日本如何才能巧妙擊敗中國。

In recent years, significant attention has been paid to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). China’s defense budget, which has increased ten fold in the last twenty five years, has funded the construction of a modern, ocean-going navy. This includes the recently fielded aircraft carrier, Liaoning, as well as fleets of destroyers, frigates, corvettes, replenishment ships, and amphibious assault ships.

幾年來，人們對中國人民解放軍海軍（PLAN）表現了顯著關注。中國的國防預算在過去的25年裡已經增長了10倍，以此建立起一個現代化的遠洋海軍。這包括最近最近啟用的航空母艦--遼寧艦，以及艦群中的驅逐艦，護衛艦，補給艦和兩棲攻擊艦。

The PLAN is indeed an impressive force, but local geography will create challenges during wartime. Japan controls a string of islands that form the Miyako Strait, which Chinese naval forces must transit to enter the western Pacific. Properly fortified, the Japanese-held Ryukyu Islands could conceivably block passage of the Strait altogether.

中國海軍的確是一支強軍，但本地區的地理環境在戰時可能（對其）造成挑戰。日本控制着由一連串島嶼組成的宮古海峽，這也是中國海軍進入西太平洋的必經之地。在適當的加築下，日本控制的琉球群島可以有效地阻礙海峽兩岸的通行。

The Ryukyus have been used to defend Japan before. Okinawa, the gateway to the Home Islands, was fortified by Japan during World War II and then invaded by the Allies. The southern half of the chain, the Sakashima Islands, were used as staging areas for kamikaze fighters during the Battle of Okinawa.

琉球群島以前就已被用來防衛日本。沖繩，日本主島的門戶，在二戰期間被加固強化，但之後被盟軍湧入。而在島鏈的南端，先島諸島曾在沖繩戰役中，被用作神風敢死隊的跳板。

Japan, which spends roughly a quarter as much on defense as China, could use the Ryukyus to execute an Anti-Access, Area Denial (A2/AD) plan in the Miyako Strait. Like any good A2/AD strategy, such a plan in the Strait would require a fraction of the spending necessary to overcome it.

日本，國防花銷大約是中國的四分之一，可以在宮古海峽利用琉球群島進行反介入，區域拒止（A2/AD）戰略。就像任何可行的A2/AD戰略，在海峽執行如此計劃總歸需要一些必要的花費克服困難。

The PLAN has three fleet commands. The North Sea Fleet, based in Qingdao, is oriented towards the Yellow Sea and beyond while the East Sea Fleet, based in Ningbo, is oriented toward the East China Sea and beyond.

中國海軍有三大艦隊。位於青島的北海艦隊，其作用於但不僅限於黃海，而坐落於寧波的東海艦隊，面向的則是東海以及更深區域。

Together, the North and East Sea Fleets field 16 destroyers, 32 frigates, all five of China’s nuclear attack submarines, and around 40 diesel electric submarines of varying ages. Backing this up would be aircraft of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force and the conventionally armed ballistic missiles of the Second Artillery Corps.

北海艦隊和東海艦隊總計共16艘驅逐艦，32艘護衛艦，全部5艘中國核攻擊潛艇和大約40艘各期柴電潛艇，和與此相補充的，中國人民解放軍空軍，中國人們解放軍海軍航空兵以及二炮。

The most direct route for both fleets is the Miyako Strait, a gateway formed by Japan’s Sakishima Islands. A gap 160 miles wide between Miyako Island and the island of Okinawa provides access to the open Pacific and beyond. Chinese naval task forces have recently made a habit of passing through the strait.

兩大艦隊的直線出海路徑就是通過宮古海峽，也是日本先島群島的門戶。這宮古島和沖繩島間160英里的缺口就是太平洋及遠洋的入口。中國海軍最近頻繁出入海峽，將之引為常態。

It’s difficult to accurately predict a conflict between China and Japan, but in many scenarios China will have to force the Miyako Strait. Japan thus has the advantage of preparing the battlefield, as well as being able to deploy a multi-layered network of sensors and weapons.

