《經濟學家》：美國VS世界－－最大威脅還是最大希望？

是的，美國與眾不同。不過它一貫如此。大多數時候，這種與眾不同對世界來說是有益的，而不是有害的。

直到大約兩年多之前，全世界各種討論會、報紙上的觀點版甚至酒吧爭論的時髦話題是，全球化是否就是美國化，以及這一趨勢算好事還是壞事。現在，很少有專家再為他們自己的國家是否不得不與美國日益相似而感到痛苦。時下，歐洲和亞洲憂慮的源頭在於，美國是否日益變得與其他國家太不一樣了，以至於變成世界上一個需要解決的問題，而不是解決問題的方案。換句話說，這並不僅僅是魯莽的布什行政班子帶領美國走向歧途的問題。從這一觀點來看，現在的美國從本質上在奉行強硬政策和單邊主義，因此，人們不再信任它能領導當今的世界。相反，它使世界其他國家感到害怕。

毋庸置疑，伊拉克是這場爭論的焦點，儘管其他事件和行動，諸如京都議定書、反彈道導彈條約、國際罪犯法庭、關塔那摩海灣（Guantanamo Bay）、聯邦政府預算赤字，甚至棉花補貼，此時都被拿來作為佐證。不過，伊拉克應當為這場爭論射出一縷更為冷靜和清醒的光束。是美國給伊拉克帶來安定、繁榮甚至民主對世界有好處呢，還是它在伊拉克失利更為有利於世界呢？是美國令人恐懼的能力還是它的無能更對世界有利呢？如果美國在喬治-布什或其民主黨對手的領導下，迫於諸如11月2日美國軍用直升飛機在伊拉克境內被擊落等軍事打擊的壓力，匆忙從伊拉克撤軍，這是個令人鼓舞的、顯示美國謙遜的標誌呢，還是毀滅性的極不負責任的行動呢？鑑於國際上對於美國於1994年從索馬里撤軍、對巴爾幹地區好幾年的不作干預、放任塔利班執掌阿富汗的政權、到最近不願出兵利比里亞等事件所給予的貶斥，為什麽現在有這麼多的國家對美國干預伊拉克持敵視的態度呢？

例外的例外

對於最後一個問題，答案之一是，觀點前後不一是無能者所擁有的奢侈品之一。對於那些不能也不會承擔責任的人來說，他們可以隨意對那些能夠而且已經承擔責任的人指手劃腳。另一點是，當不同尋常的、雄心勃勃的行動採取之後，必有不同尋常的後果，對此感到害怕是很自然的。但是，更進一步的回答是，對於外部世界來說，美國是個奇特的、令人迷惑的國家--考慮到美國社會的高度開放性和關於它的大量信息，這一點未免令人奇怪--有時，迷惑會轉變為憂慮。這是美國歷史上令人不解的眾多時段中的一段。

不過這樣的時代自這個國家成立伊始就已出現了。當我們駐華盛頓的雜誌總編撰寫本周的調查報告《一個分裂的國家》（A nation apart），“美國例外論”這一近來耳熟能詳的詞最早是由亞里克西斯-德-托克維爾（Alexis de Tocqueville）這位才華橫溢的法國人於1835年-1840年間在《美國的民主》一書中提出來的。他在那時就已指出的美國和其他國家在本質上的很多不同之處，這些差異在今天仍舊被不斷地談論着——它喧囂的民主政治，它的地方分權，它對志願組織的熱愛，以及它的民眾強烈的宗教信仰。即使在冷戰時期 ——現在的批論家們描述說當時對蘇聯的恐懼成為美國與其他國家的聯繫紐帶——人們今天對美國各種各樣的憂慮就已經司空見慣了。格雷厄姆-格林（Graham Greene，英國作家——譯註） 在其小說《寧靜的美國人》（The Quiet American）（1955年）一書中曾經抱怨，天真的美國理想主義者的禍害大於造福。數不盡影片，不管是美國人還是外國人拍攝的，均表達了對陰險的軍事工業聯合體的憂慮。這些影片還擔心美國偏執地認為赤色分子到處隱藏（reds-under-the-bed ），以及出現狂熱舉動。

另外，還有兩個問題需要注意。一個就是，最近幾年來，美國的獨特性更為顯著。這表現在經濟層面（工作時間、生產力、創新能力），社會層面（人口增長、宗教信仰、愛國主義）以及政治層面（不顧一切代價取勝的偏執派性）。高額的聯邦預算赤字雖然會使稅率提高，從而削減實力，儘管如此，美國人口的蓬勃生機與其生產率推動的經濟活力相結合，將有可能使美國在將來更為強大，而不是更衰弱。至少在經濟方面，如果一些國家想保持自己較高的生活水準與較低的失業率，它們將不得不再一次學習美國這個榜樣的某些方面。

