Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, May 20
May 20, 2022 - Press ISW
Immediate items to watch
Russian forces will likely complete their withdrawal from the
vicinity of Kharkiv City but attempt to hold a line west of Vovchansk to
defend their GLOCs from Belgorod to Izyum. It is unclear if they will
succeed.
The Russians will continue efforts to encircle Severodonetsk and
Lysychansk at least from the south, possibly by focusing on cutting off
the last highway connecting Severodonetsk-Lysychansk with the rest of
Ukraine.
Russian forces are likely preparing for Ukrainian counteroffensives
and settling in for protracted operations in Southern Ukraine.
Karolina Hird, Frederick W. Kagan, and George Barros
May 20, 5:30 ET
Russian forces are focusing on digging in and reinforcing
defensive positions in Kharkiv and along the Southern Axis in
preparation for Ukrainian counteroffensives, while the majority of
active offensive operations remain confined to Izyum-Donetsk City arc
and especially the Popasna-Severodonetsk area. The Ukrainian
General Staff reported that Russian forces are creating secondary
defensive lines on the Southern Axis, indicating that the Russian
grouping in this area may be preparing for a major Ukrainian
counter-offensive and a protracted conflict. Russian
forces reportedly are holding defensive positions north of Kharkiv City
following the success of the Ukrainian counteroffensive since May 5 and
have conducted limited spoiling attacks either to give Russian forces
time to complete their redeployment back to Russia in good order or to
allow reinforcements to arrive to defend territory in Kharkiv Oblast.
Significant Russian offensive operations are confined to the area of
Severodonetsk. Russian troops have made marginal gains to the north,
west, and south of the city, especially around Popasna, in order to
attempt to take control of Severodonetsk.
Key Takeaways
Russian forces may have made marginal gains to the
north, west, and south of Popasna in order to continue their offensive
on Severodonetsk from the south.
Russian sources may be overstating the number of Ukrainian
defenders who have been evacuated from Azovstal to either maximize the
number of Russian prisoners of war who may be exchanged for Ukrainian
soldiers or to avoid the embarrassment of admitting they have been
locked into a months-long siege against only “hundreds” of Ukrainian
soldiers.
Russian troops reportedly regained certain positions taken by the Ukrainian counteroffensive north of Kharkiv City.
Russian forces are likely preparing for a major Ukrainian counteroffensive and protracted conflict on the Southern Axis.
ISW has updated its assessment of the four primary efforts
Russian forces are engaged in at this time. We have stopped coverage of
supporting effort 4, ”Sumy and northeastern Ukraine,” because it is no
longer an active effort.:
Main effort—Eastern Ukraine (comprised of one subordinate and three supporting efforts);
Subordinate main effort- Encirclement of Ukrainian troops in the cauldron between Izyum and Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts
Supporting effort 1—Mariupol;
Supporting effort 2—Kharkiv City;
Supporting effort 3—Southern axis.
Main Effort—Eastern Ukraine
Subordinate Main Effort—Southern Kharkiv, Donetsk, Luhansk
Oblasts (Russian objective: Encircle Ukrainian forces in Eastern Ukraine
and capture the entirety of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, the claimed
territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces conducted unspecified offensive operations in the
direction of Slovyansk but did not make any confirmed advances on May
20.[ii] The Ukrainian
General Staff reported that Russian troops are attempting to erect a
pontoon bridge over the Severskyi Donets River in the vicinity of
Yaremivka, about 25 kilometers southeast of Izyum in the direction of
Slovyansk.[iii] Russian
forces additionally conducted artillery strikes on Dovhenke and Dolyna,
both southeast of Izyum heading towards Slovyansk.[iv]
Russian forces reportedly intensified efforts to break through
Ukrainian defenses around Popasna in order to push towards Severodonetsk
from the south on May 20. Pro-Russian news sources reported that
Russian forces made advances through Ukrainian lines of defense in three
directions. Russian Airborne (VDV) forces reportedly took control of
Volodymirivka and Lypove, and broke through Ukrainian defenses in
Komyshuvakha, all north of Popasna.[v] Troops
of the Russian ”Wagner” Private Military Company reportedly took
control of Trypillya and Vyskrivka to the west of Popasna.[vi] Ukrainian sources noted that offensive operations are on-going in Vyskrivka.[vii] Russian forces additionally reportedly took control of Troitske, south of Popasna.[viii] Such
reports are consistent with Ukrainian General Staff statements that the
Russian grouping around Popasna is trying to take new frontiers in the
area.[ix] NASA’s Fire
Information for Resource Management (FIRMS) data, however, does not show
a concentration of fires in this area, which may suggest that the
Russian sources are exaggerating the scale or significance of the
attacks, although the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence in
this case.[x] The
purported encirclement of the Popasna area may be an effort to break
through Ukrainian defenses in order to provide support for the on-going
battle for Severodonetsk, where Russian troops are making marginal gains
and reportedly took control of Shchedryshcheve and Syrotne, just north
of Severodonetsk.[xi]
Russian forces reportedly made marginal gains during ground attacks
in Donetsk Oblast on May 20. Pro-Russian Telegram channels stated that
Russian forces are trying to encircle a Ukrainian grouping around
Svyatohirsk and are storming Yarova, both west of Lyman and within 10
kilometers of the border with Kharkiv Oblast.[xii] The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces are continuing
offensive operations around Lyman and will likely continue to push west
to meet Russian forces in Southern Kharkiv Oblast.[xiii] Russian
forces are additionally conducting unsuccessful assault operations
around Donetsk City in the vicinity of Avdiivka and Novobakhmutivka.[xiv]
Supporting Effort #1—Mariupol (Russian objective: Capture Mariupol and reduce the Ukrainian defenders)
Russian sources may be overstating the number of Ukrainian defenders
who have been evacuated from the Azovstal Steel Plant as of May 20.
Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu stated that nearly 2,000
Ukrainian fighters have left Azovstal since evacuations began, whereas
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported that it has
registered only “hundreds” of Ukrainian prisoners of war.[xv] The
discrepancy could result merely from delays in ICRC registrations or
reporting. Official Russian sources may also be obfuscating the true
number of evacuees for various reasons, however. The Russians might
claim that they have captured more Ukrainian soldiers than they actually
did in order to maximize the number of Russian prisoners that can be
exchanged should they agree on a prisoner swap with Ukraine. The Russian
leadership may also seek to avoid the embarrassment of admitting that
their forces have been locked in a months-long siege by ”hundreds”
rather than ”thousands” of Ukrainian defenders. Commander of the Azov
Regiment Denis Prokopenko additionally stated that he has given the
command to stop the defense of Mariupol to save the lives of the
defenders of Azovstal, so evacuation numbers will likely rise in the
coming days.[xvi]
The Ukrainian General Staff reports that Russian forces are continuing filtration measures in Mariupol.[xvii] Advisor
to the Mayor of Mariupol Petro Andryushchenko additionally made a
number of claims that ISW cannot independently verify. He asserted that
Russian troops are planning to use filtration camps in Mariupol to
forcibly mobilize men into the militia of the Donetsk People’s Republic
(DNR).[xviii] He
claimed that the Russian occupation administration in Mariupol is
planning a census for men aged 18 to 50 to further force mobilization
into the DNR.[xix] He
also asserted that four schools in Mariupol are set to open by the end
of May under ”Russian standards and Russian programs,” with a full
implementation of Russian curricula reportedly slated for fall of 2022.[xx] Andryushchenko’s
claims are consistent with overall trends of filtration and occupation
processes in Mariupol that ISW has been able to verify through other
sources, although these particular claims are unverified at this time.
Supporting Effort #2—Kharkiv City (Russian objective:
Withdraw forces to the north and defend ground lines of communication
(GLOCs) to Izyum)
Russian forces focused on regaining positions taken by Ukrainian
forces during the counteroffensive north of Kharkiv City on May 20.[xxi] Russian
forces are reportedly fighting in Vesele, Tsyrkuny, Zolochiv, and
Ternova and may have recaptured Ternova and Rubizhne, although ISW
cannot independently confirm these claims at this time.[xxii] Such
efforts are likely spoiling attacks meant to disrupt the Ukrainian
counteroffensive in northern Kharkiv Oblast with the intention of either
buying Russian forces time to withdraw and redeploy to other axes of
advance or to reinforce defensive positions to the north of Kharkiv
City. Russian forces additionally continued to shell Kharkiv City and
its environs, likely to further distract Ukrainian forces from cohering
offensive actions towards the Russian border.[xxiii]
Supporting Effort #3—Southern Axis (Objective: Defend Kherson against Ukrainian counterattacks)
Russian forces focused on strengthening existing defensive lines and
creating secondary defensive lines on the Southern Axis but did not make
any confirmed advances on May 20.[xxiv] The
Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops are bringing
engineering equipment to frontlines on the Southern Axis to construct a
second line of defense, which likely indicates that Russian forces are
preparing to defend against possible Ukrainian counter-offensives and
settling in for protracted operations in Southern Ukraine.[xxv] Russian forces conducted rocket, missile, and artillery attacks against Kherson, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Odesa Oblasts.[xxvi]
The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian special services
are continuing to destabilize the situation in Transnistria through
disseminating disinformation about the mining of social infrastructure
and state institutions in Tiraspol, Bender, Dubossary, and Rybnytsia.[xxvii]
