Eritrean Independence

After a UN-controlled referendum in 1991 and complete Ethiopian pull back from Eritrea, on 24 May 1993 Eritreans declared their state - with capital in Asmara - as independent from Ethiopia.

Right from the start they were confronted with immense problems as the whole infrastructure of the country was completely destroyed by 20 years of the war, there was a large number of displaced persons and refugees in the country, and the famine was almost as bad as in Ethiopia. Nevertheless, the strategically important Red Sea ports and international aid helped the recovery.

Even under such circumstances, enmities with Ethiopians remained, as the two new governments - which previously worked together in order to topple Mengistu from power and develop democracy in their respective countries - could later never find a common language regarding their long borders. Especially the Badme area was heavily disputed, where Eritreans positioned their border troops according to the agreement between Italy and Ethiopian emperor Menlik II, made in 1903, which was not recognized valid by the Ethiopians. The government in Addis Abbeba was not especially pleased about this, nor about the fact that due to the Eritrean independence Ethiopia was completely cut off the Red Sea ports, and the Eritreans were demanding considerable payments for the transit of goods to Ethiopia.

Very soon both countries started to reorganize their armed forces in order to be ready for a new conflict. In late 1992 - in anticipation of their independence of Ethiopia - Eritreans founded their own air force (Eritrean Air Force = ERAF), and first pilots - trained on former Ethiopian at Debre Zeit - were ready in mid-1993. The rest of the ERAF development could be described as a "text-book" example. As first, lighter aircraft were acquired, like four Finish Redigos, to improve pilot training. Then, in May 1994, four Chinese Y-12 light transports arrived to Asmara. In the hangars of the same airfield Eritreans have also found eight Ethiopian MiG-21s, nine T-33s and two Mi-8s (two or three additional MiG-21s, together with one MiG-23BN and a MiG-23ML each - were captured at Assab airfield too). All were in relatively good condition, however - except for Mi-8s - they weren't brought back into flyable status, and most seems to have been given back to Ethiopia.

Instead, in 1996 Eritreans ordered six Aermacchi strike fighters from Italy, with which the first combat unit of the ERAF was founded in 1997.

Due to the worsening economic situation, problems with famine and recovery from the long war, Ethiopians started to reorganize their air force only in 1995. At the time an Israeli delegation arrived in Addis Ababa, proposing various solutions for refurbishing and upgrading surviving EtAF aircraft, and in turn causing rumours that the IAI would refurbish and upgrade at least 15 MiG-21MF/bis, bringing them to approximately the same standard as Romanian Lancers, as well as a similar number of EtAF MiG-23BNs. In fact, all such proposals were vetoed by the Ethiopian Prime Minister on the grounds that there were other, higher, priorities. Nevertheless, it seems that after a while the issue was solved and a number of EtAF MiG-21s and MiG-23s refurbished, then when the subsequent war with Eritrea erupted, the Ethiopians had a number of airframes of both types available for flying combat operations.

Quarrels over the Border

On 28 November 1997, Eritrea introduced its new currency, Nakfa. The move resulted in a strong protest from Ethiopian government, which started a boycott of Eritrean ports. This, as well as Ethiopian pressure on Eritrean economy, caused a high inflation and problems with food supply in Eritrea, and increased tensions between the two countries. On 12 May 1998, Ethiopia accused Eritrea for occupying parts of its territory along the border in the Badme region and attacked couple of Eritrean positions with artillery. The Eritreans answered, that on 6 May their troops only took back some ground taken by Ethiopians six months before. Although only the begin of the new dispute, those first skirmishes were enough for the Ethiopian Airlines to cancel all its flights from Addis Ababa to Asmara. By 31 May 1998, further clashes between border patrols developed close to Dalgedo, not far from Alitena. The intensity of these first battles was actually low, but soon enough both sides started deploying their larger units, and a large battle developed in the area around 3 June, with both sides exchanging artillery, rocket and mortar fire.

