伊拉克战争还没有结束，但有一点已经明确：中国获胜。当美国已在全世界失去威望和影响之际，中国正获得这些。这主要是因为中国已经进入自己的第一个完全成熟的选择方案，来替代冷战结束以来华盛顿的自由市场和民主模式。在美国的模式渐失光泽时，中国已光彩熠熠。(????)

美国约翰.霍普金斯大学Paul H Nitze高级国际研究院研究员孟捷慕(James Mann)5月20日在华盛顿邮报发表文章，以《中国挑战：一个闪光的没有自由的富裕典范》(THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A Shining Model of Wealth Without Liberty)为题，介绍了国际影响力正取代美国的中国，正在给一些专制国家树立榜样。(????)

文章称，对一些正寻求维持其权力控制的专制领导人来说，中国越来越成为他们的一个蓝图。我们曾把中国看成是一个经济奇迹，但它现在也正在变成一个政治典范。北京已向那些独裁者们展示，他们不必在权力和效益之间进行选择，他们可以兼得。今天的中国所展示的是，一个政权可以镇压有组织的反对派，不需要通过选举来确立其合法性。它还展示出一个执政党可以对信息和互联网进行相当大的控制，却没有让经济增长速度放慢。它还显示出一个国家的精英们可以买下舒适的公寓，可以有机会赚钱，还有个人的物质享受，只是没有政治自由。(????)

孟捷慕认为，这一切加在一起，便达到对未来的自由民主一个惊人的新挑战。其结果对全世界的自由事业来说，却是不祥的。中国的一党统治，不仅向诸如缅甸、津巴布韦、叙利亚和朝鲜这样遭到孤立的国家，而且也向一些如埃及或巴基斯坦这样的美国关键盟友，还有美国邻居古巴和委内瑞拉等国家，提供着持续的希望。

孟捷慕在文章中称，过去十年，中国模式已经从两个独立发展的汇合中涌现出来。第一个发展就是美国对外政策的失败，第二个发展则是在共产党的领导下中国经济获得成功。中国在每个发展上都坚持自己的，不过这两个发展之间的相互作用，对民主价值观来说却是特别有害的。(????)

第一个关键发展就是美国外交政策的失败，其最主要象征就是伊拉克战争。过去十年，美国外交政策一直由强调军事实力的学院派占主导地位，他们主要理论就是诉诸武力来在全球传播民主。这个主导思想不但失败了，而且还破坏了对民主的支持。美国试图通过武力来输出自由市场和政治自由的举动，甚至都无法给伊拉克带来安全，更别说繁荣了。这些已经侵蚀了我们的诉求和在全球范围内的影响力。(????)

第二个关键发展则是共产党在经济上获得的成功，使其继续控制着政权。在1989年发生的镇压天安门广场学生民主运动的随后几年，西方博学者曾预言，中国政府的一只脚已经踩在香蕉皮上。这些博学者称，中国政府随时都会垮台，或者为了继续生存下去而被迫拥抱具有深远意义的政治改革。然而，中国的经济正以每年平均9%的速度增长着，而中国共产党仍旧牢牢地控制着政权。(????)

蓍有《中国幻想：我们的领导人如何淡化中国的镇压》(The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression)和《脸面：微妙的中美关系史，从尼克松到克林顿》(About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton)及《北京吉普》(Beijing Jeep)等畅销书的孟捷慕，在其最新文章写道，接下来就是西方人抓住了互联网，并把它当成中国人的必然解放者，称“信息将敲掉竹帘”的拼命控制。然而，取而代之的则是，由于互联网的普及，中国警方已在500多个城市设立了网警机构，监控网民的电子信件和使用政治敏感的网站，并以此来作为打击异议人士的得心应手的工具。(????)

