang regime and its troops out of the country; 4) training troops for a comeback to Korea in the future; 5) pressuring the Chinese to enter the conflict.

7. China's role in the war's initial stage

As was mentioned earlier in this paper, China supported an attack on the South. However, quite soon Beijing became distressed and offended by the fact that the North Koreans did not consult with them and did not pay heed to their advice. Moscow attempted to calm the emotions of the Chinese.
On 2 July 1950, Zhou Enlai in a conversation with Soviet Ambassador Roshchin complained that the North Koreans had underestimated the probability of American military intervention, ignoring Mao Zedong's warnings back in May 1949 and 1950.

Zhou passed on Mao's advice to the North Koreans to create a strong defense line in the area of Inchon, because American troops could land there. The Chinese leadership feared landing operations by Americans in other parts of the Korean peninsula as well. In this conversation Zhou Enlai confirmed that if the Americans crossed the 38th parallel, Chinese troops, disguised as Korean, would engage the opponent. Three Chinese armies, 120,000 men in total, had already been concentrated in the area of Mukden. Zhou inquired if it would be possible to cover these troops with the Soviet air force.26

By July 8, Stalin was already showing a certain irritation with China. In a cable to Ambassador Roshchin he ordered: "Tell Mao Zedong that Koreans complain that there is no representative of China in Korea. They should quickly send a representative... if, of course, Mao Zedong feels it is necessary to have a communication link with Korea."27

On July 13, Stalin approved the Chinese decision to deploy troops in the vicinity of the Korean border and promised to train Chinese pilots and to provide China with military planes. In August-September 1950, on a number of occasions, Mao personally expressed concern over the escalation of American military intervention in Korea and reiterated the readiness of Beijing to send troops to the Korean Peninsula "to mince" American divisions. Simultaneously the Chinese leaders complained that the North Korean military command had committed many mistakes and ignored Beijing's recommendations. Moreover, Pyongyang did not even inform China of developments on the front.28

On September 20, Stalin in a cable to Mao agreed that it was not normal and correct that the North Korean leadership did not properly inform their Chinese comrades about the development of combat activities in Korea. Stalin, however, defended the Koreans, explaining the aforementioned fact by the lack of proper communications and noting that Moscow too had only received "sporadic and outdated" information from the front. Stalin reminded Mao that the (North) Korean People's Army was very young and inexperienced and it had to fight against perfectly equipped foreign troops, not simply South Koreans.

In general, Moscow and Beijing held similar views at that time on the strategy and tactics of the war, though with the landing of Americans at Inchon, the mood in China started to change. In a conversation with Roshchin on September 21, Zhou Enlai admitted that there were persons in China who complained that the Korean war would drag on and would require sacrifices on the part of Chinese. It is also significant that China's authorities leaked to the Soviets intelligence information, showing the Kremlin's policy in Korea in a bad light. Thus, at one point Moscow was informed by Beijing that the British consul in the Chinese capital had reached the conclusion that the USSR and the USA had colluded in Korea, trying, with the help of the war there, to prevent China from capturing Taiwan, completing the civil war and becoming a strong power.29

8. Stalin pressures a reluctant China to enter the Korean war

On 1 October 1950, Stalin came to the conclusion that China had to come to the rescue of the collapsing Kim regime. On that day he sent an urgent message to Mao and Zhou asking them "to move to the 38th parallel at least 5-6 divisions in order to give our Korean comrades a chance to organize under the protection of your troops' military reserves to the North of the 38th parallel."

Stalin added that Pyongyang was not informed of this request.30 It did not take Mao long to respond to Stalin's cable. Mao declined to fulfill his own promise under the pretext that Chinese troops were not strong enough and a clash between China and the USA would ruin Beijing's plans for peaceful reconstruction and could drag the USSR into a war with Washington. Instead, he suggested that the North Koreans accept defeat and resort to guerrilla tactics.31

The Soviets were stunned with this unexpected change in China's position. Stalin reminded the Chinese of their previous promises and urged them again to move into the conflict. The Soviet dictator tried to convince Beijing that the Americans would not dare to start a big war and would agree on a settlement on Korea favorable to the communist camp. Under such a scenario China would also solve the Taiwan issue. He added that even if the USA provoked a big war, "let it take place now rather than a few years later, when Japanese militarism will be restored as an American ally, and when the United States and Japan will possess a military spring-board on the continent in the form of Rhee's Korea."32

Stalin informed Kim Il Sung about his attempts to persuade the Chinese and called upon the North Koreans "to hold firm to every piece of their land." However, on 12 October 1950, the Soviet leader told Kim that the Chinese had refused again and that Korea had to be evacuated. On the next day, however, Stalin had better news: the Chinese, after long deliberations and discussions, had agreed to extend military aid to North Korea. Moscow in exchange agreed to arm the Chinese troops and to provide them with air cover.33

According to available sources, it was not easy for Beijing to adopt that military decision. Two members of the Chinese leadership considered sympathetic to Moscow, Gao Gang and Peng Dehuai, finally managed to convince Mao to take their side. Their main argument was: if all of Korea was occupied by the Americans, it would create a mortal danger to the Chinese revolution. Those who opposed participation, on the other hand, complained about Soviet refusal to participate in the conflict. Some even suggested that China should accept the American advance, even occupation by the USA of Manchuria--because in this case a war between Moscow and Washington would break out and China could stay away from trouble.