一名中國前高級法官公開致世界AI領軍人物信之三：Ray Kurzweil——人類是否忽視而遺漏了支撐文明的底層規律？

One of a Series of Open Letters from a Former Senior Chinese Judge to the World’s AI Leaders, No. 3: Ray Kurzweil — Has Humanity Overlooked a Foundational Principle That Sustains Civilization?

（Special Note:

The phrase “former Senior Judge” appears in the title only to give this letter a slightly better chance of being noticed. It is not intended to make readers focus on who I am, nor on the particular way in which I express what I wish to say.

I am simply a very ordinary old man. What I truly wish to discuss is also a principle that appears extraordinarily ordinary — so ordinary that no one can do anything without relying on it. Precisely for that reason, it is like air: because human beings are so familiar with it, it has long been overlooked.

What I truly hope all humanity will examine together is this:

Does such an “ordinary” foundational principle in fact determine the success or failure of human behavior, social cooperation, and even the rise and decline of civilizations? Could it be a basic sustaining principle of civilization that humanity has never fully recognized?

Therefore, who is saying it is not important. Whether what is being said is true is what deserves everyone’s attention.

Since 2014, I have continuously written to governments, contacted the media, social organizations, scholars, and people from many different fields, and gradually published the series Letters to Everyone in the World together with related articles. Today, in deciding to make public some of my letters to leading figures in global AI, I still have only one purpose:

to place this question before all humanity for collective examination.

I believe that when a question may concern the direction of human civilization as a whole, governments and international organizations have a responsibility to study it, the media have an obligation to help the public understand it, and every person has the right to participate in judging it.

What humanity faces today is no longer merely a “crossroads” in the conventional historical sense. If the underlying way in which civilization itself operates contains a fundamental problem, then moving forward, backward, left, or right may all amount only to repeating the old pattern — and this time, the repetition may bring humanity closer than ever before to an accelerating path toward its own destruction.

What truly needs to change is an upward transformation. Perhaps the first thing that must be elevated is the human mode of thinking through which we observe the world and judge value.

The core proposition I put forward is:

Procedures form relationships; relationships form structures; structures generate dynamic balance through feedback; and this ultimately appears as the properties and outcomes of a system.

From this, I summarize the most basic practical standard for civilization as:

grasp the procedure, build the pattern, seek the balance.

I believe the greatest difference between this and many grand theories of civilization in the past is that it does not first require people to accept a particular religion, ideology, or concrete value objective. Instead, it attempts to provide a common practical principle that everyone can understand, that can be applied to real action, and that can be tested against reality.

If this direction is wrong, I hope humanity will help prove it wrong.

If it truly touches upon some foundational principle, then humanity may be able to use it to rebuild and strengthen the underlying foundations of social cooperation, allowing civilization gradually to move away from its long-repeated cycles of mutual struggle, mutual harm, and war, and toward stable, harmonious, and sustainable cooperation.

That is the only reason I am making these letters public.

I do not hope the world will focus on the person who wrote these letters. I hope the world will seriously examine the questions these letters are actually asking.

Finally, a note: some websites impose word-count or character limits, so certain versions of these letters found online may be incomplete. If a text appears incomplete, you may search for the full version using the Chinese or English title of the letter, or contact the publicly listed email addresses of AI companies associated with the person to whom the letter is addressed and ask for assistance in locating or forwarding the complete version.

——特別題註：

標題中寫入“前高級法官”，只是為了讓這封信多獲得一點被看見的機會，並不是希望讀者關注我是誰，以及在用什麼方式表述所說之事。

我只是一個極其普通的老人。我真正想講的，也是一條看起來極其普通的規律——普通到任何人做任何事都離不開它，也因此這規律就像空氣一樣，因為人過於熟悉而長期被忽略。

我真正希望全人類共同鑑別的是：

這樣一個“普通”的底層規律，是否事實上決定着人的行為、社會合作乃至文明興衰的成敗？它是否正是人類長期沒有真正認清的文明底層支撐規律？

所以，誰在說並不重要，說的事情是否真實，才值得所有人關注。

自2014年以來，我持續向政府寫信，也不斷聯繫媒體、社會組織、學者和各領域人士，並陸續發表《致全球每一個人的信》及相關文章。今天決定公開部分致世界AI領軍人物的信，仍然只有一個目的：

