1963年以後，由於中國軍隊在中印邊 境的東西兩段後撤，再度實行脫離接觸隔離政策，雙方武裝部隊直接接觸地段僅限於中國和錫金邊境（當時印軍在錫金有2～3個山地步兵旅），中錫邊界的印軍不 斷地向中國軍隊進行挑釁，在中錫邊境的乃堆拉山口，多次越過已劃定的中錫邊界，移動界碑，修築工事，架設電話。飛機也多次侵入中國領空對西藏的康巴宗、亞 東等地進行偵察。
1966年以後，中國國內掀起了“文化大革命”高潮，1967年，各地大規模武鬥興起，衝擊軍事機關搶奪武器的情況也來此起彼伏，動亂也或多或少地波及西藏。為對中國進行戰略偵察，印軍出動山地步兵第一一二旅、炮兵第十七旅於1967年9月11日至14日在中錫邊界的乃堆拉山口向中國駐軍發起了進攻。
此前的9月，印軍不斷強行越界架設鐵絲網，中國駐軍多次提出嚴重警告，印軍置之不理。9月7日，印度士兵用刺刀刺傷兩名中國士兵。9月11日清晨7時 30分，印軍山地步兵第一一二旅一個連在一名中校營長指揮下，分兩路向乃堆拉山口的中國哨所逼近。中國駐軍嚴守“不打第一槍”的紀律，保持克制態度，對入 侵印軍發出嚴重警告。印軍將中國官兵的克制態度視為軟弱可欺，8時零7分，首先開槍射擊並投擲手榴彈，正向印軍喊話的連長李彥成當場中彈犧牲，另有6名戰 士負傷。
當時中央軍委對我邊防守軍有“針鋒相對，寸土必爭，絕不示弱，絕不吃虧”的指示，我邊防團在忍無可忍的情況下，當即發起反 擊，僅7分鐘，戰鬥結束，擊斃印軍官兵67人，用四０火箭筒將印軍在中國境內設置的7處工事悉數摧毀。8時15分，印軍敗逃，我軍嚴守紀律，未出境追 擊。
印軍不甘失敗，其炮兵第十七旅隨即向中國境內發起大規模炮擊。對此，中國軍隊早有準備。本來，中國軍隊對中錫邊境的衝突的原則是“人員不能越境，子彈炮彈亦不能打到鄰國土地上”，與中印邊 境衝突“人員絕不越過境，不能主動向印境內的炮兵射擊，但遇敵方境內炮兵向我射擊，堅決反擊”有所不同，但此次印軍氣焰囂張，經中央軍委批准，我炮兵第叄 ０八團組織了30餘門八二迫擊炮和一二０迫擊炮向印軍還擊。炮擊歷時4天3夜，將印軍8個炮擊陣地打啞，兩個指揮所、兩個觀察所和23處工事及兩輛汽車被 摧毀，斃傷印軍官兵540餘人，印軍炮兵不支，逐於13日22時停止炮擊。
情況上報中央後，周恩來總理親自指示：“敵人不打炮了，我也停止射擊。”14日中午時分，我軍也停擊炮擊。
此次作戰，印軍共傷亡607人，我軍除敵挑釁時的一亡九傷外，基本無損。印軍被迫打着白旗，到中國境內接受中國移交的印軍屍體和武器彈藥。
印軍仍未死心，10月1日11時20分，印軍廓爾喀聯隊一名排長率7名士兵侵入桌拉山口中國一側，手持廓爾喀彎刀向中國士兵尋釁，中國士兵當場提出警 告，廓爾喀佬不予置理，一擁而上，想把中國士兵綁架出境。聞訊趕到的附近哨所的中國官兵義憤填膺，搶出戰友，將廓爾喀排長推出邊界。廓爾喀兵惱羞成怒，拔 出手槍向中國官兵射擊，其餘廓爾喀士兵也向中國官兵射擊，當場打死打傷中國官兵各一人。同時，卓拉山口附近的印軍炮兵也用51毫米和81毫米迫擊炮向中國 境內射擊。
目賭戰友犧牲的中國官兵立即還擊，將入侵8名廓爾喀兵全部擊斃。12時整，中國炮兵用猛烈的炮火壓制印軍炮火，將挑釁印軍兩個連的官兵斃傷大半（195名），摧毀工事29處。印軍不支，遂於當晚19時55分停止炮擊。
當時，兄弟還是個八九歲的毛孩子，有個叔叔在五十四軍一叄０師當兵，他們也隨之也取消休假，進入戰備，待命入藏參戰。但未過多久，因印方有和平解決爭端的表示，任務取消，他們也就沒有入藏。
此後，印軍總結了中印邊 境戰爭的教訓，知道中國軍隊有“不打第一槍”的原則，認定只要不開槍，就不會遭到中國軍隊打擊，所以，有恃無恐地突破“各自後撤20公里脫離接觸”的限制 （實際上只是中國單方面後撤），不斷地越過實際控制線，在中國軍隊眼皮下設點。到80年代，個別地區，甚至深入實際控制線中國一側10公里。
1986年到1987年，中國邊防守軍根據軍委指示，曾組織過多次擠占行動，87年局勢達到過一觸即發的程度，相當緊張。
這裡特別需要指出的是，毛澤東後來對於62年撤軍的決定也大為後悔，以至於到68年不得不以印度必須歸還中國不小心越境的10多隻羊為理由準備還擊印度，印度馬上歸還了羊，到69年 中蘇局勢緊張，使得印度得以倖免，中國自此錯過了收複印度的時機
| Every battle has its own share of heroism, faint heartedness, drama and humour. The Nathu La skirmish was no exception. 2 Grenadiers were initially shaken up due to the loss of Capt Dagar and injury to their CO but found their man of the moment in Lieutenant Atar Singh who went round from trench to trench to rally the troops and was later promoted as Captain on the spot. On the lighter side was one artillery observation post officer, my colleague at Sebu La whose radio set was damaged due to shelling and he was out of communication with his guns. He rightly decided to go back to the base at Sherathang in the depth to get another radio set. While he was on his way back, Commander Artillery Brigade was coming up. He stopped the young captain, accused him of running away from the battle and sent him back after reducing him to his substantive rank of a second lieutenant. Casualties could not be evacuated for three days and nights as any move to do so invited a hail of Chinese bullets. Some wounded may well have succumbed to cold and rain. There were awards for bravery as also court martial for cowardice. However, what stood out was the steadfastness of the commanders and bravery of the jawans and junior officers. Indians refused to blink and the mighty Chinese dragon was made to look ordinary. The situation again flared up twenty days later when on 1 October 1967 a face-off between India and China took place at Cho La, another pass on the Sikkim-Tibet border a few kilometers north of Nathu La. Despite initial casualties, 7/11 GR and 10 JAK RIF stood firm and forced the Chinese to withdraw nearly three kilometers away to a feature named Kam Barracks where they remain deployed till date. Cho La Pass is firmly in Indian hands. Indian Army had got better of the Chinese yet again. No wonder, Sino-Indian border has remained peaceful ever since to the extent that today Chinese soldiers come and ask their Indian counterparts at Nathu La for cigarettes, rum and tea, mail is exchanged twice in a week in a hut constructed specially for this purpose and border personnel meeting