想要精確預測日本與中國間衝突是十分困難的，不過在很多場合下中國只能選擇取道宮古海峽。因此，日本在準備戰地上具有優勢，同時也有能力在此部署一個多層次的監測和武器網絡。

The radar network consisting of AN/TPY-2 radars would stand guard against ballistic missile attacks by the Second Artillery Corps. This would be backed up by the Japan Maritime Self Defense Force’s (MSDF) BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers, of which there are currently four. Patriot PAC-2 and PAC-3 interceptors would provide point defense against aircraft and ballistic missiles, respectively.

由AN/TPY-2雷達構成的雷達網可以防衛二炮襲來的彈道導彈。同時還有作為補充的四艘日本海上自衛隊BMD（譯註：海基宙斯盾彈道導彈防禦系統）巡洋艦和驅逐艦。而愛國者PAC-2和PAC-3導彈攔截系統則能分別防禦飛機和彈道導彈。

The three RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned surveillance aircraft Japan is reportedly procuring can conduct ocean surveillance, shadowing PLAN ships and providing real-time targeting information to Japan’s joint forces commander. They can also monitor the Chinese mainland, tracking activity at airfields, ports, missile bases and other military facilities.

而三架據傳可以為日本取得的RQ-4“全球鷹”無人偵察機可以進行海洋監測，追蹤中國海軍艦船並向日本聯合艦隊指揮官提供實時的目標信息。它們也可監控中國大陸，追蹤機場，港口，導彈基地亦或其他軍事設施。

Finally, although not currently in operation, Japan could deploy an array of hydrophones across the Strait similar to the SOSUS network that covered the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom gap during the Cold War. The system would enable Japan to monitor Chinese submarines in peacetime, and efficiently eliminate them during wartime.

最後，儘管目前沒有啟用，日本還可在海峽兩岸水下設立一套SOSUS（譯註：水下聲音偵查評估分析系統），就如同冷戰期間覆蓋了格陵蘭島-冰島-英國間的海上缺口。該系統可使日本在和平時代監聽中國潛艇，從而在戰時能有效消除它們。

The Japanese commander charged with defense of the Ryukyus would take the information from aerial, land, sea and subsea sensors and piece together a coherent picture of the battlefield. The commander could then use this intelligence to preserve his own forces while striking at Chinese forces where they are weak, both technically and professionally.

日本負責琉球防禦的指揮官能夠通過空中，陸地，水下聲吶提供的信息拼湊出連貫的戰場局勢。他可以利用這些情報在保護自己部隊的同時重擊中國軍隊薄弱之處，既專業又有技術。

Japan’s fleet of 16 submarines, in the process of being increased to 22, will be the most effective active defense. The JMSDF submarine fleet, composed of the newer Soryu and older Oyashio-class diesel electric submarines, is one of the most professional and technologically advanced in the world. The idea would be to direct Japan’s strength in submarine warfare against Chinese weaknesses in anti-submarine warfare (ASW).

日本在擴充已有的16艘潛艇至22艘，它們將是最有效的主動防禦力量。由新建蒼龍號和舊式“親潮”級柴電潛艇組成的日本海上自衛隊潛艇編隊是世界上最專業和科技最先進的力量之一。這就是中日反潛戰（ASW）中針對中國弱點的最直接力量。

Assuming a wartime surge of 11 JMSDF submarines, with a handful to watch the northern frontier with Russia, Japan could form a picket of eight submarines. Operating on a front from Taiwan to the southern Japanese island of Kyushu, the Chinese Navy would need to anticipate an average of one Japanese submarine every 82 miles, an unpleasant prospect.

假設戰時動用日本海上自衛隊11艘潛艇，其中少量看守與俄羅斯相鄰的北部邊境，日本仍可投入8艘潛艇（用於作戰）。部署在從台灣到日本九州島南部，而中國海軍平均每82海里就要偵測到1艘潛艇，前景並不樂觀。

Aircraft will also play a key role, and the aircraft of the Japan Air Self Defense Force (ASDF) and MSDF would also contribute heavily to the fight. Operating from Okinawa and Kyushu, Japan’s fleet of E-767 and E-2D early warning aircraft would detect enemy aircraft and direct the air battle. F-15J fighters would be vectored to intercept Chinese fighter sweeps. The F-15Js would also be tasked with destroying China’s airborne early warning and tanker aircraft, seriously degrading the People’s Liberation Army Air Force’s ability to operate over Japanese territory.

