伊拉克戰爭還沒有結束，但有一點已經明確：中國獲勝。當美國已在全世界失去威望和影響之際，中國正獲得這些。這主要是因為中國已經進入自己的第一個完全成熟的選擇方案，來替代冷戰結束以來華盛頓的自由市場和民主模式。在美國的模式漸失光澤時，中國已光彩熠熠。(????)

美國約翰.霍普金斯大學Paul H Nitze高級國際研究院研究員孟捷慕(James Mann)5月20日在華盛頓郵報發表文章，以《中國挑戰：一個閃光的沒有自由的富裕典範》(THE CHINA CHALLENGE: A Shining Model of Wealth Without Liberty)為題，介紹了國際影響力正取代美國的中國，正在給一些專制國家樹立榜樣。(????)

文章稱，對一些正尋求維持其權力控制的專制領導人來說，中國越來越成為他們的一個藍圖。我們曾把中國看成是一個經濟奇蹟，但它現在也正在變成一個政治典範。北京已向那些獨裁者們展示，他們不必在權力和效益之間進行選擇，他們可以兼得。今天的中國所展示的是，一個政權可以鎮壓有組織的反對派，不需要通過選舉來確立其合法性。它還展示出一個執政黨可以對信息和互聯網進行相當大的控制，卻沒有讓經濟增長速度放慢。它還顯示出一個國家的精英們可以買下舒適的公寓，可以有機會賺錢，還有個人的物質享受，只是沒有政治自由。(????)

孟捷慕認為，這一切加在一起，便達到對未來的自由民主一個驚人的新挑戰。其結果對全世界的自由事業來說，卻是不祥的。中國的一黨統治，不僅向諸如緬甸、津巴布韋、敘利亞和朝鮮這樣遭到孤立的國家，而且也向一些如埃及或巴基斯坦這樣的美國關鍵盟友，還有美國鄰居古巴和委內瑞拉等國家，提供着持續的希望。

孟捷慕在文章中稱，過去十年，中國模式已經從兩個獨立發展的匯合中湧現出來。第一個發展就是美國對外政策的失敗，第二個發展則是在共產黨的領導下中國經濟獲得成功。中國在每個發展上都堅持自己的，不過這兩個發展之間的相互作用，對民主價值觀來說卻是特別有害的。(????)

第一個關鍵發展就是美國外交政策的失敗，其最主要象徵就是伊拉克戰爭。過去十年，美國外交政策一直由強調軍事實力的學院派占主導地位，他們主要理論就是訴諸武力來在全球傳播民主。這個主導思想不但失敗了，而且還破壞了對民主的支持。美國試圖通過武力來輸出自由市場和政治自由的舉動，甚至都無法給伊拉克帶來安全，更別說繁榮了。這些已經侵蝕了我們的訴求和在全球範圍內的影響力。(????)

第二個關鍵發展則是共產黨在經濟上獲得的成功，使其繼續控制着政權。在1989年發生的鎮壓天安門廣場學生民主運動的隨後幾年，西方博學者曾預言，中國政府的一隻腳已經踩在香蕉皮上。這些博學者稱，中國政府隨時都會垮台，或者為了繼續生存下去而被迫擁抱具有深遠意義的政治改革。然而，中國的經濟正以每年平均9%的速度增長着，而中國共產黨仍舊牢牢地控制着政權。(????)

蓍有《中國幻想：我們的領導人如何淡化中國的鎮壓》(The China Fantasy: How Our Leaders Explain Away Chinese Repression)和《臉面：微妙的中美關係史，從尼克松到克林頓》(About Face: A History of America's Curious Relationship with China, from Nixon to Clinton)及《北京吉普》(Beijing Jeep)等暢銷書的孟捷慕，在其最新文章寫道，接下來就是西方人抓住了互聯網，並把它當成中國人的必然解放者，稱“信息將敲掉竹簾”的拼命控制。然而，取而代之的則是，由於互聯網的普及，中國警方已在500多個城市設立了網警機構，監控網民的電子信件和使用政治敏感的網站，並以此來作為打擊異議人士的得心應手的工具。(????)