takes place there twice a year. It was my privilege to command the Nathu La Brigade many years later and conduct the first border personnel meeting at Nathu La is 1995. Maj Gen Sheru Thapliyal, SM (Retd), commanded the Nathu La Brigade and an Infantry Division in the Ladakh Sector | The Nathu La skirmish: when Chinese were given a bloody nose | | | Sheru Thapliyal | | E-Mail- thapli@sify.com | | After the debacle of 1962, nothing could have enhanced the self esteem of the Indian Army than the mauling that was given to the Chinese at Nathu La in Sikkim on 11th September 1967 and at Chola on 1st October 1967. It must have come as a rude shock to the Chinese Army and also its political leadership. And by a happy coincidence, the Indian Army leadership which got the better of this eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation was the same that went on to create Bangladesh in 1971. Maj Gen Sagat Singh was GOC Mountain Division in Sikkim, Lt Gen Jagjit Aurora was the Corps Commander and Sam Manekshaw was the Eastern Army Commander. I too served in Nathu La. After finishing my young officer’s course, it was on 21 July 1967 that I reported to my Unit, a mule pack artillery regiment in Sikkim. Those days young officers were made to have their professional mailing by sending them on long-range patrols (LRP) for area familiarisation, take part in khad race to increase their stamina and sending them to remote observations ports on Sikkim-Tibet border for a month. Having done my share of LRPs and having taken part in the khad race, I was sent to the main Sabu La observation post on the Sikkim-Tibet Border. This observation post is about a kilometre south-west of Nathu La. It dominates Nathu La by virtue of taking on higher ground and commands an excellent view of the pass as also the Chinese defense on the feature known as North shoulder. There were two observation posts at Sabu La and had a good old radio set 62 and PRC-10 and of course line communications to the guns deployed in the rear. Nathu La at 14200 feet is an important pass on the Tibet-Sikkim border through which passes the old Gangtok-Yatung-Lhasa Trade Route. Although the Sikkim-Tibet boundary is well defined by the Anglo-Chinese Convention of 17 March 1890, the Chinese were not comfortable with Sikkim being an Indian protectorate with the deployment of the Indian Army at that time. During the 1965 War between India and Pakistan, the Chinese gave an ultimatum to India to vacate both Nathu La and Jelep La passes on the Sikkim-Tibet border. For some strange reason, the Mountain Division, under whose jurisdiction Jelep La was at that time, vacated the pass. It remains under Chinese possession till date. However, Lt. Gen Sagat Singh, true to form, refused to vacate Nathu La. Incidentally it is at Nathu La where Chinese and Indian forces are deployed barely thirty yards apart, closest anywhere on the 4000 km Sino-Indian border and the border remains undemacrated. Chinese hold the northern shoulder of the pass while Indian Army holds the southern shoulder. Two dominating features south and north of Nathu La namely Sebu La and Camel’s back were held by the Indians. Artillery observation post officers deployed on these two features have an excellent observation into Chinese depth areas whereas from Northern shoulder, Chinese have very little observations into Indian depth areas. This factor proved crucial in the clash that ensued. At the time of the clash, 2 Grenadiers was holding Nathu La. This battalion was under the command of Lt Col (Later Brigadier) Rai Singh. The battalion was under the Mountain Brigade being commanded by Brig MMS Bakshi, MVC. The daily routine at Nathu La used to start with patrolling by both sides along the perceived border which almost always resulted in arguments. The only one on the Chinese side who could converse in broken English was the Political