文章指出，中国的稳定已经掩饰了西方领导人的希望和预测，他们曾认为中国的不断繁荣将在很大程度上改变这个国家的一党政体。在过去的十年，总统总理和其它领导人都一再对中国最终将如何不必避免地走向自由和民主提出一个令人宽慰的剧本。

1997年，时任美国总统克林顿曾告诉中国前国家主席江泽民，“你们站在历史的错误一边。”克林顿坚持认为，中国的经济变化将会“随着时间而增加精神自由，我只是想，这是不可避免的，就像柏林墙倒塌那样不可避免。”1999年，布什总统在参加总统竞选时也曾说过，“同中国的自由贸易，时间站在我们这一边。”2005年，英国首相布莱尔说过，他认为在中国走向民主上有“一股不可阻挡的力量”。(????)

文章指出，乐观派认为，一旦一个国家变得更加富裕了，它的新兴的中产阶级将会争取民主变革。然而在中国，本身仍是很小比例的中产阶级支持，或至少跟随现有的政治秩序，因为毕竟这样的政治秩序使他们变成了中产阶层。执政党允许城市的精英们自由穿戴，购买他们想要的一切，出国见见世面，还可以搞婚外情，去投资去获利；作为回报，中国的精英们不会挑战紧抓政权不放的共产党。此外，中国新兴的商业社会很难产生独立党派；实际上，一切都是党的，一切都通过家庭关系和财政联系与中国的权力结构息息相关。(????)

在美国战略与国际研究中心担任资深专职撰稿人，也是《新共和》、《大西洋月刊》和华盛顿邮报等刊物和媒体的撰稿人，曾当过洛杉矶时报驻北京办事处主任的孟捷慕说，从经济角度看，中国也不完全符合一个自由市场体系的标准模式。多年来，美国的杂志和电视节目一直乐此不疲地宣称，中国已经变成了“资本主义”，而这个只是一种假设的迹象，只是根据麦当劳、肯德鸡和星巴克在中国的扩张，而得出了中国人开始象我们一样的结论。(????)

但实际上，中国快速发展的经济体系，与美国的模式有着很大的不同。的确，中国拥有私有公司和股市，但被允许上市的公司却是非常小的一部分，大部分上市公司都是国有企业，而且共产党官员又占据着这些上市公司董事会的绝大多数席位，对个人决定保持着否决权。在对外商务上，中国公司在吸引外资上一直表现得如此出色，以至于德国一家杂志近日都提出，“共产主义到底起作用？”的疑问。

当然，中国的模式并不能真正起作用，比如说对象缅甸这样的国家。由于其庞大的市场规模和诱惑，中国是独一无二的，是任何其他国家都无法比拟的。不过，世界其它地方的专制政权正越来越多地转向北京。而且还经常出现双向的“同情”。近年来，中国已经帮助津巴布韦、苏丹、乌兹别克斯坦、古巴和朝鲜来巩固其政权。(????)

孟捷慕在文章中指出，那么，美国的领导人做些什么来扭转这些呢？最重要的改变就是一种概念上的变化。我们需要摆脱早前的框架，也就是我们看到的每一项有关中国政策的争议，都要在“接触”和“孤立”两者之间进行选择。这些带有负荷的单词组成了一个虚假的选择，一点意义也没有，如果他们从来没做过。拥有世界第三大经济体，中国早就溶入世界了。(????)

此外，美国还需要跳出与中国贸易、投资和相互作用将会改变这个国家政体的这个概念。任何严肃的政策必须立足于中国的现实，既不是基于我们的错误假设，和必然与繁荣齐头并进的自由。美国与中国的贸易和投资，应该以经济成本和美国的利益来进行评估，而不是出于对中国的政治冲击。(????)

孟捷慕在文章的最后点明了他写这篇文章的目的，那就是在第二轮美中战略经济对话即将在华盛顿召开时，布什政府必须保护美国的利益。文章举例称，美国财长保尔森和中国副总理吴仪即将在华盛顿举行对话，中国仍在保持人民币的贬值，使美中贸易逆差每年都超过2000多亿美元。其结果是，刺激中国的出口，降低美国的就业与生产。但有些美国官员担心，若在这个问题逼中国太紧，可能会破坏中美关系的发展。孟捷慕说，但我不这样认为。(????)