Two days later, both the Eritrean and Ethiopian air forces went into action. At 09:45h in the morning, two MiG-23BNs of the EtAF (Lt. Mulugelta Wolde Raphael flew as #2 of this formation) appeared low over the airport of Asmara and opened fire. During their attack one Boeing 727 of Aero Zambia and two hangars were hit. Also, one person was killed and five others injured when one of the bombs hit the bus station outside of the airport. Ethiopians were confronted with a hail of Eritrean anti-aircraft fire and one of the MiGs was hit, crashing in the suburbs of Asmara. The pilot failed to eject. Only couple of hours later, the USA started an evacuation of foreign citizens from Eritrea and a US chartered Airbus A300 evacuated the first group of 190 civilians.

During the same afternoon, the Ethiopians reported two attacks of Eritrean on the city of Mekelle, the capital of Ethiopian province Tigray. Supposedly, as many as 44 civilians were killed and 135 injured as cluster bombs were used. It remains unknown if this was the incident in relation to which the then Commander of the ERAF, Brig. Gen. Habte Zion Hadgu, in an interview to Reuters, published on 9 June of the same year, boasted "One to one-hundred - that's an exchange rate!".

For the EtAF it was clear that something had to be done in order to surpress the ERAF. Thus, on the morning of 6 June 1998, two Ethiopian MiG-21s repeated the attack on the airfield of Asmara and the air base of the ERAF close by. However, the Eritrean anti-aircraft fire was heavy again and one MiG ("1083") was shot down. The pilot, Col. Bazbeh Petros, one of the most experienced Ethiopian pilots, ejected and was immediately captured (Col. Petros was shot down by Eritreans in the 1980s while flying a MiG-21 as well; he was released in 1991 and became one of the first pilots the new Ethiopian government recalled into the new Air Force ?despite the fact that his brother, Dr. Beyene Petros, is one of the leaders of Ethiopian opposition). The MiG-21 of Petros' wingman, Lt. Alemayehu Getachev, was also damaged, but returned safely to the base. Although Ethiopians actually wanted to destroy the small Eritrean Air Force on the ground by their air strikes, they were not successful and this was temporary the last Ethiopian air attack, as the government in Addis Ababa agreed to wait with further similar operations till 7 June, in order to give foreign citizens more time to left Asmara. During the evening an Airbus A310 of the German Luftwaffe started towards Jeddah. The last foreign airplanes that took off were two US C-130s, two An-24 chartered by the UN, and one Italian airliner.

The First "March on Asmara"

In the meantime, Eritrean ground troops repulsed couple of Ethiopian attacks in the Badme and Tsorona regions. However, on 6 June one of the Macchis was shot down due to the north of Mekelle. The pilot ejected and was rescued by an Mi-8 of the ERAF. At the same time, Ethiopians also attacked Zalambessa, a small but heavy fortified city on the central part of the border. On the 9 June, Addis Ababa claimed the capture of the Zalambessa, however, one Eritrean brigade, supported by rocket-launchers, counterattacked and hit the Ethiopians very hard, throwing them several kilometers back in the process. The Eritrean Macchis were deployed again on the next day during the fighting around Erde Mattios. Ethiopians claimed that local hospital was hit during air attacks and 30 people killed there. Their tries to breach Eritrean positions and march toward Asmara were stopped however, and the ERAF became even more aggressive. On the morning of the 12 June 1998, two Eritrean Mi-8 appeared in low level over Addis Pharmaceutical works, in Adigrat, attempting to bomb it. Their weapons, however, fell few yard from the plant and caused only minor damage. Only couple of hours later, four rocketed and cluster-bombed against several targets in the city as well. According to Ethiopian sources four people died and 30 other were injured during those attacks.

However heavy the fighting was, on 14 June the USA reported that a first small agreement between Addis Ababa and Asmara could be reached, in which both sides promised not to attack any population centres. An agreement about the pull-back of Eritrean troops from areas claimed by Ethiopia, negotiated by US and Russian envoys, was rejected by Eritrea and sporadic fighting continued on at least six different points along the border. Thus the Organization of African Unity (OAU) became active and on 3 August 1997 a new agreement about a cease-fire could be reached. What actually followed was a period of relative peace in which both sides tried to strengthen their forces. Very soon there were reports about large deals made with Russian companies.

