【題記】最近關於亨利基辛格《論中國》的書評如潮。本人剛剛買得一本，還沒有來得及細讀。先找來一些書評看看。下面與你分享的是布蘭特利沃馬克（Brantly Womack）的評論。發表於6月3號的《華盛頓郵報》。作者是弗吉尼亞大學的外交事務教授，本人就是中國問題專家，最新發表有《在不平等下的中國》（“China Among Unequals”）和《從歷史觀看中國的崛起》（“China’s Rise in Historical Perspective”）。

【正文】《論中國》是前國務卿亨利基辛格試圖向美國讀者解釋中國外交，檢討美中關係進程的一個作品。 它簡要而精闢地討論了維持一個互惠互利的美中互動的挑戰。它使書架上這位著名外交官已經涉及廣泛的作品新增了兩英寸的厚度。像他其他大部分作品一樣，它詳細介紹了由基辛格本人所經歷，並使之成形的現實。而這一次專注的重點，是他的最為持久的外交成就。儘管他對自己在美中關係正常化中的開創之功深感自豪，他更加深為關切的，是這種關係可能會倒退回一場零和的遊戲 - 而且帶有更大的風險。

基辛格描繪的中國形象，遠非僅僅是驕傲的古老的文明在備受西方欺凌後又重新崛起的的老生常談。因為數千年來，作為亞洲的中心，人口最多，資源最豐的國家，中國的情況與西方那些許多大國有着根本的的不同。鄰居總是存在的，中國興建起長城，使自己成為世界上最大的門控社區（gated community）。以免於鄰居的侵略。傳統中國的最大的成就是不是它的巨大，而是它從分裂和被征服的時期不斷地重新崛起。基辛格指出，中國的外交反映了圍棋的哲理。在比賽中，對手試圖彼此包圍對方，而不是西方戰略遊戲的國際象棋中的目標是將死對方。

作為一名外交家，基辛格專注於中國的對外關係。他提供了一個關於清朝廷調整自己以適應19世紀下半葉由西方主導世界的現實的精闢分析，但是卻忽視了20世紀上半葉的中國國內的動亂。按照基辛格的說法，由於中國共產黨人的勝利，毛澤東在1949年戲劇性地登上世界的舞台，卻很少關注此前幾十年的時間裡中國農村的革命陣痛，。雖然基辛格提供了一個對毛澤東的外交的一個同情的和修正主義的解釋，他卻未能充分認識到中國國內政治持續的優先事項。

直到第213頁上，基辛格才第一次使用“我“這個字。表明了他對中國的敬意。從那裡開始，敘述轉移到了作者親身經歷的與周恩來總理和毛澤東的生動和直接的互動。他詳細回憶了在1971年那次秘密使命的所有瞬間，那次使命促成了尼克松總統的歷史性訪問。在那個歷史性轉折之後，1972年，美中關係正常化的步伐加快。從那以後，基辛格一直密切參與了美中關係的進程。自從他第一次訪問中國以來，他曾經50次訪華，所以他過去40年的觀點是基於對相關事務的深刻了解，同時也是自己的親身經驗。

當他終於轉向對目前和未來的挑戰時，基辛格都變得更加簡潔，切中要害。他指出，美國把中國既視為機遇（opportunity）又視為威脅（threat ）的雙重看法，反映了中國把美國視為榜樣（model）又視為障礙（obstacle）的觀點。雖然兩國政府在官面上都強調合作，他卻強調了（雙方）不可避免的衝突。雙方在經濟上越來越趨於等量的現實會壓倒雙方的善意嗎？從本質上講，基辛格的回答是否定的，因為等量不是平等。隨着中國經濟接近美國的規模，他們的人均收入仍然只是是一個我們的四分之一，而其勞動人口將快速下降，進入到老年期。中國的人口約束將限制其未來的增長和增加社會福利負擔。與其準備與中國攤牌，基辛格提出在大西洋共同體之外，建設太平洋共同體，推動通過相互包容和相互尊重而達成的安全。

基辛格表現出對他的研究對象的明顯的同情。他是一位學者型官員，而中國是一個學者型官員的文明。一個中國的君子，或士人，是不經選舉而進入官場的公務員。他的目標是通過其個人才幹來維持系統的運行。基辛格高度重視的周恩來，就是這樣的君子- “在約60年政治生涯中，我從未遇到過比他更引人注目的人物“- 這是一種兄弟般的欽佩之情。

就這樣一部涵蓋廣泛的著作，關於事實細節的失誤是如此之少令人印象深刻。其中最重要的也許關於1996年台灣海峽的危機。書中說當時兩個美國航母戰鬥群通過了台灣海峽。事實上，獨立號和尼米茲號航母戰鬥群在海峽的另一邊100海里以外。當時的任務部署海軍到位，以隨時準備支持任何必要的行動，但不是製造對抗。