把這個問題交給全人類共同甄別。

因為我認為，對這樣一個可能關係整個人類文明方向的問題，政府和國際組織有責任研究，媒體有義務幫助公眾了解，每一個人也都有參與判斷的權利。

今天人類面對的，已經不僅是通常歷史意義上的“十字路口選擇”。如果原有文明運行方式本身存在底層問題，那麼前後左右可能都只是舊模式的重複，且這次可能是最接近不斷加速毀滅全人類的一次。

真正需要改變的是向上抬升，也許首先是人類觀察世界和判斷價值的思維模式。

我提出的核心判斷是：

程序形成關係，關係形成結構，結構通過反饋形成動態平衡，並最終表現為系統的性質與結果。

由此，我把文明最基本的做事標準概括為：

抓程序、做模式、求平衡。

我認為，這與過去許多宏大文明理論最大的區別在於：它並不首先要求人們接受某一種宗教、主義或具體價值目標，而試圖提供一個人人都能夠理解、能夠用於具體做事、也能夠接受事實檢驗的共同抓手。

如果這個方向是錯的，希望全人類幫助證明它錯。

如果它確實觸及了某種底層規律，那麼人類也許可以由此重新夯實社會合作結構的基礎，使文明從長期反覆的互斗、互害和戰爭循環中，逐步走向穩定、和諧、可持續的合作。

這也是我公開這些信件的唯一原因。

不是希望全世界關注寫信的人，而是希望全世界認真看看這些信究竟提出了什麼問題。

最後說明：部分網站存在字數或字符限制，因此網上看到的某些信件可能不是全文。如內容不完整，可以按照信件的中文或英文標題搜索全文，也可以通過與致信對象相關AI企業公開郵箱的聯繫方式，請其協助查找或轉交完整版本。）

To Ray Kurzweil: If Technology Follows Accelerating Returns, Can Human Social Cooperation Keep Pace with the Singularity?

To Mr. Ray Kurzweil and the Kurzweil Technologies / Kurzweil Library Team,

I found these contact addresses through the official Kurzweil Library website.

I would be deeply grateful if the person receiving this message could kindly forward this email and its attachments to Mr. Ray Kurzweil.

The central question raised in this letter grows directly out of Mr. Kurzweil’s Law of Accelerating Returns:

If technological capability is accelerating exponentially, while humanity’s institutions and mechanisms of social cooperation continue to evolve much more slowly, could the widening gap between the two become one of the fundamental risks of the AGI era?

If members of the Kurzweil team also find this question worthy of consideration, I would warmly welcome any criticism, comments, suggestions, or assistance in bringing it to researchers who may be interested.

Thank you very much for your time and help.

Dear Mr. Ray Kurzweil,

I hope this message finds you well.

My pen name is Jin Guyu. I am an elderly Chinese citizen and formerly served as a Senior Judge in a local court in China.

Recently, I have been studying the ideas you further developed in The Singularity Is Nearer: When We Merge with AI.

Your discussion of the Law of Accelerating Returns particularly caught my attention.

As you have argued over many years, information technology does not advance at an ordinary linear pace. Each generation of technology helps produce the next breakthrough, creating an accelerating trajectory of progress.

You continue to believe that human-level artificial intelligence, and perhaps AGI, may arrive in the relatively near future, and that as artificial intelligence, brain-computer interfaces, nanotechnology, and related technologies continue to develop, human intelligence may become increasingly integrated with machine intelligence.

If your basic judgment is correct, then what we are facing is not merely:

a more advanced ordinary tool.

We may be facing:

for the first time in human history, a technological force capable of accelerating its own further development while continuously increasing the effective capabilities of individuals and organizations.

That is precisely why I especially wanted to write to you.

After studying your ideas, one question came strongly to mind:

If technology follows a “Law of Accelerating Returns,” does the evolution of human institutions of social cooperation possess any corresponding mechanism of acceleration?

And if it does not, what happens?

For many years, drawing on my experience in law, the judiciary, Chinese social reality, and the evolution of human civilization, I have been thinking about one question:

Why are the structures of social cooperation created by humanity so persistently difficult to make genuinely stable and sustainable?

In my view, human history contains an extremely important but easily overlooked pattern:

scientific and technological change usually advances faster than the institutions and theories governing human social cooperation.

New technologies continuously create new capabilities.

Those new capabilities disrupt existing modes of production, relationships of interest, power relationships, and forms of cooperation among people.

Yet humanity has rarely been able to construct, in advance, social institutions capable of matching the new powers created by technological revolution.