Pains of the Ethiopian Air Force

At the time of the first battles, in late Spring 1998 - both the EtAF and ERAF had immense problems. Ethiopian Air Force had an advantage of 10:1 in aircraft (and her MiG-21s and MiG-23s were certainly more suitable for air-to-air and air-to-ground operations ), but, there were not enough pilots for all the available planes to go around. Actually, the EtAF was - for all purposes - non-existent between 1991 and 1995. The reason for this was the complete destruction of communist regime, including the air force, during the fighting in 1991. All the officers and pilots down to the rank of a major were imprisoned, either by the new regime (which imprisoned 26 pilots), or by the Eritreans. According to Ethiopian oppositional sources, the officers captured during the fighting in 1990-1991 were still held imprisoned by the new government as of 1999, almost all of them on charges for attacking civilian targets during the war with Eritrea and the civil war in Ethiopia.

Problematic Training

The EtAF was by the time foremost in need of new pilots. Already since the failed coup staged by air force officers against the Derga regime, in 1988, all of its future fliers would usually receive their basic flying training at the Ethiopian Airlines Flying School, based at Addis Ababa International Airfield, before re-qualifying on jets (L-39s). New students - mainly former TPLF-fighters and ethnic Tigreans - were now recruited to be trained as pilots. There are reports, however, that most of these cadets did not go through the rigorous physical exams, and that these were a nightmare to train. Such reports come mainly from Ethiopian oppositional sources. The matter of fact is that during the civil war in Ethiopia, in the 1980s, the Derg government was mainly from central and southern parts of the country, while the armed opposition and the party ruling the country since 1991, the TPLF, was from the Tigray, the northern-most Ethiopian state. For this reason, when the Derg-junta was removed, there was a new kind of tensions between different people in northern and southern Ethiopia. The TPLF had no air force; the EtAF as it was during the Derg times was mainly manned by officers from southern Ethiopia. Consequently, the new government distrusted the EtAF a lot in the early 1990s, and only a very small number of Derg officers ?all bellow the rank of colonel - were permitted to return to service. Once they re-joined the service there was a new kind of resentment: the Derg-officers disliked the idea of serving under TPLF officers who had little understanding and knowledge about air power. In their opinion, officers and other personnel that did not come through the ranks and could not fly could not run an air force.

It was not before 1998 that the first nine new pilots qualified sufficiently to be considered ready for training on L-39s: a group of Bulgarian pilots was then contracted to continue their training. Although Ethiopia acquired 25 L-39Cs in the 1980s, and five more in 1997 and 1998, only few of these were operational when Bulgarians arrived, being based at Gambela AB. Heavy maintenance at Debre Zeit was needed to bring them back into satisfactory condition, but then the hot and humid weather conditions proved such a problem that the training was moved to Arba Minch. It could be said that in the EtAF service the L-39C proved to be an exceptionally rugged and survivable aircraft, especially after equipped with Taiwanese-made GPS systems. While some reports indicate that during the following six months one of the students defected, while another had to be removed from the course after showing reluctance to fly, it appears that actually the Bulgarians were quite successful, then by 20 April 1999 their first group of students was ready for their solos. Two of these, however, crashed in similar circumstances on two different occasions on that day. Both being killed. The survivors of this group were eventually rushed to crash conversion course on MiG-23s, undertaken by Russian instructors.

Russian Involvement

By the time the tensions with Eritrea reached a point at which it was clear to Commander-in-Chief EtAF, Gen. Ababe, that the combat capability of his force might soon be required. The government in Addis Ababa came to a similar conclusion and a decision was taken to reinforce the EtAF with new aircraft. As one of first measures, an additional number of former Derg-EtAF pilots and officers were "accepted" (some of them forcibly) to service again, together with more candidates from other Ethiopian provinces. One of ex-Derg-pilots returned at the time was Gen. Techane Mesfin, a former F-5 and MiG-21-pilot: he became EtAF Chief of Operations in 1998, and was to serve until pensioned off, in 2002.

Consequently, by 1998, the situation was so that the EtAF had some 20 combat pilots -including, reportedly, at least one women - most of which were still inexperienced. The condition of the available support bases, spare parts, and ground personnel was grievous too. Thus, the Ethiopians started to look for mercenaries around the world. Within months, they could find some very good ones.