文章指出，中國的穩定已經掩飾了西方領導人的希望和預測，他們曾認為中國的不斷繁榮將在很大程度上改變這個國家的一黨政體。在過去的十年，總統總理和其它領導人都一再對中國最終將如何不必避免地走向自由和民主提出一個令人寬慰的劇本。

1997年，時任美國總統克林頓曾告訴中國前國家主席江澤民，“你們站在歷史的錯誤一邊。”克林頓堅持認為，中國的經濟變化將會“隨着時間而增加精神自由，我只是想，這是不可避免的，就像柏林牆倒塌那樣不可避免。”1999年，布什總統在參加總統競選時也曾說過，“同中國的自由貿易，時間站在我們這一邊。”2005年，英國首相布萊爾說過，他認為在中國走向民主上有“一股不可阻擋的力量”。(????)

文章指出，樂觀派認為，一旦一個國家變得更加富裕了，它的新興的中產階級將會爭取民主變革。然而在中國，本身仍是很小比例的中產階級支持，或至少跟隨現有的政治秩序，因為畢竟這樣的政治秩序使他們變成了中產階層。執政黨允許城市的精英們自由穿戴，購買他們想要的一切，出國見見世面，還可以搞婚外情，去投資去獲利；作為回報，中國的精英們不會挑戰緊抓政權不放的共產黨。此外，中國新興的商業社會很難產生獨立黨派；實際上，一切都是黨的，一切都通過家庭關係和財政聯繫與中國的權力結構息息相關。(????)

在美國戰略與國際研究中心擔任資深專職撰稿人，也是《新共和》、《大西洋月刊》和華盛頓郵報等刊物和媒體的撰稿人，曾當過洛杉磯時報駐北京辦事處主任的孟捷慕說，從經濟角度看，中國也不完全符合一個自由市場體系的標準模式。多年來，美國的雜誌和電視節目一直樂此不疲地宣稱，中國已經變成了“資本主義”，而這個只是一種假設的跡象，只是根據麥當勞、肯德雞和星巴克在中國的擴張，而得出了中國人開始象我們一樣的結論。(????)

但實際上，中國快速發展的經濟體系，與美國的模式有着很大的不同。的確，中國擁有私有公司和股市，但被允許上市的公司卻是非常小的一部分，大部分上市公司都是國有企業，而且共產黨官員又占據着這些上市公司董事會的絕大多數席位，對個人決定保持着否決權。在對外商務上，中國公司在吸引外資上一直表現得如此出色，以至於德國一家雜誌近日都提出，“共產主義到底起作用？”的疑問。

當然，中國的模式並不能真正起作用，比如說對象緬甸這樣的國家。由於其龐大的市場規模和誘惑，中國是獨一無二的，是任何其他國家都無法比擬的。不過，世界其它地方的專制政權正越來越多地轉向北京。而且還經常出現雙向的“同情”。近年來，中國已經幫助津巴布韋、蘇丹、烏茲別克斯坦、古巴和朝鮮來鞏固其政權。(????)

孟捷慕在文章中指出，那麼，美國的領導人做些什麼來扭轉這些呢？最重要的改變就是一種概念上的變化。我們需要擺脫早前的框架，也就是我們看到的每一項有關中國政策的爭議，都要在“接觸”和“孤立”兩者之間進行選擇。這些帶有負荷的單詞組成了一個虛假的選擇，一點意義也沒有，如果他們從來沒做過。擁有世界第三大經濟體，中國早就溶入世界了。(????)

此外，美國還需要跳出與中國貿易、投資和相互作用將會改變這個國家政體的這個概念。任何嚴肅的政策必須立足於中國的現實，既不是基於我們的錯誤假設，和必然與繁榮齊頭並進的自由。美國與中國的貿易和投資，應該以經濟成本和美國的利益來進行評估，而不是出於對中國的政治衝擊。(????)

孟捷慕在文章的最後點明了他寫這篇文章的目的，那就是在第二輪美中戰略經濟對話即將在華盛頓召開時，布什政府必須保護美國的利益。文章舉例稱，美國財長保爾森和中國副總理吳儀即將在華盛頓舉行對話，中國仍在保持人民幣的貶值，使美中貿易逆差每年都超過2000多億美元。其結果是，刺激中國的出口，降低美國的就業與生產。但有些美國官員擔心，若在這個問題逼中國太緊，可能會破壞中美關係的發展。孟捷慕說，但我不這樣認為。(????)