More often, the pattern is:

technology breaks through first;

existing structures of social cooperation then become mismatched;

society experiences enormous disruption, conflict, and sometimes war;

old institutions are forced to change under crisis;

new institutions and rules of cooperation gradually emerge;

and humanity then reaches another temporary equilibrium.

In other words, across long periods of human history:

institutions have not guided technology safely into society; rather, technology has repeatedly collided with old institutions and forced humanity to relearn how to cooperate.

In the past, this institutional lag has imposed enormous costs, but humanity has usually still had the opportunity to:

experience disaster → learn → modify institutions → rebuild order.

But when I place this historical pattern alongside your Law of Accelerating Returns, I become deeply concerned:

If technological progress accelerates more and more rapidly, while social institutions continue to adapt mainly through correction after crises, will the speed gap between the two continue to widen?

In other words:

technology may advance exponentially, while human institutions still evolve largely through slow political bargaining, conflict, failure, and historical experience.

If so, then the deepest danger may not simply be how powerful AI becomes.

The deeper danger may be:

an expanding “civilizational speed gap” between technological capability and humanity’s capacity for social cooperation.

In the past, major technologies such as the steam engine, electricity, industrialization, nuclear technology, and the internet could disrupt old structures of social cooperation and then force humanity to adjust.

But AGI may be the first technology for which:

the gap between technological capability and social institutions becomes so large that humanity may no longer be able to afford the old pattern of “being broken first, then learning how to rebuild.”

This time, what is crushed may not merely be a particular institution.

What may be crushed is humanity’s very opportunity to continue learning and rebuilding civilization.

I have noticed that although you remain broadly optimistic about artificial intelligence and the future, you do not ignore the risks.

You have particularly discussed the dual-use nature of AI:

the same intelligence that can help solve disease, poverty, and other major human problems can also be used for war, attack, deception, and destruction.

You have also expressed a judgment that particularly caught my attention:

to keep AI safe, humanity must protect and improve its governance and social institutions.

This is very close to a conclusion I have reached independently over many years.

But I would like to take the question one step further:

What exactly must be improved when we say that “governance and social institutions” need improvement?

More regulation?

More laws?

New international organizations?

Or do we need to investigate something more fundamental:

whether the basic procedures through which human beings form relationships of social cooperation contain structural defects of their own?

You have argued that we have, in effect, already entered a kind of human-machine civilization.

And as brain-computer interfaces, artificial intelligence, and other technologies continue to merge, the boundary between humans and machines may change even further.

This leads me to a question that I believe is extremely important:

If AI increasingly becomes “part of us,” then what ultimately determines the nature of future AI civilization may not be only the algorithms inside AI, but the cooperative structure according to which the entire “human + AI” system operates.

Suppose the basic operating logic of human society continues to rely heavily upon:

competition among states;

competition among corporations;

struggles for power;

conflicts of interest;

mutual deterrence;

information manipulation;

military competition;

and ever-increasing defenses created by distrust.

What happens when AI increases the capabilities of every participant by a hundredfold or a thousandfold?

It may, of course, enormously increase humanity’s ability to create wealth, cure disease, and understand the universe.

But it may simultaneously increase:

the ability of each state to suppress or overpower other states;

the ability of each organization to control other organizations;

the ability of malicious actors to cause destruction;

and the ability of every participant in society to harm others in zero-sum competition.

This brings me to the question that I have been hoping humanity will discuss:

Even if AI itself never loses control, if the human competitive system amplified by AI loses control, can we still say that AI is safe?

I deeply respect your optimism about the future.

You have pointed to the nuclear era as evidence that humanity has shown an ability to avoid the most catastrophic outcomes.

I sincerely hope that judgment is correct.

But I would like to raise an additional question.

Nuclear weapons, despite their enormous destructive power, do not themselves continuously improve scientific research capacity, economic capability, information-processing power, political influence, and strategic decision-making.

Moreover, once nuclear weapons are built, they can be placed under the control of a relatively small number of actors who may use them primarily as instruments of deterrent balance, with all sides having powerful incentives not to use them.

AGI may be fundamentally different.

It may enter almost every subsystem of society while simultaneously increasing the capabilities of all participants in competition.

And unlike nuclear weapons, AGI may not remain a power that can be confined to the control of a small number of comparatively rational actors. It may eventually become accessible to vast numbers of people and organizations.

