2021-10-7
美軍自己事後認為，長津湖之戰，美軍贏得實屬僥倖，此話不差。
首先，在1982年出版的《朝鮮戰爭不為人知的故事》這本書中透露，美軍在戰爭開始階段，並不知道志願軍司令部和九軍團的高層領導是彭德懷和宋時輪，而以為是林彪:
During the First Phrase Chinese Offensive marine reconnaissance saw many Chinese trucks were on the northern fringes of the Chosin Reservoir. But these trucks were so precious and afforded such superb rocket targets for roaming Corsair fighter craft that the Chinese used them sparingly. Thus, in planning his tactics, the Chinese Commander General Lin Piao was bound by a rigid stricture: His line divisions could fight three to five days before exhausting their food and ammunition. They then had to be replaced with fresh divisions. Had U.S. intelligence paid more attention to the tactics of the Chinese Revolution, a more accurate explanation could have been deduced for the sudden enemy evaporation.
好在美軍五星上將麥克阿瑟的這個誤判，在長津湖作戰的時候被發現，並被取而代之的後起之秀李奇微將軍及時糾正了，才扭轉了整個朝鮮戰爭的戰局。
第二，是美軍一開始並沒有意識到，住在長津湖周圍成千上萬的北朝鮮老百姓，會扶老攜幼，拼死拼活哭天抹淚地追隨着美國大兵們一起撤離。這個亞洲國家特有的劇本，在後來美軍撤離西貢的時候，以及最近美軍撤離喀布爾的時候，一再地上演。這給美軍的成建制撤退，造成了很大的負擔。也給一貫以軍民魚水情自詡的志願軍戰士，造成了極大的困惑。
A pathetic flotsam of war trailed the marines - civilian refugees, thousands of them, women and children and old men, carrying whatever belongings they still owned. They had lived five years under Kim Il Sung. They apparently did not think the Chinese Communists would improve their lives。
事情的轉機，在於美軍陸戰一師的戰地指揮官，敢於抗命不遵，固執己見，才轉危為安。
Their survival, in the end, was due to General Oliver P. Smith's refusal to be cowed by Generals MacArthur and Almonds - a stubbornness that (also) saved the lives of 10,000 marines.
第三，也就是最為致命的，是美軍在整個朝鮮戰爭期間，竟然使用了錯誤的地圖，這在誤炸中國使館的時候，發生過一次，但那不是第一次，也肯定不會是最後一次。好在長津湖血戰的時候，美軍是在撤離，而不是在進攻，所以用錯了地圖，對戰局沒有影響。
有了以上這三個致命的弱點，美軍還能夠全身而退，不能不說是上天的眷顧。