飛機也將起到重要作用，日本航空自衛隊的飛機和海上自衛隊都將對戰鬥極為有利。部署在沖繩和九州的日本E-767和E-2D先期預警機編隊將偵測到敵機並直接開始空戰。F-15J戰機將徑直攔截中國戰鬥機並將其橫掃。F-15J也承擔破壞中國先期預警機和空中加油機的作戰任務，大幅降低中國空軍在日本領土進行部署的能力。

Japanese airfield space supporting the Ryukyus is limited, and a priority would be placed on F-15Js and their air superiority capability. Backing them up from bases farther away on mainland Japan would be the JASDF’s F-2 fighters, recently upgraded to carry medium range AAM-4B radar-guided air to air missiles. The F-2s could also conduct anti-ship missions with Type 93 anti-ship missiles, likely in conjunction with attacks from submarines and surface ships.

日本在琉球的機場容納空間是有限的，並將有限放置具有最優對空能力的F-15Js。而作為它們補充的，將是較遠日本主島基地的航空自衛隊F-2戰鬥機，最近經過升級攜帶中程AAM-4B雷達制導導彈。F-2戰鬥機也通過93型反艦導彈執行反艦任務，並與水上艦艇和潛艇協力作戰。

The MSDF’s patrol aircraft, the new Kawasaki P-1 and the older P-3C Orion will conduct reconnaissance and hunt Chinese submarines. Japan has over 90 P-3Cs and a handful of P-1s.

日本海上自衛隊的巡邏機包括新川崎P1和舊式P-3C“獵戶座”，它們將監測並打擊中國潛艇。日本有超過90架P-3Cs和少量的P-1s。

In the event of war, the MSDF would organize at least two surface task forces centered around its Hyuga and Izumo class helicopter carriers. Each carrier will be equipped with at least six anti-submarine warfare helicopters, allowing it to hunt Chinese submarines over a wide area. Each would be protected by an Aegis destroyer of the Kongo or Atago classes. Other task forces would be centered around an Aegis destroyer and charged with providing area defense against conventionally armed ballistic missiles.

在戰爭中，海上自衛隊將以日向和出雲級直升機航空母艦為中心組成至少兩個作戰任務編隊。每艘航母至少配備6架反潛直升機，其將在大範圍海域搜尋中國潛艇。而每一航母又被金剛或愛宕級宙斯盾驅逐艦所保護。其他任務部隊以宙斯盾驅逐艦為中心，負責常規彈道導彈的區域防衛。

To support the A2/AD plan, Japan could organize a fleet of “street fighters”, the 200-ton guided missile patrol boats of the Hayabusa class. The six Hayabusa class ships are each armed with four SSM-1B anti-ship missiles, roughly equivalent to the American Harpoon missile, and are capable of speeds of up to 46 knots. The Hayabusas could mount hit and run attacks on Chinese ships, hiding out among the Sakishima Islands between raids.

為了支撐A2/AD計劃，日本可能組建一套“街頭霸王”編隊，包括200噸位的隼級導彈巡邏艇。這6艘隼級導彈巡邏艇各配備了4枚SSM-1B反艦導彈，大體上相當於美國的魚叉導彈，而且最高能達到46節的速度。隼級對中國艦艇可以執行游擊戰術，出擊間隙藏匿於先島群島。

Finally, Type-88 land-based anti-ship missiles will keep Chinese forces at bay, preventing landings on the islands of Miyakojima, Ishigakijima, and even Okinawa. Not only will these missiles protect populated islands, they will shape the battlefield, creating zones where Chinese ships will have to worry about multiple threats. A mobile system, the Type 88 would be a difficult threat for China to neutralize.

最後，88型陸基反艦導彈將使中國軍隊只能停在海灣，防止可能在宮古島，石垣島，甚至沖繩進行的登陸。而且，這些導彈不僅可以保護島嶼，也將改變戰場，使中國艦船不得不應對這一區域多樣的威脅。88型是一種可移動導彈系統，這將使中國難以消除其威脅。

Japan has several batteries of Type 88-missiles, which mount six missiles per transporter truck. The Type-88 has a range of nearly 100 miles, meaning that missiles mounted on Miyakojima and Okinawa would overlap in range, completely covering the strait. Theoretically, there are enough populated islands to target Chinese ships with land-based anti-ship missiles all the way from Taiwan to Kyushu. Notably, in recent years Japan has held exercises that utilized Type-88 missiles near the Strait.