Its capabilities may also cross barriers that today appear secure and operate in ways outside ordinary expectations — potentially including the capacity to undermine systems that currently safeguard other forms of extreme technological power.

So I ask:

Is humanity’s past success in controlling nuclear weapons sufficient evidence that our existing institutions can also preserve stability within a continuously self-accelerating “human-AI system”?

I do not know the answer.

But I believe the question deserves serious examination.

Over the past twenty years or more, I have gradually developed a hypothesis at the level of natural philosophy, which I provisionally call:

the “Procedural Determination Hypothesis.”

It asks:

Are the properties ultimately displayed by a complex system determined not only by the elements that compose it, but also, to a significant extent, by the procedures through which those elements form relationships, the structures created by those relationships, and the way those structures establish dynamic equilibrium through feedback?

In its simplest form:

procedure → relationship → structure → dynamic feedback → system properties and outcomes.

I do not believe this hypothesis has been proven.

I want it to be criticized, experimentally tested, and falsified if it is wrong.

Several recent developments in neuroscience have particularly interested me.

For example:

the whole-brain fruit-fly connectome and computational models based on its real connectivity indicate that, even when individual neuron models are greatly simplified, preserving substantial portions of the real relational structure still allows many functions to be reproduced or predicted;

and when human cortical organoids are transplanted into rat brains, the human neurons can mature, form functional connections, and influence rat behavior, yet the animal does not thereby begin displaying recognizably human behavior.

These experiments certainly do not prove my hypothesis.

But they make me increasingly hope that the scientific community will investigate the following question:

How much of the overall nature of a complex system resides in “what the elements are,” and how much resides in “how those elements form relationships and structures”?

If we change the combinations, connections, and feedback procedures among elements without changing the elements themselves, how does the nature of the system change?

Conversely, if we change some of the elements but embed them within the original relational structure, what happens to the system’s properties?

What ultimately matters most to me is extending this question toward:

human social cooperation.

I provisionally call this direction:

“Human Social Cooperation Engineering.”

I do not mean creating a new ideology.

Nor do I mean designing a system that one person could impose upon all humanity.

What I want to discuss is:

Can human social cooperation itself be studied scientifically, as we study other complex systems?

For example:

What kinds of procedures allow independent individuals to form stable relationships?

What kinds of institutional feedback can prevent power, wealth, violence, or information from continuously concentrating toward extremes?

Why can every participant make a locally rational decision, yet collectively produce a catastrophe that none of them wanted?

Why do states all say they want peace, yet repeatedly find themselves structurally pushed toward arms races?

Why might companies understand that an AGI race is dangerous, yet no individual company feels able to stop?

Why does one country’s fear that another country will gain the lead ultimately cause all countries to accelerate?

If these problems share common structural causes, then:

can we turn those structural causes into scientific questions that can be modeled, compared, experimented upon, falsified, and optimized?

This is also one of the greatest insights your Law of Accelerating Returns has given me.

If:

technology experiences accelerating returns;

but:

institutions of social cooperation do not experience accelerating renewal;

then is human civilization creating an increasingly dangerous divergence?

On one side:

ever-faster growth in capability.

On the other:

social mechanisms that still update slowly and largely through crisis, conflict, and historical cost.

That is why I especially want to ask you:

Before the Singularity truly arrives, does humanity also need to create an “accelerated learning mechanism for social cooperation”?

So that humanity no longer has to:

experience disaster first, and learn cooperation afterward;

but can instead:

simulate in advance → identify structural risks in advance → modify procedures in advance → search for dynamic equilibrium in advance.

If this were possible, then “Human Social Cooperation Engineering” might be understood as:

an attempt to give the learning speed of human social cooperation, for the first time, a chance to catch up with the speed of technological progress.

I have also noticed an important difference between your overall outlook and mine.

You believe that, despite its risks, technology has on balance continued to improve life, health, prosperity, and human well-being, and that humanity can use new intelligence to solve problems created by new technologies.

I do not wish to reject your optimism.

On the contrary, I want to ask:

Can we give that optimism a more secure structural foundation?

If you believe that:

future AI will ultimately reflect human values,

then I would like to ask a further question:

Should we first study through what institutions, procedures, and relational structures human values are transmitted into the broader “human-AI civilization”?

Because “human values” are not a single variable.

Human beings possess:

cooperation and altruism;

but also war and hatred;

creativity and compassion;

but also domination, deception, and fear.

