日本《外交學者》網站21日刊登美國海軍戰爭學院副教授霍姆斯關於印度洋-太平洋地區海軍實力前5名國家的排行榜，讓人意外的是，該排名依次為韓國、日本、美國、印度和中國。霍姆斯解釋說，該排名不是以海軍艦船數量為基礎，而是以真正的“實力”——海軍執行國家賦予其任務的能力以及能在多大程度上完成作戰和戰略目標為標準。

　　該排行榜上，韓國海軍名列第一。報道稱，首爾正在打造最符合韓國目標的海軍，例如在近海反制朝鮮、攔截平壤可能針對韓國發射的導彈。韓國海軍裝備有“宙斯盾”驅逐艦、准航母和其他先進戰艦，使其可與美國海軍一同行動。日本海上自衛隊的情況同韓國海軍類似，但日本國防開支占GDP比例不超過1%的障礙限制了海上自衛隊的規模和雄心。

　　而儘管美國海軍是世界上最強大的海上力量，但美國海軍資產分散於全球各地。華盛頓是否會為配合其以亞洲為中心的政策，加快向印度洋-太平洋地區集中力量的步伐，目前仍然不得而知。印度海軍則受制於新裝備服役的拖沓，在裝備的互用性、後勤和維護方面也面臨諸多挑戰。但新德里已展現出外交政策自制力，限制其海上抱負。只要印度政治領導人能限制對印度海軍的財政支持，“印度就能夠容忍斷斷續續的海軍建設步伐”。

　　報道最後認為，中國海軍正快速成長為一支頂級海上力量，但中國海軍仍缺乏實戰檢驗。中國海軍很少在實戰條件下操作裝備，這讓外界無法對其裝備的性能做出判斷。而且要維護中國在從北部的日本到南部的馬六甲海峽的廣大海域上的利益，中國海軍還有很長的路要走。

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The Top 5 Navies of the Indo-Pacific

By James R. Holmes

Who’s No. 1?

Rather than rank Asian navies by tiresome (if essential) bean-counting measures, why not rank them by the standard that truly matters, namely their capacity to execute the missions national leaders entrust to them—and thence to fulfill operational and strategic aims? The seafaring nation that best matches purposes with power, political aspirations with strategy and forces, stands the best chance of achieving its goals. Also crucial is the threat environment, the true arbiter of how much naval power is enough. What better way to assign the title of Asia’s top navy? Herewith, my list of the Top 5 Indo-Pacific navies:

1. South Korean Navy.The American, Chinese, and Japanese fleets garner most of the attention, but Seoul has quietly assembled a navy that fits with South Korea’s modest goals, such as countering North Korean depredations in offshore waters and intercepting missiles Pyongyang may loft the South’s way. The navy boasts a contingent of Aegis destroyers, along with helicopter carriers and other state-of-the-art warships. This panoply of hardware allows the ROK Navy to take part in seaborne ventures alongside the U.S. Navy and other advanced forces. For my money the ROK Navy stands an excellent chance of executing the missions assigned to it.

2. Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF). Like the ROK Navy, the JMSDF is modest in size yet well-equipped, sporting Aegis destroyers, light aircraft carriers, and an elite diesel submarine force. It also enjoys the advantage of operating as a combined force with the U.S. Navy. The security alliance not only supplements Japan’s national defense but also sharpens up seamanship and tactics within the officer and enlisted corps. In fact, I might rate the JMSDF Asia’s top sea service but for Tokyo’s informal cap on defense spending at 1 percent of GDP. This limits the navy’s size and ambitions at a time when the geopolitical situation is swiftly deteriorating. Tripling the 1 percent figure would approximate a reasonable standard for a nation at peace. Whether Japan’s newly installed LDP government can shatter that ceiling remains to be seen.

3. U.S. Navy. The U.S. Navy doubtless remains the world’s foremost, ship for ship and plane for plane, but it has scattered assets around the globe despite talk of a pivot to Asia. That attenuates its standing in the Indo-Pacific. Rather than pivot to Asia, the navy plans to dribble a few more assets into the region over several years. Whether Washington will step up the pace—concentrating forces in the Indo-Pacific to match its Asia-centric strategy with steel—is one open question. How many assets will be in the inventory is another. Admiral J. C. Wylie points out that Congress makes strategic decisions through the budgetary process, whether lawmakers realize it or not. Quite so. Sea power is a political choice, not a birthright. Observers in the region understand that, whether your average congressman does or not. Tracking trends in the fleet’s size and disposition will say much about the direction of U.S. maritime strategy.

4. Indian Navy. New Delhi’s naval project continues to make fitful progress. Engineering problems with the Vikramaditya, nee Admiral Gorshkov, dominated headlines last year. Such deficiencies are correctable. More worrisome is the slow rate of “indigenization,” meaning the domestic defense industry’s capacity to design and manufacture high-tech military gear. Unable to supply its own needs, the Indian military continues to procure armaments from a variety of foreign suppliers, creating interoperability, logistical, and maintenance challenges for itself within the force. On the other hand, New Delhi has exhibited remarkable foreign-policy restraint, confining its ambitions to the realm of the achievable. So long as political leaders refrain from writing checks the Indian Navy can’t cash, the nation can tolerate quite a few fits and starts in its naval buildup.