一篇駁斥《皇帝新腦》的文章，（博士）怎麼看？

這是一篇專門駁斥《皇帝新腦》書中對人工智能的觀點的文章。登在ScienceDirect網站上的。

至於贊同《皇帝新腦》一書觀點的文章，俺就不找了。

該文章俺沒有看的。這裡僅是它的提要。僅從提要看，它的主要觀點是駁斥《皇帝新腦》關於人工智能的觀點。具體的觀點，俺不敘述了，那也要費時間整理的。

該文斷言，Roger Penrose關於人工智能的主要觀點的依據是她對哥德爾不完備定理的誤解上的。

俺農民的意見是：Roger Penrose是否誤解了哥德爾不完備定理，俺不清楚的；該文作者是否正確理解了哥德爾不完備定理，俺也不清楚的。俺僅知道一點：Roger Penrose關於人工智能的結論，不僅僅是基於哥德爾不完備定理的推理，還包括了其它的論據。但該文作者好像認為，那是可有可無的。

這是不成立的。如果他真那樣認為，這大概說明他理解不了Roger Penrose的某些論斷：

比方說，“當人們在進行數學過程時通常竭力尋找算法，但是這種努力的過程本身並不是算法過程。”

“我們的意識思維應當有非算法的性質”。

“這個世界很可能是決定性的，但同時卻是不可計算的。”

他的這些觀點，多數都是猜測而已。

他顯然不贊同普利高津的觀點：在遠離平衡態時，世界是非決定性的；而其它過程則是決定性的。

（博士）如何看？有何高見？給我們農民撥雲見日！

下面是文章的名字和提要：

The emperor's real mind: Review of Roger Penrose's the emperor's new mind: Concerning computers, minds and the laws of physics

Abstract

The Emperor's New Mind by Roger Penrose has received a great deal of both praise and criticism. This review discusses philosophical aspects of the book that form an attack on the “strong” AI thesis. Eight different versions of this thesis are distinguished, and sources of ambiguity diagnosed, including different requirements for relationships between program and behaviour. Excessively strong versions attacked by Penrose (and Searle) are not worth defending or attacking, whereas weaker versions remain problematic. Penrose (like Searle) regards the notion of an algorithm as central to AI, whereas it is argued here that for the purpose of explaining mental capabilities the architecture of an intelligent system is more important than the concept of an algorithm, using the premise that what makes something intelligent is not what it does but how it does it. What needs to be explained is also unclear: Penrose thinks we all know what consciousness is and claims that the ability to judge Gödel's formula to be true depends on it. He also suggests that quantum phenomena underly consciousness. This is rebutted by arguing that our existing concept of “consciousness” is too vague and muddled to be of use in science. This and related concepts will gradually be replaced by a more powerful theory-based taxonomy of types of mental states and processes. The central argument offered by Penrose against the strong AI thesis depends on a tempting but unjustified interpretation of Gödel's incompleteness theorem. Some critics are shown to have missed the point of his argument. A stronger criticism is mounted, and the relevance of mathematical Platonism analysed. Architectural requirements for intelligence are discussed and differences between serial and parallel implementations analysed.