So perhaps the true question is not:

Will AI reflect human values?

but:

What structures within human society will cause which human values to be systematically amplified in the AI era?

I believe this is one of the most important points of connection between your technological optimism and my Procedural Determination Hypothesis.

The practical importance of this connection is the following:

if, through serious examination of the Procedural Determination Hypothesis, we can first clarify a foundational safeguard for humanity’s values — one capable of serving as an alignment standard amid humanity’s many conflicting value judgments — then the foundations of human social cooperation may gain a more stable and sustainable safeguard.

That, in turn, might provide a stronger structural foundation for the realization of the optimistic future you envision.

Therefore, I am taking the liberty of writing to you not because I expect you to accept my theory.

What I truly hope for is:

First, please help judge:

Does the widening gap between the speed of technological acceleration and the speed at which institutions of social cooperation are updated deserve to be regarded as an independent and foundational risk of the AGI era?

Second, if you believe this question deserves study, I hope that you or appropriate researchers might review my ideas concerning the “Procedural Determination Hypothesis” and “Human Social Cooperation Engineering,” and identify either their most fundamental errors or the aspects that may deserve further experimental investigation.

Third, if preliminary examination suggests that the question does have value, I hope you might use your influence in futures research, artificial intelligence, and the study of the Singularity to help encourage an interdisciplinary discussion:

Before human intellectual capability expands exponentially, must humanity also develop a way to learn, adjust, and stabilize its structures of social cooperation much more rapidly?

In other words:

If the “Singularity” means an accelerating leap in human capability, must our capacity for social cooperation undergo a corresponding leap of its own?

Based on my past experience and present circumstances, while I am still able to communicate freely with the international community, I hope to place this question before people who are genuinely capable of judging it.

I am not asking you to believe:

that I have found the answer.

What I truly hope you will help judge is simply:

Have I at least raised a question worthy of serious scientific examination?

If it is wrong,

please help prove it wrong.

If it deserves investigation,

please do not allow it to lose the opportunity to be seriously evaluated simply because the person raising it is an ordinary elderly Chinese man without a research institution or research funding.

Thank you very much for taking the time to read this unusual letter.

Your work on the accelerating returns of technology has helped humanity see ever more clearly that:

the future is approaching us faster and faster.

What I now want to ask is:

Can humanity also begin to learn how to cooperate faster?

May the intelligence that grows in the future amplify not only humanity’s capabilities, but also humanity’s wisdom in cooperation.

With sincere respect,

Pen name: Jin Guyu
Former Senior Judge of a Local Court in China
Author of the Letters to Everyone in the World series

Email: ——

Attachments

1. The Procedural Determination Hypothesis — A One-Page Challenge

2. The AI Era That Could End Civilization Before We Even Understand What Went Wrong Is Here — An Open Global Challenge to Bill Gates

3. A Request for Humanity to Jointly Study and Experiment with Strategic Directions for Upgrading Civilization: Who Can Guarantee That No One Will One Day Use AGI to Launch a “9/11” Against All Humanity?

4. To Demis Hassabis: Must Humanity Upgrade Its Structures of Social Cooperation Before AGI Arrives?

5. A Renewed Request Concerning Human Cooperation, Civilization, and the Risks of AGI — Letter to Elon Musk

The text that follows is the original Chinese version of this letter.