出於一個學者型官員的責任，基辛格講述了一個有節制的故事（disciplined story），它既是個人的，又是官方的。基辛格的敘訴迴避了自己的失敗和缺點，但他同樣也迴避了繼任的幾屆政府的失敗和缺點。值得一提的是他有兩個標準：第一，它符合了積極的發展主流，第二，它不會對未來外交造成傷害。

我希望《論中國》不是基辛格書架上的最後的兩個英寸，但是很難想象一個對他個人會更有意義，更令人滿足的話題。同時又更具有當代意義，且更引人注目。《論越南》肯定不會是。或許《論美國》？然而，正如周恩來曾經對法國大革命的觀察，現在下結論還是為時尚早。

【原文】 “On China” is former secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s attempt to explain Chinese diplomacy to an American audience, to review the course of U.S.-China relations, and briefly but incisively to address the challenge of sustaining a mutually beneficial interaction. It adds an honorable two inches to the diplomat’s already broad shelf of works. Like most of the others, it articulates reality as experienced and shaped by Kissinger, this time focusing on the venue of his most enduring diplomatic accomplishment. Despite his paternal pride in the normalization of U.S.-China relations, he is deeply concerned that the relationship might drift back into a zero-sum game — only played with greater risk.

Kissinger’s portrait of China goes well beyond the stereotype of the proud, ancient civilization humiliated by the West and now rising again. Because it has been for millennia the central country of Asia and has the largest population and resource base, China’s situation is fundamentally different from that of the West’s numerous great powers. With the building of the Great Wall, China became the world’s largest gated community, protecting itself from neighbors that it could not eliminate. Traditional China’s greatest accomplishment was not its vastness but rather its constant reemergence from periods of disunity and conquest. Kissinger points out that China’s diplomacy mirrors the game of wei qi, also known as go, in which players try to encircle one another, rather than the Western strategic game of chess in which the goal is checkmate.

As a diplomat, Kissinger concentrates on China’s external relations. He provides an incisive analysis of the Qing Dynasty’s adjustment to the realities of a world dominated by the West in the second half of the 19th century but neglects China’s domestic turmoil of the first half of the 20th. In Kissinger’s account, Mao Zedong makes his dramatic entrance on the world stage in 1949 at the time of the Chinese communist victory with little attention to the preceding decades of rural revolutionary gestation. While Kissinger provides a sympathetic and revisionist interpretation of Mao’s diplomacy, he does not sufficiently appreciate the continuing priority of Chinese domestic politics.

It is a tribute to Kissinger’s respect for China that he first uses the word “I” on page 213. At that point the narrative shifts to the vivid immediacy of his personal interactions with Premier Zhou Enlai and Mao. He recounts in moment-by-moment detail the secret mission in 1971 that prepared the way for President Nixon’s historic visit. The pace quickens after the historic turn toward normalization in 1972.Kissinger has remained intimately involved with the U.S.-China relationship ever since the first of his 50 visits, so his version of the past 40 years is well-informed as well as personal.

As he finally turns toward present and future challenges, Kissinger becomes both more succinct and hard-hitting. He notes that the American dual perception of China as opportunity/threat is mirrored by China’s perception of America as model/obstacle. While both governments officially emphasize cooperation, he addresses the question of an inevitable clash. Will the approaching reality of economic parity overwhelm good intentions? Essentially, Kissinger’s answer is no, because parity is not equality. As China’s economy nears the size of America’s, its per-capita income will still be one-quarter of ours, and its work force will have entered a rapid decline to old age. China’s demographic constraints will limit its future growth and increase its welfare burden. Rather than preparing for a showdown with China, Kissinger suggests building a Pacific Community along the lines of the Atlantic Community to promote security through inclusivity and mutual respect.

Kissinger displays a palpable sympathy for his subject. He is a scholar-official, and China is a civilization of scholar-officials. A Chinese junzi, or prince, is an unelected servant to the political community. His goal is to sustain the system through his personal adroitness. Kissinger’s high regard for the junzi Zhou Enlai — “in some sixty years of public life, I have encountered no more compelling figure” — is a fraternal admiration.

For a book of such general scope there are surprisingly few errors of fact. Perhaps the most important one is the claim that during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 two U.S. carrier battlegroups sailed through the strait. In fact the Independence and Nimitz groups approached no closer than 100 nautical miles of the other side of Taiwan. The task was to position the Navy to be ready to support any necessary action but not to create a confrontation.

True to his scholar-official responsibilities, Kissinger tells a disciplined story that is personal and yet official. Kissinger’s narrative evades his own failures and shortcomings, but he does the same for succeeding administrations as well. He has two criteria for what is worthy of mention: first, that it fits the mainstream of positive developments, and second, that it does no harm to future diplomacy.

I hope that “On China” is not the final two inches on the Kissinger bookshelf, but it is hard to imagine another topic that for him would be more personally meaningful and satisfying or one more compelling in its contemporary relevance. Certainly not “On Vietnam.” But perhaps “On America”? And yet, as Zhou Enlai once observed about the French Revolution, it may be too early to draw conclusions.

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