《经济学家》：美国VS世界－－最大威胁还是最大希望？

是的，美国与众不同。不过它一贯如此。大多数时候，这种与众不同对世界来说是有益的，而不是有害的。

直到大约两年多之前，全世界各种讨论会、报纸上的观点版甚至酒吧争论的时髦话题是，全球化是否就是美国化，以及这一趋势算好事还是坏事。现在，很少有专家再为他们自己的国家是否不得不与美国日益相似而感到痛苦。时下，欧洲和亚洲忧虑的源头在于，美国是否日益变得与其他国家太不一样了，以至于变成世界上一个需要解决的问题，而不是解决问题的方案。换句话说，这并不仅仅是鲁莽的布什行政班子带领美国走向歧途的问题。从这一观点来看，现在的美国从本质上在奉行强硬政策和单边主义，因此，人们不再信任它能领导当今的世界。相反，它使世界其他国家感到害怕。

毋庸置疑，伊拉克是这场争论的焦点，尽管其他事件和行动，诸如京都议定书、反弹道导弹条约、国际罪犯法庭、关塔那摩海湾（Guantanamo Bay）、联邦政府预算赤字，甚至棉花补贴，此时都被拿来作为佐证。不过，伊拉克应当为这场争论射出一缕更为冷静和清醒的光束。是美国给伊拉克带来安定、繁荣甚至民主对世界有好处呢，还是它在伊拉克失利更为有利于世界呢？是美国令人恐惧的能力还是它的无能更对世界有利呢？如果美国在乔治-布什或其民主党对手的领导下，迫于诸如11月2日美国军用直升飞机在伊拉克境内被击落等军事打击的压力，匆忙从伊拉克撤军，这是个令人鼓舞的、显示美国谦逊的标志呢，还是毁灭性的极不负责任的行动呢？鉴于国际上对于美国于1994年从索马里撤军、对巴尔干地区好几年的不作干预、放任塔利班执掌阿富汗的政权、到最近不愿出兵利比里亚等事件所给予的贬斥，为什麽现在有这么多的国家对美国干预伊拉克持敌视的态度呢？

例外的例外

对于最后一个问题，答案之一是，观点前后不一是无能者所拥有的奢侈品之一。对于那些不能也不会承担责任的人来说，他们可以随意对那些能够而且已经承担责任的人指手划脚。另一点是，当不同寻常的、雄心勃勃的行动采取之后，必有不同寻常的后果，对此感到害怕是很自然的。但是，更进一步的回答是，对于外部世界来说，美国是个奇特的、令人迷惑的国家--考虑到美国社会的高度开放性和关于它的大量信息，这一点未免令人奇怪--有时，迷惑会转变为忧虑。这是美国历史上令人不解的众多时段中的一段。

不过这样的时代自这个国家成立伊始就已出现了。当我们驻华盛顿的杂志总编撰写本周的调查报告《一个分裂的国家》（A nation apart），“美国例外论”这一近来耳熟能详的词最早是由亚里克西斯-德-托克维尔（Alexis de Tocqueville）这位才华横溢的法国人于1835年-1840年间在《美国的民主》一书中提出来的。他在那时就已指出的美国和其他国家在本质上的很多不同之处，这些差异在今天仍旧被不断地谈论着——它喧嚣的民主政治，它的地方分权，它对志愿组织的热爱，以及它的民众强烈的宗教信仰。即使在冷战时期 ——现在的批论家们描述说当时对苏联的恐惧成为美国与其他国家的联系纽带——人们今天对美国各种各样的忧虑就已经司空见惯了。格雷厄姆-格林（Graham Greene，英国作家——译注） 在其小说《宁静的美国人》（The Quiet American）（1955年）一书中曾经抱怨，天真的美国理想主义者的祸害大于造福。数不尽影片，不管是美国人还是外国人拍摄的，均表达了对阴险的军事工业联合体的忧虑。这些影片还担心美国偏执地认为赤色分子到处隐藏（reds-under-the-bed ），以及出现狂热举动。

另外，还有两个问题需要注意。一个就是，最近几年来，美国的独特性更为显著。这表现在经济层面（工作时间、生产力、创新能力），社会层面（人口增长、宗教信仰、爱国主义）以及政治层面（不顾一切代价取胜的偏执派性）。高额的联邦预算赤字虽然会使税率提高，从而削减实力，尽管如此，美国人口的蓬勃生机与其生产率推动的经济活力相结合，将有可能使美国在将来更为强大，而不是更衰弱。至少在经济方面，如果一些国家想保持自己较高的生活水准与较低的失业率，它们将不得不再一次学习美国这个榜样的某些方面。