致 Ray Kurzweil：如果技術遵循加速回報，人類社會合作制度能否跟得上奇點的速度？

尊敬的 Ray Kurzweil 先生：

您好！

我筆名金穀雨，是一名來自中國的老人，曾任中國地方法院高級法官。

最近，我認真了解了您在 《The Singularity Is Nearer: When We Merge with AI》 中進一步闡述的思想。

您關於**“加速回報定律”（Law of Accelerating Returns）**的論述，尤其引起了我的注意。

按照您的長期判斷，信息技術並不是以普通線性速度進步，而是在不斷利用上一輪技術成果推動下一輪突破，因此呈現持續加速的發展趨勢。

您仍然認為，人類級人工智能乃至AGI可能在非常接近的未來到來，而隨着人工智能、腦機接口、納米技術等進一步發展，人類自身的智能能力也可能與機器智能越來越深地融合。

如果您的基本判斷成立，那麼我們面對的並不是：

一種更先進的普通工具。

我們面對的可能是：

人類歷史上第一次出現一種能夠反過來加速自身進步，並且不斷提高人類和組織行動能力的技術力量。

這正是我為什麼特別希望寫信給您。

因為，在閱讀您的思想以後，我產生了一個問題：

如果技術遵循“加速回報定律”，那麼人類社會合作制度的更新，是否也存在一種能夠與之匹配的“加速機制”？

如果不存在，會發生什麼？

我長期從法律、司法、中國社會現實以及人類文明演變中思考一個問題：

為什麼人類建立的社會合作結構，總是如此難以真正穩定和可持續？

在我看來，人類歷史上長期存在一個非常重要但容易被忽視的現象：

科學技術迭代的速度，通常快於人類社會合作制度和相關理論更新的速度。

新的技術不斷創造新的能力。

新的能力打破原來的生產方式、利益關係、權力關係以及人與人之間的合作方式。

但是，人類很少能夠在技術革命到來以前，就提前建立好與新能力相匹配的社會合作制度。

更多時候發生的是：

技術先突破；

舊的社會合作結構隨後失配；

社會發生巨大震盪、衝突甚至戰爭；

舊制度在危機中被迫改變；

新的制度和合作規則才逐漸形成；

然後人類重新獲得一個暫時的平衡。

也就是說，在很長的歷史時期內：

不是制度引導技術安全進入社會，而是技術一次又一次通過衝擊舊制度，逼迫人類重新學習合作。

過去這種滯後雖然給人類造成過極其巨大的代價，但人類通常仍有機會：

經歷災難 → 學習 → 修改制度 → 重建秩序。

但是，當我把這個歷史現象與您的“加速回報定律”放在一起以後，我產生了一個非常強烈的擔憂：

如果技術進步越來越快，而社會合作制度的調整仍然主要依靠危機以後再糾錯，那麼兩者之間的速度差是否會越來越大？

也就是說：

技術可能指數式前進，而人類社會制度仍然主要依靠緩慢的政治博弈、衝突、失敗和歷史經驗來更新。

如果是這樣，那麼真正危險的並不只是AI有多強。

真正危險的可能是：

技術能力與社會合作能力之間正在形成一個越來越大的“文明速度差”。

過去，蒸汽機、電力、工業化、核技術、互聯網等重大技術可以打碎舊的社會合作模式，然後迫使人類再調整。

但是AGI可能是第一次：

技術跨越社會制度的幅度大到，人類未必還能承受“先被打碎，再學習重建”的代價。

這一次，被碾碎的也許不只是某一種制度。

被碾碎的可能是整個人類繼續學習和重新建設文明的機會。

我注意到，您雖然對人工智能和未來總體保持樂觀，但並沒有忽視風險。

您特別談到了人工智能的雙重用途：

同一種智能能力，既可以解決疾病、貧困和其他巨大問題，也可以被用於戰爭、攻擊、欺騙和破壞。

而您提出過一個讓我非常注意的判斷：

要使AI保持安全，人類必須保護並改善自己的治理和社會制度。

這一點與我長期形成的判斷非常接近。

但我希望再往前追問一步：

“改善治理和社會制度”究竟應該改善什麼？

是增加更多監管？

增加更多法律？

增加新的國際組織？

還是我們需要研究一個比這些更底層的問題：

人類形成社會合作關係的基本程序本身，是否存在結構性缺陷？

您曾經提出，我們事實上已經進入一種“人—機器文明”。

而未來隨着腦機接口、人工智能和其他技術繼續融合，人類和機器之間的界限還會進一步改變。

這使我產生了一個我認為非常重要的問題：

如果AI最終越來越成為“我們的一部分”，那麼真正決定未來AI文明性質的，也許就不只是AI內部的算法，而是“人類 + AI”這一整個系統按照什麼樣的合作結構運行。

假如今天人類社會的基礎運行方式仍然大量依靠：

國家之間的競爭；

企業之間的競爭；

權力爭奪；

利益衝突；

相互威懾；

信息操縱；

軍事競爭；

以及因為不信任而不斷增加的防禦，

那麼，當AI使所有參與者的能力提高百倍、千倍以後，會發生什麼？

它當然可能極大提高人類創造財富、治療疾病和理解宇宙的能力。

但它也可能同時提高：

每一個國家壓制其他國家的能力；

每一個組織控制其他組織的能力；

每一個惡意行為者造成破壞的能力；

每一個社會主體在零和競爭中傷害對方的能力。

於是就出現了我一直希望全人類討論的問題：

即使AI本身始終沒有失控，如果被AI放大的人類競爭系統失控了，我們還能說AI是安全的嗎？

我非常尊重您對未來的樂觀。

您以核武器時代為例，認為人類最終顯示出了避免最嚴重災難的能力。

我也希望這個判斷是正確的。

但是我想提出一個補充問題：

核武器雖然具有極大的毀滅性，但它並不會自己不斷提高科研能力、經濟能力、信息能力、政治影響能力和戰略決策能力。特別是，核武器造出來可以被少數更具理性的人控製成為威懾性的平衡工具，大家都不使用。

