【古風按】最近一段時間以來，國內外的眾多主流財經傳媒一直在叫囂：中國的宏觀投資規模太大了，這種財經政策的失誤會導致產能過剩，直接帶來中國經濟的硬着陸。可是，中國的執政核心好像並沒有聽懂這些“善意的警告”，依然我行我素。好不怪哉！英國《經濟學人》雜誌的這篇文章就把這裡面的貓膩給揭露出來了。原來，中國根本就沒有所謂的宏觀投資規模過大的問題，所有的這些誤讀都在宏觀經濟的數據解讀當中。當然，這也說明中國的執政核心對中國經濟的理解與駕馭能力的確很高超，廣大的網友確實不需要過度操心了。

更有三個重點值得大家注意：

①中國的人均累積投資規模其實還不到美國1930年水平的四分之一，以後還有很長的發展道路要走（潛台詞：中國目前的國力才剛剛踏上快速上升期的初級階段，其後中國的國力還將得到極其巨大的壯大）；

②中國政府通報的GDP數據中，第三產業（特別是國民的消費）數額被大幅度地低估了，即使按照保守的估計，中國的實際GDP比公布的數值至少多出10%以上（潛台詞：中美間的國力差距其實比表面的幻象要小得多，所以5年內中國超越美國成為世界第一大經濟體是完全不成問題的了）；

③中國勞動生產率的提高速度是世界上最快的（潛台詞：中國根本就不會遭受西方國家將要經歷的所謂老齡化問題，因為中國目前還處在人浮於事的勞動生產率較低狀態，人口的老齡化不僅不會制約中國國力的發展，而且會大力促進中國的產業升級與勞動生產率的進一步提升，逐漸消化掉人浮於事的低效率現象，更加徹底地釋放出國民的勞動創造力。相比之下，西方列強們的勞動生產率已經接近頂峰，以後只會出現兩種惡果：其一，就業人口的勞動生產率會繼續提升，可是勞動人口的失業率會進一步大幅攀升；其二，西方國家也要開始實行通過多人干一份活的人浮於事的方式來降低勞動生產率，從而達到降低失業率與建設和諧穩定社會的目的。不論是哪一種選擇，西方列強必將踏上衰退之路，而中國卻會持續地高速發展）。

請繼續參閱下面的相關資訊：

古風評說中國GDP超美
http://blog.creaders.net/nWAY/user_blog_diary.php?did=102543

一張圖就能顯現：美元的霸主地位就快丟失啦！
http://blog.creaders.net/nWAY/user_blog_diary.php?did=105988

古風解讀美國未來的經濟與股市行情
http://blog.creaders.net/nWAY/user_blog_diary.php?did=107374

古風解讀西方主要列強未來的國運
http://blog.creaders.net/nWAY/user_blog_diary.php?did=107804

古風解讀美國奧式全民健保的末日
http://blog.creaders.net/nWAY/user_blog_diary.php?did=108418

古風解讀土耳其總理最近為何訪華
http://blog.creaders.net/nWAY/user_blog_diary.php?did=109443

http://www.economist.com/node/21552555

Capital controversy: China’s “overinvestment” problem may be greatly overstated
from The Economist, 14 April 2012

The IMF says so. Academics and Western governments agree. China invests too much. It is an article of faith that China needs to rebalance its economy by investing less and consuming more. Otherwise, it is argued, diminishing returns on capital will cramp future growth; or, worse still, massive overcapacity will cause a slump in investment, bringing the economy crashing down. So where exactly is all this excessive investment?

Most people point to the rapid growth in China’s capital spending and its unusually high share of GDP. Fixed-asset investment (the most widely cited figure, because it is reported monthly) has grown at a breathtaking annual rate of 26% over the past seven years. Yet these numbers are misleading. They are not adjusted for inflation and they include purchases of existing assets, such as land, that are inflated by the rising value of land and property. A more reliable measure, and the one used in other countries, is real fixed-capital formation, which is measured on a value-added basis like GDP. This has increased by a less alarming annual average of 12% over the past seven years, not that much faster than the 11% growth rate in GDP in that period.