文章最后写道，首先，我们应该透过美国国家利益的镜头来接近中国。这不仅包括安全与繁荣，而且还包括我们在一个开放政治体系和自由世界中的利益。如果我们没有象世界其它国家那样认真地对待中国的新模式，那么，我们就会发现，我们自己正站在历史错误的一边。

早前曾介绍过孟捷慕在洛杉矶时报发表的一篇文章，他以三种不同的剧本，来为中国设想出三个不同的未来。其一，是令人宽慰的剧本：中国的政治体制势必开放，或者说，甚至它已经演变为政治自由化。其二，指的是中国的情况从基础上说是如此的不稳定，以至于出现某种政治灾难，或经济发展急转直下，或两者兼而有之。我们可以称之为动荡的未来。其三，就是中国的一党政治体制不会在根本上发生改变。这种看法认为，中共仍将保持一个长期的独裁政权。(????)

看看中国如何按照以上三种剧本进行“表演”，可以认真观察北京是如何主办2008年奥运会的。孟捷慕说，按照第一种令人宽慰的剧本，在奥运会举办前和奥运会举办期间，中国就会试着向全世界用电视来展示自己。这些机会包括，在体育竞赛的同时，中国领导人将采取步骤来展示这个国家如何更加开放。(????)

而第二种将会出现动乱的剧本，也是中国领导所担心的问题：可能出现的社会不安，将会影响奥运会赛事。届时，将会有很多对政府不满的团体，急于在举世瞩目的奥运会期间吸引全世界的关注，而中国当局将不会选择对他们动武。这种结果几乎可以肯定的是，中国公安部门要付出巨大的努力来平息示威，把那些抗议者拒绝在北京之外。(????)

孟捷慕在文章最后指出，那么我们是否将会在北京奥运会上看到“第三种未来”呢？估计不会很多。观察中国政治是否真正出现开放，抑或北京是否仍然保持它的专制政权，可能要等到奥运会结束一到两年后，也就是访问者都已离开中国回国后，才是观察中国政治的最佳时间。(????)

孟捷慕说，“我相信，中国目前的一党统治将会在未来持续很长一段时间。”

A Shining Model of Wealth Without Liberty

By James Mann
Sunday, May 20, 2007; B01

The Iraq war isn't over, but one thing's already clear: China won.

As the United States has been bleeding popularity and influence around the world, China has been gaining both. That's largely because it has been coming into its own as the first full-blown alternative since the end of the Cold War to Washington's model of free markets and democracy. As the U.S. model has become tarnished, China's has gained new luster.

For authoritarian leaders around the world seeking to maintain their grip on power, China increasingly serves as a blueprint. We're used to thinking of China as an economic miracle, but it's also becoming a political model. Beijing has shown dictators that they don't have to choose between power and profit; they can have both. Today's China demonstrates that a regime can suppress organized opposition and need not establish its legitimacy through elections. It shows that a ruling party can maintain considerable control over in????ation and the Internet without slowing economic growth. And it indicates that a nation's elite can be bought off with comfortable apartments, the chance to make money, and significant advances in personal, non-political freedoms (clothes, entertainment, sex, travel abroad).

This all adds up to a startling new challenge to the future of liberal democracy. And the result is ominous for the cause of freedom around the world. China's single-party state offers continuing hope not only to such largely isolated dictatorships as Burma, Zimbabwe, Syria and North Korea but also to some key U.S. friends who themselves resist calls for democracy (say, Egypt or Pakistan) and to our neighbors in Cuba and Venezuela.

The China model has emerged from the confluence of two independent developments over the past decade. Each stands on its own, yet the interaction between the two has been especially toxic for democratic values.

First has been the failure of U.S. foreign policy, symbolized above all by the war in Iraq. Over the past decade, U.S. foreign policy has been dominated by a school of thought that emphasizes military power and has tied the spread of democracy to the use of force. Not only has this failed, it has also undermined support for democracy. U.S. attempts to export free markets and political liberty by force have been unable to bring even security, much less prosperity, to Iraq. And they've eroded our appeal and clout worldwide.