而AGI可能不同。

它可能進入幾乎每一個社會子系統，同時提高參與競爭者的能力。而且其不可能像核武器一樣能被少數更具理性的人控制，而使將成為每個人都能獲取的能量，且這個能量將衝破更多的壁壘且在常識性意外的層面發揮能量，這裡也包括突破少數人控制的核能的保障體系而予以全部瞬間釋放.......

所以：

過去人類成功控制核武器的經驗，是否足以證明我們也能在一個能力不斷自我加速的“人類—AI系統”中繼續依靠原有制度維持穩定？

我不知道答案。

但我認為這個問題值得被認真檢驗。

過去二十多年，我逐漸形成了一個自然哲學層面的假說，我暫時稱之為：

“程序定質假說”（Procedural Determination Hypothesis）。

它試圖研究：

一個複雜系統最終呈現出的性質，是否不僅取決於構成它的元素本身，更在很大程度上取決於這些元素按照什麼程序形成關係、這些關係形成什麼結構，以及這些結構如何通過反饋形成動態平衡。

用最簡約的方式表達就是：

程序 → 關係 → 結構 → 動態反饋 → 系統性質與結果。

我並不認為這個假說已經得到證明。

我希望它被批評、被實驗、被證偽。

最近一些神經科學研究尤其引起我的興趣。

例如：

果蠅全腦連接組以及基於真實連接結構建立的計算模型顯示，即使單個神經元模型被大幅簡化，只要保留大量真實的關繫結構，系統仍可以恢復和預測相當多的功能；

而人類皮層類器官植入大鼠腦以後，人類神經元能夠成熟、形成實際功能連接並影響大鼠行為，但整個動物並沒有因此表現出“人類行為”。

這些實驗當然沒有證明我的假說。

但它們使我越來越希望科學界能夠檢驗一個問題：

複雜系統的整體性質，有多少儲存在“元素是什麼”之中，又有多少儲存在“元素如何形成關係和結構”之中？

如果改變元素之間的組合、連接和反饋程序，而不改變元素本身，系統性質會發生什麼？

反過來，如果改變部分元素，卻把它們放進原來的整體關繫結構，系統性質又會怎樣？

而我最終真正關心的，是把這個問題進一步推進到：

人類社會合作。

我暫時把這個方向稱作：

“人類社會合作工程”（Human Social Cooperation Engineering）。

我的意思不是建立一種新的意識形態。

更不是由某個人設計一套制度以後強迫全人類接受。

我想討論的是：

能不能像研究其他複雜系統一樣，對人類社會合作本身進行科學研究？

例如：

什麼樣的程序使獨立的個體形成穩定關係？

什麼樣的制度反饋能夠阻止權力、財富、暴力或者信息不斷向極端集中？

為什麼每一個參與者都可能作出局部理性的選擇，最後卻形成所有人都不希望看到的集體災難？

為什麼國家都說自己希望和平，卻又不斷被結構推向軍備競賽？

為什麼企業都可能知道AGI競賽存在風險，卻沒有任何一家企業敢真正停下來？

為什麼一個國家擔心另一個國家領先以後，最終所有國家都會加速？

如果這些問題具有共同的結構原因，那麼：

我們能不能把這些結構原因變成可以建模、比較、實驗、證偽和優化的科學問題？

這也是您的“加速回報定律”給我帶來的最大啟發之一。

如果：

技術存在加速回報；

但：

社會合作制度不存在加速更新；

那麼，人類文明是否正在形成一個越來越危險的剪刀差？

一邊是：

越來越快的能力增長。

另一邊是：

仍然緩慢、依靠危機、衝突和歷史代價才能更新的社會合作機制。

所以我特別想請您判斷一個問題：

奇點真正到來以前，人類是否還需要建立一種“社會合作的加速學習機制”？

使人類不再必須：

先發生災難，隨後才學習合作。

而能夠：

提前模擬 → 提前發現結構風險 → 提前修改程序 → 提前尋找動態平衡。

如果這能夠實現，那麼“Human Social Cooperation Engineering”或許可以被理解為：

讓人類社會合作的學習速度，第一次有機會追趕技術進步速度的一種嘗試。

我也注意到，您的總體判斷與我有一個很重要的不同。

您相信技術雖然帶來危險，但總體正在使生命、健康、財富和人類福祉不斷改善，並且人類有能力利用新的智能解決新技術製造的問題。

我並不想否定您的樂觀主義。

相反，我希望提出的是：

能否為這種樂觀提供一個更加牢固的結構基礎？