文章最後寫道，首先，我們應該透過美國國家利益的鏡頭來接近中國。這不僅包括安全與繁榮，而且還包括我們在一個開放政治體系和自由世界中的利益。如果我們沒有象世界其它國家那樣認真地對待中國的新模式，那麼，我們就會發現，我們自己正站在歷史錯誤的一邊。

早前曾介紹過孟捷慕在洛杉磯時報發表的一篇文章，他以三種不同的劇本，來為中國設想出三個不同的未來。其一，是令人寬慰的劇本：中國的政治體制勢必開放，或者說，甚至它已經演變為政治自由化。其二，指的是中國的情況從基礎上說是如此的不穩定，以至於出現某種政治災難，或經濟發展急轉直下，或兩者兼而有之。我們可以稱之為動盪的未來。其三，就是中國的一黨政治體制不會在根本上發生改變。這種看法認為，中共仍將保持一個長期的獨裁政權。(????)

看看中國如何按照以上三種劇本進行“表演”，可以認真觀察北京是如何主辦2008年奧運會的。孟捷慕說，按照第一種令人寬慰的劇本，在奧運會舉辦前和奧運會舉辦期間，中國就會試着向全世界用電視來展示自己。這些機會包括，在體育競賽的同時，中國領導人將採取步驟來展示這個國家如何更加開放。(????)

而第二種將會出現動亂的劇本，也是中國領導所擔心的問題：可能出現的社會不安，將會影響奧運會賽事。屆時，將會有很多對政府不滿的團體，急於在舉世矚目的奧運會期間吸引全世界的關注，而中國當局將不會選擇對他們動武。這種結果幾乎可以肯定的是，中國公安部門要付出巨大的努力來平息示威，把那些抗議者拒絕在北京之外。(????)

孟捷慕在文章最後指出，那麼我們是否將會在北京奧運會上看到“第三種未來”呢？估計不會很多。觀察中國政治是否真正出現開放，抑或北京是否仍然保持它的專制政權，可能要等到奧運會結束一到兩年後，也就是訪問者都已離開中國回國後，才是觀察中國政治的最佳時間。(????)

孟捷慕說，“我相信，中國目前的一黨統治將會在未來持續很長一段時間。”

A Shining Model of Wealth Without Liberty

By James Mann
Sunday, May 20, 2007; B01

The Iraq war isn't over, but one thing's already clear: China won.

As the United States has been bleeding popularity and influence around the world, China has been gaining both. That's largely because it has been coming into its own as the first full-blown alternative since the end of the Cold War to Washington's model of free markets and democracy. As the U.S. model has become tarnished, China's has gained new luster.

For authoritarian leaders around the world seeking to maintain their grip on power, China increasingly serves as a blueprint. We're used to thinking of China as an economic miracle, but it's also becoming a political model. Beijing has shown dictators that they don't have to choose between power and profit; they can have both. Today's China demonstrates that a regime can suppress organized opposition and need not establish its legitimacy through elections. It shows that a ruling party can maintain considerable control over in????ation and the Internet without slowing economic growth. And it indicates that a nation's elite can be bought off with comfortable apartments, the chance to make money, and significant advances in personal, non-political freedoms (clothes, entertainment, sex, travel abroad).

This all adds up to a startling new challenge to the future of liberal democracy. And the result is ominous for the cause of freedom around the world. China's single-party state offers continuing hope not only to such largely isolated dictatorships as Burma, Zimbabwe, Syria and North Korea but also to some key U.S. friends who themselves resist calls for democracy (say, Egypt or Pakistan) and to our neighbors in Cuba and Venezuela.

The China model has emerged from the confluence of two independent developments over the past decade. Each stands on its own, yet the interaction between the two has been especially toxic for democratic values.

First has been the failure of U.S. foreign policy, symbolized above all by the war in Iraq. Over the past decade, U.S. foreign policy has been dominated by a school of thought that emphasizes military power and has tied the spread of democracy to the use of force. Not only has this failed, it has also undermined support for democracy. U.S. attempts to export free markets and political liberty by force have been unable to bring even security, much less prosperity, to Iraq. And they've eroded our appeal and clout worldwide.