日本有很多88型導彈的炮架，每輛導彈發射車裝載6枚導彈。88型導彈射程近100英里，這意味着安置在宮古島和沖繩島的導彈範圍將會疊加，完全覆蓋海峽。理論上講，從台灣到九州有足夠多的群島，將部署以中國艦船為目標的陸基反艦導彈。值得注意的是，近年來日本已在海峽附近使用88型導彈進行演習。

It’s worth noting that Joint operations will be critical for any JSDF A2/AD campaign. In the past, Japanese military forces have been notoriously parochial, duplicating capability, withholding intelligence from other branches and preventing effective unity of command. In our scenario, the joint forces commander will be directing air, land and sea forces toward a common goal.

值得注意的是，聯合行動是任何日本自衛隊A2/AD活動的關鍵。在過去，日本軍隊實力明顯受限，複製能力，從支部情報被截留，防止統一有效的指揮。在我們(設定)的場景中，聯合作戰指揮官將使空軍，陸軍和海軍朝向同一目標。

In that regard, the joint forces commander will need to be able to communicate with his forces by secure means. Without the ability to receive information and pass orders over vast distances, the Japanese defense would proceed in piecemeal and be defeated in such. Adopting a modern digital communications system like the U.S. standard Link 16 will help ensure communications even in the face of Chinese electronic jamming.

在這方面，聯合作戰指揮官將要能夠與軍隊通過安全方式通訊。（如果）沒有接受信息和遠距離傳達指令的能力，日本的防衛力量將會變得零碎並因這一點而被擊敗。採用現代化數字通訊系統，如美國16號鏈接標準，甚至將能在中國電子干擾下保持通訊。

Nonetheless, most of the systems to support this strategy are already in place. Others, such as a SOSUS network for the Ryukyus, secure digital communications, and joint operations proficiency are easily attainable and not terribly expensive. Still other improvements, such as the XASM-3 hypersonic anti-ship missile, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, and more Aegis destroyers are already on the way.

不過，支撐此戰略的大多數系統已經就位。而其他的，如為琉球建立水下聲音偵查評估分析系統，安全數字通信和熟練的聯合作戰能力是很容易達到，也不是很貴。其他改進項目也是如此，如XASM-3高超音速反艦導彈，F-35聯合作戰戰鬥機，更多的宙斯盾驅逐艦都指日可待。

Japan’s A2/AD plan would be the strategic equivalent of aikido, the Japanese martial art that emphasizes self defense. Aikido emphasizes turning the enemy’s strength and momentum against himself. Similarly, the SDF would draw the enemy out into the Ryukyus, away from its land-based power, where it could be defeated. Such a strategy is more in tune with the Japanese public’s pacifist tendencies and an easier sell politically.

日本的A2/AD計劃在戰略上和合氣道類似，是一種重在自衛的日本武術。合氣道強調以彼之力還施彼身。與此類似，自衛隊會將敵人引至遠離其陸基力量，可被擊敗的琉球。這策略與日本民眾的和平主義傾向相適應，也是較容易兜售的政策。

Japan cannot hope to match China’s defense spending. Although Japan has raised defense spending two years in a row, the increases have been modest and in line with Japan’s mediocre economic performance. An A2/AD strategy is an economical way to deter China in peacetime and defeat it in wartime.

日本與中國相同國防開支將是不可期望的。儘管日本已經連續兩年增長國防開支，（但）這增長適中，是與日本表現平平的經濟相稱的。A2/AD策略在經濟上比較合算，其在和平年代威懾中國而在戰時能夠擊敗中國。

Kyle Mizokami is a writer based in San Francisco who has appeared in The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast. In 2009 he co-founded the defense and security blog Japan Security Watch.

作者介紹：Kyle Mizokami 是舊金山的一名作家，曾為The Diplomat, Foreign Policy, War is Boring and The Daily Beast撰文。（譯註：包括《外交官》《外交政策》等知名雜誌）其在2009年聯合創始了名叫“日本安全觀察”的防衛與安全博客。