日本《外交学者》网站21日刊登美国海军战争学院副教授霍姆斯关于印度洋-太平洋地区海军实力前5名国家的排行榜，让人意外的是，该排名依次为韩国、日本、美国、印度和中国。霍姆斯解释说，该排名不是以海军舰船数量为基础，而是以真正的“实力”——海军执行国家赋予其任务的能力以及能在多大程度上完成作战和战略目标为标准。

　　该排行榜上，韩国海军名列第一。报道称，首尔正在打造最符合韩国目标的海军，例如在近海反制朝鲜、拦截平壤可能针对韩国发射的导弹。韩国海军装备有“宙斯盾”驱逐舰、准航母和其他先进战舰，使其可与美国海军一同行动。日本海上自卫队的情况同韩国海军类似，但日本国防开支占GDP比例不超过1%的障碍限制了海上自卫队的规模和雄心。

　　而尽管美国海军是世界上最强大的海上力量，但美国海军资产分散于全球各地。华盛顿是否会为配合其以亚洲为中心的政策，加快向印度洋-太平洋地区集中力量的步伐，目前仍然不得而知。印度海军则受制于新装备服役的拖沓，在装备的互用性、后勤和维护方面也面临诸多挑战。但新德里已展现出外交政策自制力，限制其海上抱负。只要印度政治领导人能限制对印度海军的财政支持，“印度就能够容忍断断续续的海军建设步伐”。

　　报道最后认为，中国海军正快速成长为一支顶级海上力量，但中国海军仍缺乏实战检验。中国海军很少在实战条件下操作装备，这让外界无法对其装备的性能做出判断。而且要维护中国在从北部的日本到南部的马六甲海峡的广大海域上的利益，中国海军还有很长的路要走。

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The Top 5 Navies of the Indo-Pacific

By James R. Holmes

Who’s No. 1?

Rather than rank Asian navies by tiresome (if essential) bean-counting measures, why not rank them by the standard that truly matters, namely their capacity to execute the missions national leaders entrust to them—and thence to fulfill operational and strategic aims? The seafaring nation that best matches purposes with power, political aspirations with strategy and forces, stands the best chance of achieving its goals. Also crucial is the threat environment, the true arbiter of how much naval power is enough. What better way to assign the title of Asia’s top navy? Herewith, my list of the Top 5 Indo-Pacific navies:

1. South Korean Navy.The American, Chinese, and Japanese fleets garner most of the attention, but Seoul has quietly assembled a navy that fits with South Korea’s modest goals, such as countering North Korean depredations in offshore waters and intercepting missiles Pyongyang may loft the South’s way. The navy boasts a contingent of Aegis destroyers, along with helicopter carriers and other state-of-the-art warships. This panoply of hardware allows the ROK Navy to take part in seaborne ventures alongside the U.S. Navy and other advanced forces. For my money the ROK Navy stands an excellent chance of executing the missions assigned to it.

2. Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). Like the ROK Navy, the JMSDF is modest in size yet well-equipped, sporting Aegis destroyers, light aircraft carriers, and an elite diesel submarine force. It also enjoys the advantage of operating as a combined force with the U.S. Navy. The security alliance not only supplements Japan’s national defense but also sharpens up seamanship and tactics within the officer and enlisted corps. In fact, I might rate the JMSDF Asia’s top sea service but for Tokyo’s informal cap on defense spending at 1 percent of GDP. This limits the navy’s size and ambitions at a time when the geopolitical situation is swiftly deteriorating. Tripling the 1 percent figure would approximate a reasonable standard for a nation at peace. Whether Japan’s newly installed LDP government can shatter that ceiling remains to be seen.

3. U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy doubtless remains the world’s foremost, ship for ship and plane for plane, but it has scattered assets around the globe despite talk of a pivot to Asia. That attenuates its standing in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than pivot to Asia, the navy plans to dribble a few more assets into the region over several years. Whether Washington will step up the pace—concentrating forces in the Indo-Pacific to match its Asia-centric strategy with steel—is one open question. How many assets will be in the inventory is another. Admiral J. C. Wylie points out that Congress makes strategic decisions through the budgetary process, whether lawmakers realize it or not. Quite so. Sea power is a political choice, not a birthright. Observers in the region understand that, whether your average congressman does or not. Tracking trends in the fleet’s size and disposition will say much about the direction of U.S. maritime strategy.

4. Indian Navy. New Delhi’s naval project continues to make fitful progress. Engineering problems with the Vikramaditya, nee Admiral Gorshkov, dominated headlines last year. Such deficiencies are correctable. More worrisome is the slow rate of “indigenization,” meaning the domestic defense industry’s capacity to design and manufacture high-tech military gear. Unable to supply its own needs, the Indian military continues to procure armaments from a variety of foreign suppliers, creating interoperability, logistical, and maintenance challenges for itself within the force. On the other hand, New Delhi has exhibited remarkable foreign-policy restraint, confining its ambitions to the realm of the achievable. So long as political leaders refrain from writing checks the Indian Navy can’t cash, the nation can tolerate quite a few fits and starts in its naval buildup.