The second key development has been the staying power and economic success of the Chinese Communist Party. In the years immediately after the crackdown on pro-democracy protesters around Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989, Western pundits predicted that the Chinese government had one foot on a banana peel. Any day now, they said, it would fall or be forced to embrace far-reaching political re???? to survive. Instead, China's economy expanded by a factor of nine, and the Communist Party remains firmly in control.

Westerners next seized on the Internet as the inevitable liberator of the Chinese. "In????ation will knock down the bamboo curtain!" went the refrain. Instead, Chinese cops in the 500 cities that have established Internet police bureaus are using the Web -- tapping into people's e-mail accounts and monitoring individuals using politically sensitive Web sites -- as a handy tool to stamp out dissent.

China's stability has belied the hopes and forecasts of Western leaders that growing prosperity would significantly alter the country's one-party political system. Over the past decade, presidents, prime ministers and others have frequently offered a soothing scenario about how China will inexorably move toward freedom and democracy. In 1997, President Bill Clinton said China was on "the wrong side of history." Political change would come "just as, inevitably, the Berlin Wall fell," he predicted. President Bush has repeated many of these same themes: "Trade freely with China, and time is on our side," he once said. British Prime Minister Tony Blair said two years ago that he thought there was "an unstoppable momentum" toward democracy in China. Not quite.

The optimists assume that once a country becomes more affluent, its emerging middle class will press for democratic change. But in China, the middle class (itself still tiny as a proportion of the overall population) supports or at least goes along with the existing political order; after all, that order made it middle class in the first place. The ruling party allows urban elites the freedom to wear and buy what they want, to see the world, to have affairs, to invest and to profit mightily; in return, the elites don't challenge the Communist Party's hold on power. Moreover, China's new business community is hardly independent of the party; in effect, it is the party, linked to China's power structure through financial connections or family ties.

In economic terms, China doesn't fit into the standard model of a free-market system, either. American magazines and television programs have for years joyously proclaimed that China has "gone capitalist" -- a supposed sign (along with the proliferation of McDonald's, Kentucky Fried Chicken and Starbucks) that the Chinese are becoming like us. In fact, the fast-growing economic system that China is developing is quite different from the American model -- a fact not lost on other countries. Yes, China has private firms and stock markets. But only a small portion of the stock of any given company is traded on the stock market; the majority is held by state-owned enterprises. Communist Party officials frequently retain a majority of the seats on boards of directors and keep veto power over personnel decisions. And when it comes to foreign businesses, the Chinese system has been so good at attracting outside investment and fueling economic growth that the German magazine Der Spiegel recently asked, "Does Communism Work After All?"

Of course, the Chinese model doesn't really work for, say, Burma; China is unique because of its sheer size and the allure of its massive markets, which no other country can match. Still, repressive regimes elsewhere are increasingly looking to Beijing. And often the sympathy flows both ways: China has, in recent years, helped to prop up Zimbabwe, Sudan, Uzbekistan, Cuba and North Korea.

So what can U.S. leaders do to turn things around? The most important change is a conceptual one. We need to get beyond the arid framework of seeing every policy dispute involving China as a choice between "engagement" and "isolation." Those loaded words set up a false selection and have little meaning anymore, if they ever did. With the third-biggest trading economy in the world, China is already engaged.

We also need to get beyond the notion that our trade, investment and interaction with China are going to trans???? its political system. Any serious policy must be based on China as it is, not on our mistaken assumption that prosperity and liberty inevitably go hand in hand. Trade and investment should be ????uated for their economic costs and benefits to the United States, not for their political impact on China.

Take, for example, the economic meetings coming up this week between Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson and Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi. China has maintained its currency, the yuan, at a value so cheap that the U.S. trade deficit with China has soared to more than $200 billion a year. The result has been to boost Chinese exports and depress U.S. employment and production. But some American officials are concerned that pressing China too much on this issue might spoil U.S.-China ties. I don't think so.

Above all, we should approach China through the lens of our national interest. That includes not just security and prosperity but our interest in a world with open political systems and the freedom to dissent. If we don't take China's new model as seriously as the rest of the world does, we could find that we're the ones on the wrong side of history.

jmresponses@comcast.net

James Mann, author in residence at Johns Hopkins University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies,

is author of "The China Fantasy."