民主制度——既是答案又是问题

另一个需要注意的问题是，把美国与其他国家分开的一些独特因素同样使美国自身分裂开来。宗教的、清教徒式的、保守的美国人（主要是共和党人）同更世俗的、追求享乐的、宽容的美国人（主要是民主党人）并驾齐驱。直到在911恐怖袭击阴影下举行的2002年美国中期选举之时，连续的民意测验表明美国是个“50 对50的国家”（50-50 nation）。两个党派都能发现对自己将来有利的趋势：人口状况对民主党有利，而经济发展和爱国主义则对共和党有利。在美国闹哄哄的异常活跃的民主制度中，这意味着各种行动和冒险行为趋于自我调节，至少一些年内会是如此。这既使人放心也令人担心：它有可能缓和极端行径，并抑制一些诸如支持宗教权利的游说势力的影响；不过它也可能会鼓励美国从海外的麻烦中抽身而退。

如果这种状况发生，这对美国来说是一场灾难，对于世界来说也是一场悲剧。美国在阿富汗和伊拉克面临的基本窘状是，无所作为和进行干涉看起来都是前途堪忧、风险重重的选择，不过无所作为看起来要更为糟糕些。中东和中亚差不多，进行干涉困难重重，而且成效微乎其微。不过两个国家除了持续动荡外，与美国干涉之前相比，两个国家人民的生活都得到了改善；当然，比基地恐怖组织营地驻扎和萨达姆-侯赛因掌权的状况就更好了。正如下一位领导人所谈论的，在阿富汗，还有更多的工作需要去做，不过至少其中的一部分工作是完全有可能实现的。然而在伊拉克，如果美国军队伤亡人数持续增加，这将会在华盛顿，包括在共和党人之间，发出有强有力的声音，迫使布什先生宣布胜利并撤军。

幸运的是，布什不太可能这样做。批评人士讨厌布什的一面——一种非白即黑的世界观，一双对反对意见充耳不闻的耳朵——也使得布什表现出其倔强不屈的另一面。说得好听一些，他是一个有责任感的人；说得尖刻一些，也许他是一个清醒的人，他将会意识到，过早的撤出伊拉克看起来像个败局，而这样的失败无异于政治自杀。

拥有着坚定的信念以及几个盟国的支持，美国甘冒世界之大不韪，同世界大多数国家的意见相左，通过干涉伊拉克的内政，显示出自己的确是个与众不同的国家：它是一个随时准备肩负起责任，随时去做自己认为正确事情的国家。由于这一作为如此胆大，而且与当今世界的标准如此不同，因而，准确地说，这一行为未免让别的国家忧心忡忡。因此，这样的行动也不会得到瀑布般的赞扬和礼物。正像政府官员肆意责骂国外的批评人士，以及通过触犯人权损害美国自己的道德权威一样，这一行事方式更强化了人们的忧虑。尽管如此，现在美国必须通过当场创造出事实来赢得这场争论。如果事实上失败了，美国将有可能退回到自己的老巢。不过成功是会实现的。这将需要长期痛苦而代价高昂的努力。不过只有如此，希望才会重生，威胁才会被驱散。

附：网址与原文

http://www.economist.com/opinion/displayStory.cfm?story_id=2189509

America versus the world

Greatest danger, or greatest hope?

Nov 6th 2003

From The Economist print edition

Yes, America is different. But it always has been. Mostly, the difference is good for the world, not bad

UNTIL a little over two years ago, the fashionable topic for debate in conferences, opinion pages and even bars around the world was whether globalisation was really Americanisation, and whether that was a good or a bad thing. Now, few pundits anguish about whether their countries are having to become more like America. The fashionable source of anxiety in both Europe and Asia is whether America is becoming so different from everywhere else that it is becoming a problem for the world, not a solution. It is not just a reckless Bush administration leading America astray, in other words. On this view, the United States is now inherently assertive and unilateralist, and so can no longer be trusted to lead the world. Instead, it should be feared.

Inevitably, Iraq is the crucible for this debate, though other events and actions?athe Kyoto Protocol, the anti-ballistic missile treaty, the International Criminal Court, Guantanamo Bay, federal budget deficits, even cotton subsidies?aare being called in as thesis reinforcements. Yet Iraq ought also to cast this debate in a colder, more sobering light. Will it be better for the world if America succeeds in bringing stability, prosperity and even democracy to Iraq, or if it fails? Is it American competence that is feared, or incompetence? If America, under George Bush or a Democratic rival, were to withdraw hastily under the pressure of attacks such as the downing in Iraq on November 2nd of a military helicopter (see article), would that be an encouraging sign of humility or a devastatingly irresponsible act? Given that foreign voices were so keen to disparage America for withdrawing from Somalia in 1994, for failing for years to intervene in the Balkans, for having ?°allowed?± the Taliban to take power in Afghanistan, and for being reluctant recently to send troops to Liberia, why should so many be hostile now to intervention in Iraq?