民主制度——既是答案又是問題

另一個需要注意的問題是，把美國與其他國家分開的一些獨特因素同樣使美國自身分裂開來。宗教的、清教徒式的、保守的美國人（主要是共和黨人）同更世俗的、追求享樂的、寬容的美國人（主要是民主黨人）並駕齊驅。直到在911恐怖襲擊陰影下舉行的2002年美國中期選舉之時，連續的民意測驗表明美國是個“50 對50的國家”（50-50 nation）。兩個黨派都能發現對自己將來有利的趨勢：人口狀況對民主黨有利，而經濟發展和愛國主義則對共和黨有利。在美國鬧哄哄的異常活躍的民主制度中，這意味着各種行動和冒險行為趨於自我調節，至少一些年內會是如此。這既使人放心也令人擔心：它有可能緩和極端行徑，並抑制一些諸如支持宗教權利的遊說勢力的影響；不過它也可能會鼓勵美國從海外的麻煩中抽身而退。

如果這種狀況發生，這對美國來說是一場災難，對於世界來說也是一場悲劇。美國在阿富汗和伊拉克面臨的基本窘狀是，無所作為和進行干涉看起來都是前途堪憂、風險重重的選擇，不過無所作為看起來要更為糟糕些。中東和中亞差不多，進行干涉困難重重，而且成效微乎其微。不過兩個國家除了持續動盪外，與美國干涉之前相比，兩個國家人民的生活都得到了改善；當然，比基地恐怖組織營地駐紮和薩達姆-侯賽因掌權的狀況就更好了。正如下一位領導人所談論的，在阿富汗，還有更多的工作需要去做，不過至少其中的一部分工作是完全有可能實現的。然而在伊拉克，如果美國軍隊傷亡人數持續增加，這將會在華盛頓，包括在共和黨人之間，發出有強有力的聲音，迫使布什先生宣布勝利並撤軍。

幸運的是，布什不太可能這樣做。批評人士討厭布什的一面——一種非白即黑的世界觀，一雙對反對意見充耳不聞的耳朵——也使得布什表現出其倔強不屈的另一面。說得好聽一些，他是一個有責任感的人；說得尖刻一些，也許他是一個清醒的人，他將會意識到，過早的撤出伊拉克看起來像個敗局，而這樣的失敗無異於政治自殺。

擁有着堅定的信念以及幾個盟國的支持，美國甘冒世界之大不韙，同世界大多數國家的意見相左，通過干涉伊拉克的內政，顯示出自己的確是個與眾不同的國家：它是一個隨時準備肩負起責任，隨時去做自己認為正確事情的國家。由於這一作為如此膽大，而且與當今世界的標準如此不同，因而，準確地說，這一行為未免讓別的國家憂心忡忡。因此，這樣的行動也不會得到瀑布般的讚揚和禮物。正像政府官員肆意責罵國外的批評人士，以及通過觸犯人權損害美國自己的道德權威一樣，這一行事方式更強化了人們的憂慮。儘管如此，現在美國必須通過當場創造出事實來贏得這場爭論。如果事實上失敗了，美國將有可能退回到自己的老巢。不過成功是會實現的。這將需要長期痛苦而代價高昂的努力。不過只有如此，希望才會重生，威脅才會被驅散。

附：網址與原文

http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2189509

America versus the world

Greatest danger, or greatest hope?

Nov 6th 2003

From The Economist print edition

Yes, America is different. But it always has been. Mostly, the difference is good for the world, not bad

UNTIL a little over two years ago, the fashionable topic for debate in conferences, opinion pages and even bars around the world was whether globalisation was really Americanisation, and whether that was a good or a bad thing. Now, few pundits anguish about whether their countries are having to become more like America. The fashionable source of anxiety in both Europe and Asia is whether America is becoming so different from everywhere else that it is becoming a problem for the world, not a solution. It is not just a reckless Bush administration leading America astray, in other words. On this view, the United States is now inherently assertive and unilateralist, and so can no longer be trusted to lead the world. Instead, it should be feared.

Inevitably, Iraq is the crucible for this debate, though other events and actions?athe Kyoto Protocol, the anti-ballistic missile treaty, the International Criminal Court, Guantanamo Bay, federal budget deficits, even cotton subsidies?aare being called in as thesis reinforcements. Yet Iraq ought also to cast this debate in a colder, more sobering light. Will it be better for the world if America succeeds in bringing stability, prosperity and even democracy to Iraq, or if it fails? Is it American competence that is feared, or incompetence? If America, under George Bush or a Democratic rival, were to withdraw hastily under the pressure of attacks such as the downing in Iraq on November 2nd of a military helicopter (see article), would that be an encouraging sign of humility or a devastatingly irresponsible act? Given that foreign voices were so keen to disparage America for withdrawing from Somalia in 1994, for failing for years to intervene in the Balkans, for having ?°allowed?± the Taliban to take power in Afghanistan, and for being reluctant recently to send troops to Liberia, why should so many be hostile now to intervention in Iraq?