The second key development has been the staying power and economic success of the Chinese Communist Party. In the years immediately after the crackdown on pro-democracy protesters around Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, Western pundits predicted that the Chinese government had one foot on a banana peel. Any day now, they said, it would fall or be forced to embrace far-reaching political re???? to survive. Instead, China's economy expanded by a factor of nine, and the Communist Party remains firmly in control.

Westerners next seized on the Internet as the inevitable liberator of the Chinese. "In????ation will knock down the bamboo curtain!" went the refrain. Instead, Chinese cops in the 500 cities that have established Internet police bureaus are using the Web -- tapping into people's e-mail accounts and monitoring individuals using politically sensitive Web sites -- as a handy tool to stamp out dissent.

China's stability has belied the hopes and forecasts of Western leaders that growing prosperity would significantly alter the country's one-party political system. Over the past decade, presidents, prime ministers and others have frequently offered a soothing scenario about how China will inexorably move toward freedom and democracy. In 1997, President Bill Clinton said China was on "the wrong side of history." Political change would come "just as, inevitably, the Berlin Wall fell," he predicted. President Bush has repeated many of these same themes: "Trade freely with China, and time is on our side," he once said. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said two years ago that he thought there was "an unstoppable momentum" toward democracy in China. Not quite.

The optimists assume that once a country becomes more affluent, its emerging middle class will press for democratic change. But in China, the middle class (itself still tiny as a proportion of the overall population) supports or at least goes along with the existing political order; after all, that order made it middle class in the first place. The ruling party allows urban elites the freedom to wear and buy what they want, to see the world, to have affairs, to invest and to profit mightily; in return, the elites don't challenge the Communist Party's hold on power. Moreover, China's new business community is hardly independent of the party; in effect, it is the party, linked to China's power structure through financial connections or family ties.

In economic terms, China doesn't fit into the standard model of a free-market system, either. American magazines and television programs have for years joyously proclaimed that China has "gone capitalist" -- a supposed sign (along with the proliferation of McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Starbucks) that the Chinese are becoming like us. In fact, the fast-growing economic system that China is developing is quite different from the American model -- a fact not lost on other countries. Yes, China has private firms and stock markets. But only a small portion of the stock of any given company is traded on the stock market; the majority is held by state-owned enterprises. Communist Party officials frequently retain a majority of the seats on boards of directors and keep veto power over personnel decisions. And when it comes to foreign businesses, the Chinese system has been so good at attracting outside investment and fueling economic growth that the German magazine Der Spiegel recently asked, "Does Communism Work After All?"

Of course, the Chinese model doesn't really work for, say, Burma; China is unique because of its sheer size and the allure of its massive markets, which no other country can match. Still, repressive regimes elsewhere are increasingly looking to Beijing. And often the sympathy flows both ways: China has, in recent years, helped to prop up Zimbabwe, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Cuba and North Korea.

So what can U.S. leaders do to turn things around? The most important change is a conceptual one. We need to get beyond the arid framework of seeing every policy dispute involving China as a choice between "engagement" and "isolation." Those loaded words set up a false selection and have little meaning anymore, if they ever did. With the third-biggest trading economy in the world, China is already engaged.

We also need to get beyond the notion that our trade, investment and interaction with China are going to trans???? its political system. Any serious policy must be based on China as it is, not on our mistaken assumption that prosperity and liberty inevitably go hand in hand. Trade and investment should be ????uated for their economic costs and benefits to the United States, not for their political impact on China.

Take, for example, the economic meetings coming up this week between Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi. China has maintained its currency, the yuan, at a value so cheap that the U.S. trade deficit with China has soared to more than $200 billion a year. The result has been to boost Chinese exports and depress U.S. employment and production. But some American officials are concerned that pressing China too much on this issue might spoil U.S.-China ties. I don't think so.

Above all, we should approach China through the lens of our national interest. That includes not just security and prosperity but our interest in a world with open political systems and the freedom to dissent. If we don't take China's new model as seriously as the rest of the world does, we could find that we're the ones on the wrong side of history.

jmresponses@comcast.net

James Mann, author in residence at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,

is author of "The China Fantasy."