The Russian company Rosvoorouzhenie was already active in Ethiopia, via its representative, Col. Vladimir Nefedow and several other "instructors", most of which moved to Addis Ababa after the fall of Southern Yemen, in 1994. Thus the Russians and Ethiopians were fast to agree several large arms deals, and from the summer of 1998, not only deliveries of new hardware, but also a group of capable former officers of the Russian Air Force arrived in Ethiopia. First news about this reached Asmara very soon and - in a vain try to prevent any such "reinforcements" for the EtAF - Eritrean president Afewerki announced, that every foreign mercenary whose airplane might go down over Eritrea will be shot immediately upon his capture by the Eritrean forces.

The warning of Afewerki was not to change the minds of some 80 Russians arrived now in Addis Ababa on board several chartered Il-76s together with crates containing new radars, weapons, communication- and supply equipment. Not only the Russians were to help: at around this time ten refurbished MiG-23BNs were purchased from Romania as well. Thus, by late autumn 1998, the EtAF boasted some 18 MiG-23BNs, perhaps ten refurbished MiG-21 (some 30 other - non-refurbished - examples were held in reserve, and used as sources of spares), six An-12s, two DH-6s, 24 Mi-24/35s and 22 Mi-8s. A further deal with the USA, worth some $11 million, brought also four refurbished C-130Bs to Ethiopia (the later were supplied free of charge, but Ethiopia had to pay for their refurbishment by an US company).

But, this was still considered as not enough, especially as the availability of Russian mercenaries now made it possible for Ethiopia to acquire more modern aircraft. Thus a deal valued approximately $150 million was agreed with Moscow for sale of eight surplus Su-27S?(including two two-seat Su-27UBs). Another deal with the Hungarian "Danubian Aircraft Company", saw a delivery of four Mi-8Ts (formerly owned by the Iraqi Air Force, and impounded at Tokol airfield near Budapest since 1991) with the help of an Antonov An-124, in October 1997 (how urgent such deliveries were expected by the EtAF, shows the fact that during the first days after their arrival in Ethiopia, one of the Mi-8s logged no less but 30 flight hours!). Also, additional Mi-24 helicopters, more ammunition and ground navigation equipment were purchased. Most of the new items were flown to Addis Ababa between 10 and 23 December 1998 with Il-76s and An-124s of different smaller Russian companies.

The first Su-27 - dismantled at Krasnodar Air Base ?departed for Ethiopia aboard an Antonov An-22 on 15 December. Due to the new Russian engagement in Ethiopia, the EtAF - now actually under command of retired Russian Gen. Yanakow Yoakim Ivanovich - was about to became a viable air force again: this was achieved foremost with help of a considerable number of Russian pilots, instructors and technicians, most of which were only recently retired from the Russian Air Force. How good the cooperation between Ethiopia and Russia functioned was shown at its best on 6 January 1999, when one Su-27US, flown by Russian Col. (ret.) Vyacheslaw Myzin, crashed during a post-assembly test-flight (almost two weeks after the delivery of the aircraft). Myzin ejected safely. Within only a few days the Russian company Promexport replaced the lost plane by dispatching a new one (also an ex-Russian Air Force example) to Ethiopia.

The initial group of EtAF Su-27-pilots were trained at Debre-Zeit by Russian instructors. It was not before 1999 that a second group of Ethiopians was sent to Russia for training on the type. Interestingly, it was also not before this group returned to Ethiopia that a unit was formed officially: the No. 5 Fighter-Interceptor Squadron EtAF.

It should be mentioned here that the EtAF Su-27-force was depleted already before Myzin crash: in December 1998 the Su-27 flown by Flt.Lt. Abaniyeh crashed during a night-flying exercise, killing the pilot. This was already a second fatal accident in the EtAF within two months, as in November 1998 an EtAF L-39 was shot down in error by air defence of Mekelle, with both Ethiopian pilots -including the student, Flt.Lt. Endegena Tadesse - being killed; Tadesse was buried at Debre Zeit, on 14 November 1998. In yet another incident, a Mi-35 crashed during a night training exercise near Sendafa, after hitting a power-line or pole, killing the crew and one Russian instructor.