如果您認為：

未來AI最終會反映人類價值，

那麼我想進一步問：

我們有沒有必要先研究，人類價值究竟通過什麼制度、程序和關繫結構進入整個“人類—AI文明”？

因為“人類價值”並不是一個單一變量。

人類同時擁有：

合作和利他；

也擁有戰爭和仇恨；

創造和同情；

也擁有支配、欺騙和恐懼。

所以真正的問題也許不是：

AI會不會反映人類價值？

而是：

人類社會的什麼結構，會使哪些價值在AI時代被系統性放大？

我認為，這是您的技術樂觀主義與我提出的“程序定質假說”之間最值得討論的連接點。這個鏈接最值得關注的現實意義是：我們如果能通過甄別“程序定質規律”，先將人類的價值實現的底線保障系統明晰化，成為人類雜亂價值判斷的對齊標準，那麼，人類的社會合作結構基礎將有一個穩定可持續的保障，來為你的樂觀展望的實現提供一個更加牢固的結構基礎。

因此，我冒昧給您寫這封信，不是希望您接受我的理論。

我真正希望得到的是：

第一，請您幫助判斷：

“技術加速速度與社會合作制度更新速度之間不斷擴大的差距”，是否值得被視為AGI時代一個獨立而基礎的風險問題？

第二，如果您認為這個問題值得研究，我希望您或者適當的研究人員能夠審閱我提出的“程序定質假說”和“人類社會合作工程”設想，並指出其中最根本的錯誤或者值得繼續實驗的地方。

第三，如果經過初步檢驗以後，您認為這個問題確實具有價值，我希望您能夠利用自己在未來研究、人工智能以及奇點思想領域的影響力，幫助推動一次跨學科討論：

在人類智能能力發生指數級擴張以前，人類是否也必須建立一種能夠更快速學習、調整和穩定自身社會合作結構的方法？

換句話說：

如果“奇點”意味着人類能力的加速躍遷，那麼“社會合作能力”是否也必須擁有自己的躍遷？

基於我過去的經歷和現實條件，我希望趁自己仍然能夠自由與國際社會聯繫的時候，把這個問題交給真正有能力判斷它的人。

我不要求您相信：

我已經找到了答案。

我真正希望您幫助判斷的只是：

我是否至少提出了一個值得被科學界認真檢驗的問題？

如果它錯了，

請幫助證明它錯。

如果它值得研究，

請不要讓它因為提出者只是一個沒有研究機構、沒有科研資金、已經年老的普通中國人，而失去一次被認真判斷的機會。

感謝您願意閱讀這封不同尋常的信。

您關於技術“加速回報”的研究，使人類越來越清楚地看見：

未來正在越來越快地向我們走來。

我現在真正想追問的是：

人類自身學習合作的速度，能不能也開始加快？

願未來不斷增長的智能，最終放大的不僅是人類的能力，也包括人類合作的智慧。

謹致敬意！

筆名：金穀雨
曾任中國地方法院高級法官
《致全球每一個人的信》系列作者

Email: ——

附件

1. The Procedural Determination Hypothesis — A One-Page Challenge

2. The AI Era That Could End Civilization Before We Even Understand What Went Wrong Is Here — An Open Global Challenge to Bill Gates

3. A Request for Humanity to Jointly Study and Experiment with Strategic Directions for Upgrading Civilization: Who Can Guarantee That No One Will One Day Use AGI to Launch a “9/11” Against All Humanity?

4. To Demis Hassabis: Must Humanity Upgrade Its Structures of Social Cooperation Before AGI Arrives?

5. A Renewed Request Concerning Human Cooperation, Civilization, and the Risks of AGI — Letter to Elon Musk