9. Chinese "volunteers" enter the Korean War, the communist camp is euphoric

After the entrance of Chinese "volunteers" into the Korean war in late November 1950, the mood of Stalin and Kim Il Sung (as well as that of Mao Zedong, of course) dramatically changed for the better. With every new success of the Chinese on the battlefield the desires and arrogance of Stalin and his allies grew (though they did feel their weak points and exchanged occasional complaints).
On December 1, Stalin cabled Mao: "Your successes make happy not only myself and my comrades in the leadership, but the entire Soviet people. Let me welcome from all my heart you and your friends in the leadership, your army and the entire Chinese people in connection with tremendous successes in the struggle against American troops."34

On December 4, Soviet deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, talking to the Chinese Ambassador Wang Jiaxiang, advised Beijing to continue its successful offensive by crossing the 38th parallel. He stressed that the Chinese had to exploit the emerging opportunities to the full extent. Both sides agreed that Americans were confused and had fallen into a very unfavorable situation, that disagreements had developed between Washington and London. The Chinese ambassador quoted reports from the front that Americans were poor fighters, much worse than the Japanese."35

On December 7, Stalin and Mao agreed to go on with the fighting and present at the United Nations tough conditions for a cease-fire. On 8 January 1951, in a cable announcing the further advance of Chinese troops, Stalin wrote: "From all my heart I congratulate Chinese comrades on the capture of Seoul. This is a great victory of popular patriotic forces over forces of reaction."36 On January 16, Mao suggested to Kim Il Sung to reinforce and to restructure joint forces in Korea (in order "not to repeat mistakes committed by the Korean troops from June to September 1950"). After a certain rest, Mao proposed that a spring (April/May) offensive could start "with the purpose of achieving the final solution of the South Korean issue." Mao did not exclude that the Americans, having learned about serious preparations on the Chinese-North Korean side, would cease resisting and leave the Korean peninsula. But even if Washington continued to resist, it would soon realize that resistance was futile and evacuate its troops from Korea.37

On January 19, Peng Dehuai reported to Mao that Pyongyang accepted Mao's plan of a rest and thorough preparation for the final assault (though Pak Hon-Yong tried to hurry things up). It was also agreed that the North Koreans could not advance alone; Chinese participation was needed.38

10. Euphoria disappears

By the end of January 1951, as documents testify, the communists' euphoria started to decline; soon it disappeared, replaced by worries, fear, confusion, and at times panic. Reading the documents, one also senses growing irritation among the ranks of the communist allies. It is also noticeable that Stalin tried to keep the USSR as much as possible out of direct participation in the war--if he agreed to send Soviet advisers, pilots and other military personnel to Korea once in a while, every time he did so only after repeated pleas by Mao and Kim. Stalin did not always satisfy the requests of his allies about supplies of armaments, but for objective reasons: they wanted more than the USSR, still weak after WWII and engaged in a global Cold War, could provide.

On January 28, Mao informed Stalin that the adversary had begun an unexpected offensive and due to this the communist troops lost the opportunity to rest and to undergo a restructuring. Instead they had to launch a counterattack. After achieving an operational success the Chinese side hoped to resume preparation for the final assault on the South.39 Stalin promptly agreed with the strategy, stressing that "from the international point of view it is undoubtedly advisable that Inchon and Seoul are not captured by the adversary, that Chinese-Korean troops give a serious rebuff to the advancing troops of the adversary."40

In late January/early February 1951, Stalin criticized the structure, organization, and quality of the Korean armed forces, suggesting substantial changes. His proposals were immediately accepted by the Koreans and supported by Beijing. By that time the first reports of the falling spirit of the Korean troops reached Beijing and Moscow.41 That the situation for the communist side continued to deteriorate is quite clear from a cable sent by Mao to Stalin on 1 March 1951, in which the Chinese leader admitted that a general offensive was no longer possible, that the adversary had superiority in weapons and dominated the air, and that Sino-Korean troops were sustaining heavy losses and urgently needed air cover by Soviet air force units. Mao stressed that the communist side must prepare for a long war and admitted that American troops will not be driven out of Korea for at least a number of years.42

