【题记】最近关于亨利基辛格《论中国》的书评如潮。本人刚刚买得一本，还没有来得及细读。先找来一些书评看看。下面与你分享的是布兰特利沃马克（Brantly Womack）的评论。发表于6月3号的《华盛顿邮报》。作者是弗吉尼亚大学的外交事务教授，本人就是中国问题专家，最新发表有《在不平等下的中国》（“China Among Unequals”）和《从历史观看中国的崛起》（“China’s Rise in Historical Perspective”）。

【正文】《论中国》是前国务卿亨利基辛格试图向美国读者解释中国外交，检讨美中关系进程的一个作品。 它简要而精辟地讨论了维持一个互惠互利的美中互动的挑战。它使书架上这位著名外交官已经涉及广泛的作品新增了两英寸的厚度。像他其他大部分作品一样，它详细介绍了由基辛格本人所经历，并使之成形的现实。而这一次专注的重点，是他的最为持久的外交成就。尽管他对自己在美中关系正常化中的开创之功深感自豪，他更加深为关切的，是这种关系可能会倒退回一场零和的游戏 - 而且带有更大的风险。

基辛格描绘的中国形象，远非仅仅是骄傲的古老的文明在备受西方欺凌后又重新崛起的的老生常谈。因为数千年来，作为亚洲的中心，人口最多，资源最丰的国家，中国的情况与西方那些许多大国有着根本的的不同。邻居总是存在的，中国兴建起长城，使自己成为世界上最大的门控社区（gated community）。以免于邻居的侵略。传统中国的最大的成就是不是它的巨大，而是它从分裂和被征服的时期不断地重新崛起。基辛格指出，中国的外交反映了围棋的哲理。在比赛中，对手试图彼此包围对方，而不是西方战略游戏的国际象棋中的目标是将死对方。

作为一名外交家，基辛格专注于中国的对外关系。他提供了一个关于清朝廷调整自己以适应19世纪下半叶由西方主导世界的现实的精辟分析，但是却忽视了20世纪上半叶的中国国内的动乱。按照基辛格的说法，由于中国共产党人的胜利，毛泽东在1949年戏剧性地登上世界的舞台，却很少关注此前几十年的时间里中国农村的革命阵痛，。虽然基辛格提供了一个对毛泽东的外交的一个同情的和修正主义的解释，他却未能充分认识到中国国内政治持续的优先事项。

直到第213页上，基辛格才第一次使用“我“这个字。表明了他对中国的敬意。从那里开始，叙述转移到了作者亲身经历的与周恩来总理和毛泽东的生动和直接的互动。他详细回忆了在1971年那次秘密使命的所有瞬间，那次使命促成了尼克松总统的历史性访问。在那个历史性转折之后，1972年，美中关系正常化的步伐加快。从那以后，基辛格一直密切参与了美中关系的进程。自从他第一次访问中国以来，他曾经50次访华，所以他过去40年的观点是基于对相关事务的深刻了解，同时也是自己的亲身经验。

当他终于转向对目前和未来的挑战时，基辛格都变得更加简洁，切中要害。他指出，美国把中国既视为机遇（opportunity）又视为威胁（threat ）的双重看法，反映了中国把美国视为榜样（model）又视为障碍（obstacle）的观点。虽然两国政府在官面上都强调合作，他却强调了（双方）不可避免的冲突。双方在经济上越来越趋于等量的现实会压倒双方的善意吗？从本质上讲，基辛格的回答是否定的，因为等量不是平等。随着中国经济接近美国的规模，他们的人均收入仍然只是是一个我们的四分之一，而其劳动人口将快速下降，进入到老年期。中国的人口约束将限制其未来的增长和增加社会福利负担。与其准备与中国摊牌，基辛格提出在大西洋共同体之外，建设太平洋共同体，推动通过相互包容和相互尊重而达成的安全。

基辛格表现出对他的研究对象的明显的同情。他是一位学者型官员，而中国是一个学者型官员的文明。一个中国的君子，或士人，是不经选举而进入官场的公务员。他的目标是通过其个人才干来维持系统的运行。基辛格高度重视的周恩来，就是这样的君子- “在约60年政治生涯中，我从未遇到过比他更引人注目的人物“- 这是一种兄弟般的钦佩之情。

就这样一部涵盖广泛的著作，关于事实细节的失误是如此之少令人印象深刻。其中最重要的也许关于1996年台湾海峡的危机。书中说当时两个美国航母战斗群通过了台湾海峡。事实上，独立号和尼米兹号航母战斗群在海峡的另一边100海里以外。当时的任务部署海军到位，以随时准备支持任何必要的行动，但不是制造对抗。

出于一个学者型官员的责任，基辛格讲述了一个有节制的故事（disciplined story），它既是个人的，又是官方的。基辛格的叙诉回避了自己的失败和缺点，但他同样也回避了继任的几届政府的失败和缺点。值得一提的是他有两个标准：第一，它符合了积极的发展主流，第二，它不会对未来外交造成伤害。