By the time, there were already 300 Russian officers and instructors in Ethiopia (all of which were contracted via the Russian Ministry of Defense, although a number of Mi-24/35-crews was contracted from a private Russian company), and EtAF Russian Gen. Yanakow was instructing its high command. According to Eritrean authorities, the other most important Russian officers in Ethiopia of the time were.

Eritrean Problems

The Eritreans had completely different problems. Financially they could barely follow the Ethiopian pace in this arms race, despite some support from several Arab and Islamic countries. But, they couldn't afford to stay behind and now a twist of fate was to help them acquire modern fighter jets, in turn starting an arms race of special sort in this part of Africa.

Namely, concerned by the possibility that Ethiopians might sent their MiG-21s and MiG-23s to Israel for refurbishment, the Russians decided to grant permission for export of MiG-29s to Eritrea. Thus, in the summer of 1998, eight refurbished MiG-29s and two MiG-29UBs were purchased for ErAF at a cost of approximately $25 million each! First of new Eritrean fighters has been seen on 14 December 1998 in the flight near Asmara. Even better friends the Eritreans found in the Ukraine and during the summer of 1998 a kind of a small air bridge was also organized between Kiev and Asmara. One of the involved transports, an Il-76MD (UR-UCI), crashed close to Asmara on 17 July 1998.

This new relationship was to a large degree possible because of a quarrel between the Russians and Ukrainians working for the Rosvoorouzhenie, which resulted with the Russians working for Ethiopia, and the Ukrainians doing their best for the Eritreans. Nefedow, for example, changed the sides and started working for Eritreans. He was not only instrumental in brokering the purchase of MiG-29s, but also of four armed Mi-17s from Kazan helicopters. At the same time, a group of Eritrean pilots went through a kind of crash course in the Ukraine, in order to learn how to fly and use new MiGs and Mils.

New Battles

Reinforcements that both air forces acquired came just in the last moment before the next round of heavy clashes broke out, in early February 1999. This time, Ethiopians tried again to break through Eritrean positions at Zalambessa without success. Nevertheless, the EtAF - and its Russian mercenaries - could now finally show the worth of all the money spent for them.

In order to find a reason for its counteroffensive with aim of capturing Badme, on 5 February 1999 the Ethiopian government claimed that two Eritrean planes attacked a fuel depot in Adigrat, some 48 kilometres inside the Ethiopian border, important for the supply of Ethiopian army with fuel. Already on the next day, the Ethiopian attack was in the full swing, causing a series of fierce battles in the Badme area, where Ethiopian ground forces were supported by EtAF helicopter gunships. On the morning of the 8 February, Ethiopian army launched another offensive against Eritrean positions at Alitena, Tsorona and Zalambessa, claiming some smaller successes, but again without any break through. Both sides paid a very heavy price, however, as many soldiers died in artillery exchanges and air attacks. After further operations of Ethiopian helicopter gunships, Eritreans started to build up their air defences over the front, and on the morning of 14 February 1999 claimed one of two Ethiopian Mi-24 that attacked the front line close to Burre, some 72km south of Aseb. Both crew members were killed. Ethiopia confirmed the loss but denied the Eritrean claim for a shooting down of a second Mi-24 on 24 February 1999. Ethiopians, whose Russian mercenaries and own fighter pilots were still in training for the forthcoming operation, pressed their old An-12Bs in service as bombers, and couple of night attacks, undertaken by those planes, were reported as flown against the Eritrean positions in the hills around Badme.

Two days later, on 26 February 1999, Ethiopian fighters finally started their operations again. That morning two weaves of two MiG-23BNs each bombed the Eritrean logistical support centre at Harsele, while other planes bombed the water supply installations in the port of Assab and the airfield nearby. All those attacks were repeated on 21 and 23 February as well, even during the negotiations to establish a peaceful settlement that took place in both capitals, with the support of Organization for African Unity (OAU) and the EU. It became clear, that Eritrean Air Force had to deploy its new fighters in order to stop the newest offensive of the EtAF. The air warfare between Ethiopia and Eritrea was thus short of its highest point.