The level of fixed-capital formation does look unusually high, at an estimated 48% of GDP in 2011 (see left-hand chart). By comparison, the ratio peaked at just under 40% in Japan and South Korea. In most developed countries it is now around 20% or less. But an annual investment-to-GDP ratio does not actually reveal whether there has been too much investment. To determine that you need to look at the size of the total capital stock—the value of all past investment, adjusted for depreciation. Qu Hongbin, chief China economist at HSBC, estimates that China’s capital stock per person is less than 8% of America’s and 17% of South Korea’s (see right-hand chart). Another study, by Andrew Batson and Janet Zhang at GK Dragonomics, a Beijing-based research firm, finds that China still has less than one-quarter as much capital per person as America had achieved in 1930, when it was at roughly the same level of development as China today.

Some claim that a rise in the ratio of China’s capital stock to GDP is evidence that new investment is becoming less efficient: a given increase in capital leads to a smaller increase in GDP. But a rising capital-output ratio is perfectly normal when a poor country shifts from agriculture to more capital-intensive industry. GK Dragonomics estimates that China’s ratio of 2.4 in 2010 is well within the range of 2 to 3 seen in most countries.

Another yardstick is the return on capital, which should be falling if there is huge spare capacity. Yet average industrial profit margins and the rate of return on capital of listed firms have been fairly steady over the past decade after adjusting for the cycle. Although many firms, particularly state-owned ones, benefit from cheap loans, the average real cost of borrowing across the whole economy is much higher, so this distortion is more likely to lead to a misallocation of investment than to excess overall investment. The growth rate in China’s “total factor productivity” (TFP), a measure of the efficiency with which both labour and capital are used, has also been one of the fastest in the world.

TFP growth has probably fallen in the past few years, but that largely reflects a spurt in infrastructure investments, which deliver modest immediate gains but will boost productivity over the next 20 or 30 years. Although sceptics dismiss many of these projects as white elephants, a report by BCA Research suggests that the country’s infrastructure is still lagging behind demand. The total length of railway track has increased by 50% since 1995, for example, but passenger numbers have doubled and freight traffic has increased by 150%. China has around 6% of the world’s total railway network, yet carries 24% of global freight volumes. And despite all the new property construction in recent years, there is still an overall shortage of housing in China. Roughly one-third of urban residents live in poor-quality collective housing. This means that many more houses need to be built. Again, the problem is misallocation of investment rather than oversupply. There is huge unsatisfied demand from people who cannot afford to buy at current prices, while a rising number of richer households own more than one home, often as an investment.

Flawed figures?

China’s rising investment and falling consumption as a share of GDP are commonly portrayed as an economic anomaly. Yet this pattern is normal in a rapidly industrialising country. In a traditional agricultural economy farmers consume most of their income, but once industrialisation gets under way a rising share of national income goes to owners of capital, who invest it in factories and the like. Investment rises as a share of GDP, and consumption falls. During their peak periods of industrialisation, South Korea and Japan saw an even sharper rise in investment relative to GDP than China has seen over the past 20 years.

As for that oddly high level in its investment-to-GDP ratio, one explanation is that China’s statistical system (set up when it was a command economy) is better at recording investment than consumer spending. Many think consumption (especially of services) is undermeasured as a share of GDP, and hence that investment is overstated. A report by Morgan Stanley suggests that China’s true investment-to-GDP ratio may be up to ten percentage points lower than officially reported (ie, 38% rather than 48%).

Given China’s rapid growth, cheap loans and the big role played by state-owned banks, it is inevitable that capital has been wasted in some industries. But the evidence suggests that China has not seriously overinvested. That does not mean rebalancing is unnecessary. Under China’s capital-heavy model of growth, owners of capital have been getting much richer than workers. The main reason for shifting from capital-intensive production to the more labour-intensive, consumer-friendly sort is not to sustain economic growth, but to reduce inequality. Workers could then enjoy more of the rewards of China’s past investment.