我希望《论中国》不是基辛格书架上的最后的两个英寸，但是很难想象一个对他个人会更有意义，更令人满足的话题。同时又更具有当代意义，且更引人注目。《论越南》肯定不会是。或许《论美国》？然而，正如周恩来曾经对法国大革命的观察，现在下结论还是为时尚早。

【原文】 “On China” is former secretary of state Henry Kissinger’s attempt to explain Chinese diplomacy to an American audience, to review the course of U.S.-China relations, and briefly but incisively to address the challenge of sustaining a mutually beneficial interaction. It adds an honorable two inches to the diplomat’s already broad shelf of works. Like most of the others, it articulates reality as experienced and shaped by Kissinger, this time focusing on the venue of his most enduring diplomatic accomplishment. Despite his paternal pride in the normalization of U.S.-China relations, he is deeply concerned that the relationship might drift back into a zero-sum game — only played with greater risk.

Kissinger’s portrait of China goes well beyond the stereotype of the proud, ancient civilization humiliated by the West and now rising again. Because it has been for millennia the central country of Asia and has the largest population and resource base, China’s situation is fundamentally different from that of the West’s numerous great powers. With the building of the Great Wall, China became the world’s largest gated community, protecting itself from neighbors that it could not eliminate. Traditional China’s greatest accomplishment was not its vastness but rather its constant reemergence from periods of disunity and conquest. Kissinger points out that China’s diplomacy mirrors the game of wei qi, also known as go, in which players try to encircle one another, rather than the Western strategic game of chess in which the goal is checkmate.

As a diplomat, Kissinger concentrates on China’s external relations. He provides an incisive analysis of the Qing Dynasty’s adjustment to the realities of a world dominated by the West in the second half of the 19th century but neglects China’s domestic turmoil of the first half of the 20th. In Kissinger’s account, Mao Zedong makes his dramatic entrance on the world stage in 1949 at the time of the Chinese communist victory with little attention to the preceding decades of rural revolutionary gestation. While Kissinger provides a sympathetic and revisionist interpretation of Mao’s diplomacy, he does not sufficiently appreciate the continuing priority of Chinese domestic politics.

It is a tribute to Kissinger’s respect for China that he first uses the word “I” on page 213. At that point the narrative shifts to the vivid immediacy of his personal interactions with Premier Zhou Enlai and Mao. He recounts in moment-by-moment detail the secret mission in 1971 that prepared the way for President Nixon’s historic visit. The pace quickens after the historic turn toward normalization in 1972.Kissinger has remained intimately involved with the U.S.-China relationship ever since the first of his 50 visits, so his version of the past 40 years is well-informed as well as personal.

As he finally turns toward present and future challenges, Kissinger becomes both more succinct and hard-hitting. He notes that the American dual perception of China as opportunity/threat is mirrored by China’s perception of America as model/obstacle. While both governments officially emphasize cooperation, he addresses the question of an inevitable clash. Will the approaching reality of economic parity overwhelm good intentions? Essentially, Kissinger’s answer is no, because parity is not equality. As China’s economy nears the size of America’s, its per-capita income will still be one-quarter of ours, and its work force will have entered a rapid decline to old age. China’s demographic constraints will limit its future growth and increase its welfare burden. Rather than preparing for a showdown with China, Kissinger suggests building a Pacific Community along the lines of the Atlantic Community to promote security through inclusivity and mutual respect.

Kissinger displays a palpable sympathy for his subject. He is a scholar-official, and China is a civilization of scholar-officials. A Chinese junzi, or prince, is an unelected servant to the political community. His goal is to sustain the system through his personal adroitness. Kissinger’s high regard for the junzi Zhou Enlai — “in some sixty years of public life, I have encountered no more compelling figure” — is a fraternal admiration.

For a book of such general scope there are surprisingly few errors of fact. Perhaps the most important one is the claim that during the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996 two U.S. carrier battlegroups sailed through the strait. In fact the Independence and Nimitz groups approached no closer than 100 nautical miles of the other side of Taiwan. The task was to position the Navy to be ready to support any necessary action but not to create a confrontation.

True to his scholar-official responsibilities, Kissinger tells a disciplined story that is personal and yet official. Kissinger’s narrative evades his own failures and shortcomings, but he does the same for succeeding administrations as well. He has two criteria for what is worthy of mention: first, that it fits the mainstream of positive developments, and second, that it does no harm to future diplomacy.

I hope that “On China” is not the final two inches on the Kissinger bookshelf, but it is hard to imagine another topic that for him would be more personally meaningful and satisfying or one more compelling in its contemporary relevance. Certainly not “On Vietnam.” But perhaps “On America”? And yet, as Zhou Enlai once observed about the French Revolution, it may be too early to draw conclusions.

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