Exceptionally exceptional

One answer to this final question is that incoherence is one of the luxuries of impotence. Those who cannot, or will not, take responsibility themselves feel free to snipe at those who do. Another is that it is natural to feel afraid when dramatic, ambitious actions are being undertaken, for the consequences of such actions can themselves be dramatic. But a further answer is that to the outside world America is a strangely puzzling country-strangely, given the openness of its society and the abundance of information about it-and at times the puzzlement turns to worry. This is one of those times.

Such times have, however, occurred ever since the country was founded. As our Washington bureau chief writes in his survey this week, "A nation apart", the very phrase "American exceptionalism" that is so often heard these days was first coined by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835-40, when that brilliant Frenchman wrote his "Democracy in America". Many of the things he pointed out then as profound differences between America and other countries continue to be remarked upon today-its vociferous democracy, its decentralisation, its liking for voluntary associations, the intensity of its people's religious belief. Even during the cold war, which critics like now to describe as a time when fear of the Soviet Union acted as a bond between Americans and others, today's sorts of worries were commonplace. Graham Greene's "The Quiet American" (1955) complained that naive American idealists did more damage than good. Countless films, whether made by Americans or by foreigners, raised worries about a sinister military-industrial complex, about reds-under-the-bed obsessiveness, about zealotry.

Two other things, though, need also to be observed. One is that in recent years it is true that some of America's distinctiveness has become more marked. That is so in economics (working hours, productivity, innovation), society (population growth, religious belief, patriotism) and politics (a win-at-all-costs partisanship). Indeed, the combination of demographic vitality and productivity-led economic vigour is likely to make America even stronger in future, not weaker, despite the fact that high federal budget deficits could force some strength-sapping tax rises (see article). At least in economics, other countries are again going to have to try to follow some of America's example, if their living standards are to be kept high and unemployment low.

Democracy as solution, and as problem

The second observation, though, is that some elements of American distinctiveness divide America just as much as they divide it from others. Religious, puritanical, conservative Americans (mainly Republicans) are ranged against more secular, hedonistic, tolerant ones (mainly Democrats). Until the 2002 mid-term elections, carried out under the shadow of September 11th, successive polls had showed America to be a "50-50 nation". Both parties can find trends that could favour them in future: demography could favour Democrats, while economic drive and patriotism may favour Republicans. In America's cacophonous and hyper-active democracy, this means that actions and adventures tend to be self-regulating, at least over a period of years. Yet that offers both reassurance and worry: it may moderate excesses, and curb the influence of lobbies such as the religious right; but it could also encourage cutting and running from messes overseas.

If that were to occur, it would be a disaster for America and a tragedy for the world. The basic dilemma that was faced in Afghanistan and Iraq was that doing nothing and intervening both looked bad and risky options, but that doing nothing looked worse. In the Middle East as in Central Asia, intervention has been painful and progress has been stumbling. But despite the continued instability in both countries, life is better in both than before the intervention occurred; and much, much better than if al-Qaeda's terror camps had been left in place or if Saddam Hussein had been left in power. As the next leader argues, more needs to be done in Afghanistan, and at least some of it is likely to be. In Iraq, however, if the casualty toll among American forces keeps rising it could well prompt influential voices in Washington, including among Republicans, to press Mr Bush to declare victory and retreat.

Fortunately, he is unlikely to. The flip side of some of the things critics dislike about him -a black-and-white view of the world, a tin ear for dissenting views-makes him also show a stubborn determination. Put more favourably, he is a man with a sense of duty. Put more cynically, perhaps, he is a man who will be keenly aware that early withdrawal will look like failure, and such failure would be politically suicidal.

By intervening in Iraq, against the majority of world opinion but with the courage of its own convictions and the support of a few allies, America showed that it was indeed a different nation from others: one prepared to shoulder responsibilities and to do what it thinks is right. Such behaviour is alarming precisely because it is bold and, by today's standards, different. It is never likely to bring forth a cascade of praise or gifts. It was done, however, in a way likely to reinforce the concern, as administration officials poured abuse on their foreign critics and, through their violations of human rights, damaged America's own moral authority. Now, though, the argument has to be won by creating facts on the ground. If the facts are of failure, America will be likely to shrink back into its shell. But success is there to be had. It will take a long, costly and painful effort. Only once it is done, however, will hope be restored and danger dispelled.

譯自2003年11月6日《經濟學家》（Economist）

譯者：張麗霞（西雅圖）(zlxsd@163.com) 校者：田方萌（北京）

首發於光明觀察，轉載請註明譯者及出處；本譯文僅供參考，引用請查對原文。