Exceptionally exceptional

One answer to this final question is that incoherence is one of the luxuries of impotence. Those who cannot, or will not, take responsibility themselves feel free to snipe at those who do. Another is that it is natural to feel afraid when dramatic, ambitious actions are being undertaken, for the consequences of such actions can themselves be dramatic. But a further answer is that to the outside world America is a strangely puzzling country-strangely, given the openness of its society and the abundance of information about it-and at times the puzzlement turns to worry. This is one of those times.

Such times have, however, occurred ever since the country was founded. As our Washington bureau chief writes in his survey this week, "A nation apart", the very phrase "American exceptionalism" that is so often heard these days was first coined by Alexis de Tocqueville in 1835-40, when that brilliant Frenchman wrote his "Democracy in America". Many of the things he pointed out then as profound differences between America and other countries continue to be remarked upon today-its vociferous democracy, its decentralisation, its liking for voluntary associations, the intensity of its people's religious belief. Even during the cold war, which critics like now to describe as a time when fear of the Soviet Union acted as a bond between Americans and others, today's sorts of worries were commonplace. Graham Greene's "The Quiet American" (1955) complained that naive American idealists did more damage than good. Countless films, whether made by Americans or by foreigners, raised worries about a sinister military-industrial complex, about reds-under-the-bed obsessiveness, about zealotry.

Two other things, though, need also to be observed. One is that in recent years it is true that some of America's distinctiveness has become more marked. That is so in economics (working hours, productivity, innovation), society (population growth, religious belief, patriotism) and politics (a win-at-all-costs partisanship). Indeed, the combination of demographic vitality and productivity-led economic vigour is likely to make America even stronger in future, not weaker, despite the fact that high federal budget deficits could force some strength-sapping tax rises (see article). At least in economics, other countries are again going to have to try to follow some of America's example, if their living standards are to be kept high and unemployment low.

Democracy as solution, and as problem

The second observation, though, is that some elements of American distinctiveness divide America just as much as they divide it from others. Religious, puritanical, conservative Americans (mainly Republicans) are ranged against more secular, hedonistic, tolerant ones (mainly Democrats). Until the 2002 mid-term elections, carried out under the shadow of September 11th, successive polls had showed America to be a "50-50 nation". Both parties can find trends that could favour them in future: demography could favour Democrats, while economic drive and patriotism may favour Republicans. In America's cacophonous and hyper-active democracy, this means that actions and adventures tend to be self-regulating, at least over a period of years. Yet that offers both reassurance and worry: it may moderate excesses, and curb the influence of lobbies such as the religious right; but it could also encourage cutting and running from messes overseas.

If that were to occur, it would be a disaster for America and a tragedy for the world. The basic dilemma that was faced in Afghanistan and Iraq was that doing nothing and intervening both looked bad and risky options, but that doing nothing looked worse. In the Middle East as in Central Asia, intervention has been painful and progress has been stumbling. But despite the continued instability in both countries, life is better in both than before the intervention occurred; and much, much better than if al-Qaeda's terror camps had been left in place or if Saddam Hussein had been left in power. As the next leader argues, more needs to be done in Afghanistan, and at least some of it is likely to be. In Iraq, however, if the casualty toll among American forces keeps rising it could well prompt influential voices in Washington, including among Republicans, to press Mr Bush to declare victory and retreat.

Fortunately, he is unlikely to. The flip side of some of the things critics dislike about him -a black-and-white view of the world, a tin ear for dissenting views-makes him also show a stubborn determination. Put more favourably, he is a man with a sense of duty. Put more cynically, perhaps, he is a man who will be keenly aware that early withdrawal will look like failure, and such failure would be politically suicidal.

By intervening in Iraq, against the majority of world opinion but with the courage of its own convictions and the support of a few allies, America showed that it was indeed a different nation from others: one prepared to shoulder responsibilities and to do what it thinks is right. Such behaviour is alarming precisely because it is bold and, by today's standards, different. It is never likely to bring forth a cascade of praise or gifts. It was done, however, in a way likely to reinforce the concern, as administration officials poured abuse on their foreign critics and, through their violations of human rights, damaged America's own moral authority. Now, though, the argument has to be won by creating facts on the ground. If the facts are of failure, America will be likely to shrink back into its shell. But success is there to be had. It will take a long, costly and painful effort. Only once it is done, however, will hope be restored and danger dispelled.

译自2003年11月6日《经济学家》（Economist）

译者：张丽霞（西雅图）(zlxsd@163.com) 校者：田方萌（北京）

首发于光明观察，转载请注明译者及出处；本译文仅供参考，引用请查对原文。