Stalin satisfied Mao's requests, immediately noting that large-scale military operations were in the offing for Sino-Korean troops.43 In the following months Moscow promptly and favorably responded to all other requests of the Chinese, concerning first of all airplanes and air defense.
Meanwhile, further correspondence between the USSR and the PRC reveals that the fighting spirit of the communist side continued to deteriorate as that of the Americans improved.44 The situation got so bad that Stalin felt it necessary to criticize Mao for wrong tactics employed in the war.45

11. Communists seek an armistice

By June 1951 the situation at the front became so hopeless for the communists that they started to seek a way out. The question of an armistice was raised by the North Koreans and Chinese. Stalin had no choice but to agree. Maneuvers around the armistice talks did not, however, prevent the communists from looking for every opportunity to reinforce the army, to gain territory and to strike at the opposite side. At the same time the communists constantly worried about attacks by the opposite side.

The conditions presented by the communists for an armistice were inflexible. It is also worth noting that Stalin flatly refused to direct the armistice negotiations and quite rudely told Mao to do the job. Another prominent feature of this period was constant bargaining between Stalin and Mao about Soviet military supplies and military advisers. Mao kept bombarding Stalin with new requests, and the Kremlin chief continued to rebuff Mao, sometimes with visible irritation.

In June 1951, Kim Il Sung and Gao Gang went to Moscow, where they convinced Stalin to agree to the necessity of an armistice-seeking policy. However, at the same time the communists discussed measures to beef up their military capabilities and to prepare for an offensive in August.46 In ensuing communications, tactics were worked out on who would raise the issue of the armistice first and how it would be done. It was also decided to insist on restoration of the border line along the 38th parallel and on a small neutral zone on both sides. Mao suggested to raise, for the sake of bargaining, the issue of Taiwan and then to drop it. Simultaneously China requested from the USSR armaments for 60 divisions. Stalin gave the OK, though he rebuked the Chinese for trying to get all the weapons during one year, explaining that it was "physically impossible and totally unthinkable."47

Preparing for the negotiations, Mao cabled Stalin: "It is extremely important that you personally take charge of the negotiations in order to prevent us from getting into an awkward position."48 Stalin rejected the idea, saying: "In your cable you proposed that we, from Moscow, should direct the armistice talks. This is, of course, unthinkable and not necessary. It's you, comrade Mao Zedong, who'll have to direct negotiations. We can at best give advice on some questions. We are not able to be in direct communication with Kim Il Sung. You must have direct communication with him."49

To raise the stakes at the forthcoming negotiations the communists decided to be more active on the front, to put additional pressure on the adversary as well as to improve their own defenses in case the other side would try to gain a military advantage.

Measures were also taken to upgrade the overall military potential of North Korea, making it ready for a prolonged war. Stalin satisfied the requests of his allies as much as he was able, except for the advisers. Periodically Stalin lashed at the Chinese for extravagant requests for weapons and unwillingness to share them with the North Koreans.

My analysis concludes here, leaving for other contributions a reexamination of the strategy and tactics of the communist side at the armistice talks and in the final stage of the war. In conclusion, I would stress that further archival research is needed to get definite answers to the following aspects of communist politics in the Korean war:

1. The exact reasons for the reversal of Stalin's position on "the liberation" of South Korea.
2. The real motives behind China's initial refusal to enter the Korea War, and the total picture of Soviet-Chinese interactions on Korea in 1949-1950.
3. The detailed process of communist preparations for the war.
4. The events of the first days of the war and reaction to these events in Moscow, Beijing, and Pyongyang.
5. What further strategy Stalin had in mind when he ordered North Korean communists to evacuate the country in the autumn of 1950.
1. See, e.g., coded message N 121973, 2 May 1947, The 8th Directorate of the General Staff, Soviet Armed Forces, pp. 4-6, Archives of the President of the Russian Federation (hereafter APRF); cable from Ambassador Shtykov to the Soviet Foreign Ministry, 19 January 1949, APRF.
2. APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 13-23, 46.
3. Shtykov report to Stalin, 2 May 1949, Archives of Foreign Policy, Russian Federation (AVP RF). See also Marshal Vasilevsky and Ambassador Shtykov's cable to Stalin on 20 April 1949, N 17064, APRF.
4. See, e.g., Stalin cable to Shtykov, 30 October 1949, APRF.
5. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 13-23, 46.
6. See, e.g., memorandums of conversations of ambassador Shtykov with Kim Il Sung and Pak Hon-Yong, 12 and 14 August 1949, and Charge'd'Affaires Tunkin's cable to Moscow on 3 September 1949, AVP RF.
7. See APRF, Fond 3, list 65, file 776, pp. 30-32.
8. See Shtykov cable to Stalin, 19 January 1950, AVP RF.
9. Stalin's cable to Shtykov, 30 January 1950, AVP RF.
10. See Shtykov cable to Stalin, 23 March 1950, AVP RF.
11. See Shtykov cable to Stalin, 15 May 1949, AVP RF; cable to Stalin by General Kovalev about a conversation with Mao Zedong, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 331, pp. 59-61.
12. Shtykov cable to Moscow, 12 May 1950, AVP RF.
13. Coded message N 2220, 3 May 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 331, pp. 59-61.
14. Shtykov cable to Stalin, 12 May 1950.
15. Coded message N 5500, 14 May 1950, APRF, Fund 45, list 1, file 331, p. 55.
16. See Ambassador Roshchin's cable to Moscow, 14 May 1950, AVP RF.
17. APRF, Fund 6, list 9, file 14, p 57.
18. Shtykov cable to Stalin, 1 January 1950, AVP RF.
19. Shtykov cable to Stalin, 12 May 1950, AVP RF.
20. Coded message N 34691 /sh, 1 July 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, p. 104.
21. Coded message N 405809, 2 July 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 346, pp. 105-107.
22. Coded message N 75021, 28 August 1950, ibid., pp. 5-6, 10-11.
23. APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 347, pp. 12-15.
24. Coded message N 600262/sh, 27 September 1950, APRF, Fund 3, list 65, file 827, pp. 94-96.
25. Coded message N 600508/sh, 30 September 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list l, file 347, pp.41-45.
26. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 2 July 1950.
27. Stalin cable to Roshchin, 8 July 1950.
28. See, e.g., Mao's conversations with Soviet academician on 19 and 28 August 1950, and Zhou's comments on 14 September 1950 to Roshchin.
29. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 13 July 1950, AVP RF.
30. Coded message N 4581, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 334, pp. 97-98.
31. Roshchin cable to Moscow, 3 October 1950, coded message N 25199, ibid., pp. 105-106.
32. See Stalin's cable to Kim Il Sung (quoting Stalin's earlier message to Mao), 8 October 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 347, pp. 65-67.
33. Coded message N 4829, 14 October 1950, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 343, p.77.
34. Coded message N 9768. APRF, Fond 3, list 1, file 336, p. 5.
35. See APRF, Fond 3, list 65, file 371, pp. 35-37.
36. Ibid., list 1, file 336, pp. 88-90.
37. See coded message N 15603, 16 January 1951, APRF, Fond 3, list 1, file 336, pp. 81-82.
38. Coded message 15994, 21 January 1951, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 335, pp. 37-40.
39. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, p. 44.
40. See APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 47-48.
41. Ibid., Fond 3, list 65, file 828, p. 123.
42. See APRF, Fond 45, list l, file 337, pp. 78-82.
43. Ibid., p. 118.
44. See, e.g., the coded message N 20412, June 1951, ibid., file 339, pp. 4-6.
45. Ibid., file 338, pp. 98-99.
46. Coded message N 3557, 13 June 1951, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 337, pp. 31-32; see also file 339, pp. 61-63.
47. Coded message N 635177, 24 June 1951, ibid., file 339, p. 78.
48. Coded message N 21334, 30 June 1951, APRF, Fond 45, list 1, file 339, p. 92.
49. Coded message N 3917, 30 June 1951, ibid., pp. 95-96.