Commissar who could be recognised by a red patch on his cap. Sentries of both the forces used to stand barely one meter apart in the centre of the Pass which is marked by Nehru Stone, commemorating Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru’s trek to Bhutan through Nathu La and Chumbi Valley in 1959. Argument between the two sides soon changed to pushing and shoving and on 6 September 1967 a scuffle took place in which Political Commissar fell down and broke his spectacles. These incidents only added to the excitement. I developed excellent rapport with Capt Dagar of 2 Grenadiers and a few days before the clash we had gone to Gangtok together on “liberty” to see a movie. Little did I know that within a week, Dagar would be a martyr. In order to de-escalate the situation it was decided by the Indian military hierarchy to lay a wire in the centre of the Pass from Nathu La to Sebu La to demarcate the perceived border. This task was to be carried out by the jawans of 70 Field Company of Engineers assisted by a company of 18 Rajput deployed at Yak La pass further north of Nathu La. The wire laying was to commence at first light on the fateful morning of 11 September 1967. That morning dawned bright and sunny unlike the normal foggy days. The engineers and jawans started erecting long iron pickets from Nathu La to Sebu La along the perceived border while 2 Grenadiers and Artillery Observation Post Officers at Sebu La and Camel’s Back were on alert. Immediately the Chinese Political Commissar, with a section of Infantry came to the centre of the Pass where Lt. Col Rai Singh, CO 2 Grenadiers was standing with his commando platoon. The Commissar asked Lt Col Rai Singh to stop laying the wire. Orders to the Indian Army were clear. They were not to blink. An argument started which soon built up into a scuffle. In the ensuing melee, the commissar got roughed up. Thereafter the Chinese went up back to their bunkers and engineers resumed laying the wire. Within a few minutes of this, a whistle was heard on the Chinese side followed by murderous medium machine gun fire from north shoulder. The pass is completely devoid of cover and the jawans of 70 Field Company and 18 Rajput were caught in the open and suffered heavy casualties which included Col Rai Singh who was wounded. He was awarded MVC later. Two brave officers – Capt Dagar of 2 Grenadiers and Major Harbhajan Singh of 18 Rajput rallied a few troops and tried to assault the Chinese MMG but both died a heroic death. They were posthumously awarded Vir Chakra and MVC respectively. 2 Grenadier opened small arms fire on North shoulder but it was not very effective. Within the first ten minutes, there were nearly seventy dead and scores wounded lying in the open on the pass. Within half an hour, Chinese artillery opened up on the pass as well as in the depth areas but it was mostly prophylactic fire due to lack of observation and failed to do much damage. Meanwhile we as artillery observation post officers asked for artillery fire, permission for which came a little later. Because of excellent domination and observation from Sebu La and Camel’s back, artillery fire was most effective and most of the Chinese bunkers on North shoulder and in depth were completely destroyed and Chinese suffered very heavy casualties which by their own estimates were over 400. The artillery duel thereafter carried on day and night. For the next three days, the Chinese were taught a lesson. On 14 September, Chinese threatened use of Air Force if shelling did not stop. By then the lesson had been driven home and an uneasy ceasefire came about. The Chinese, true to form, had pulled over dead bodies to their side of the perceived border at night and accused us of violating the border. Dead bodies were exchanged on 15 September at which time: Sam Manekshaw, Aurora and Sagat were present on the Pass. | |
